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In the past ten years, widely disparate federal due process cases-ranging
from challenges by institutionalized people to involuntary administration of
psychotropic medication, to class actions on behalf of children in foster care,
to litigation by students dismissed from graduate school-have been resolved
by application of the same rule, the professional judgment standard. Use of the
professional judgment standard entitles people in certain situations to minimally
adequate services. However, the use of the standard also allows state
professionals to violate an individual's rights in the name of treatment, because
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it equates the vindication of constitutional liberties with the fulfillment of
professional standards.
The United States Supreme Court adopted the professional judgment standard
in 1982 in Youngberg v. Romeo,' a damages action on behalf of a severely
mentally retarded man institutionalized at the Pennhurst State School and
Hospital in Pennsylvania. During two years at Pennhurst, Nicholas Romeo had
suffered over seventy injuries, including broken bones, damaged sexual organs
and lacerations.2 Some injuries "became infected, either from inadequate medical
attention or from contact with human excrement that the Pennhurst staff failed
to clean up."'3 After Romeo's mother filed suit, Romeo was transferred to the
institution's hospital for treatment of a broken arm, where he was restrained
daily for long periods of time. Romeo's mother's complaints ultimately charged
that her son's rights to safety and personal security were violated and asked
both for relief from excessive restraint and for treatment and programs for his
mental retardation.4
As the Court recognized, Romeo's constitutional claims fell into two
categories: traditional due process claims alleging state infringement of individual
liberty (the claims involving restraint and personal security), and a claim
affirmatively seeking state-provided services (the claim for treatment).
"Respondent's first two claims," the Court said, "involve liberty interests
recognized by prior decisions of this Court, interests that involuntary commitment
proceedings do not extinguish.... Respondent's remaining claim [for habilita-
tion] is more troubling."5 The Court thus distinguished between Romeo's right
to freedom from state interference, which all citizens enjoy and which survives
institutionalization, and the right to treatment, an affirmative right to adequate
services from the state that arises out of institutionalization.
The case presented the Supreme Court with the opportunity to decide for
the first time whether institutionalized individuals had a right to treatment and
to clarify the standard by which it should be applied. The Court held that
individuals confined in state institutions have a right to treatment "which is
reasonable in light of [each individual's] identifiable liberty interest" in freedom
1. 457 U.S. 307 (1982). The Court adopted the standard suggested by Chief Judge Seitz in his
concurrence in the Third Circuit opinion below, Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 178 (3d Cir. 1980),
vacated, 457 U.S. 325 (1982).
2. Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d at 155. Some of these injuries were self-inflicted during times when
Romeo was unsupervised, others were the results of attacks by fellow residents, and some may have been
inflicted by staff. Id. at 162.
3. Id. at 155.
4. Because mental retardation is not a treatable disability, Romeo claimed a right to "training" or
"habilitation" rather than treatment. The term "habilitation" refers to "that education, training and care required
by retarded individuals to reach their maximum development." Halderman v. Permhurst State Sch. & Hosp.,
446 F. Supp. 1295, 1298 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (citation omitted), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 612 F.2d 84
(3d Cir. 1979) (en banc). Since Romeo, courts have not distinguished between a right to treatment and a
right to habilitation, although there is a conceptual difference between treatment, which can cure a patient,
and habilitation, which serves to improve the ability of the individual to function independently.
5. 457 U.S. at 315-16.
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from unnecessary governmental restraint.6 In Romeo's case, because the parties
had stipulated that Romeo would never be able to leave the confines of the
institution and the record showed that his "primary needs" were "bodily safety
and a minimum of restraint,"7 he was entitled to "training to ensure safety and
freedom from undue restraint."8 Individuals in other situations, the Court noted,
might have different liberty interests and thus require different levels of
treatment. 9 As noted above, the Court held that all individuals retain their right
to personal security and freedom from unreasonable bodily restraint.
Having made the crucial distinction between negative rights against state
intrusion and affirmative rights to government services, however, the Supreme
Court proceeded to adopt the same standard, the professional judgment standard,
to determine whether there had been a violation of both types of rights. The
Court held that a professional's decision is presumptively valid, whether it is
challenged as providing inadequate services or as state intrusion on the
individual. Professional decisions in the institutional setting are only
unconstitutional if "the decision by the professional is such a substantial
departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to
demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on
such a judgment."10
Although the professional judgment standard may be appropriate to measure
the level of services that a state is constitutionally bound to provide to
individuals in its custody, the standard is inappropriate to justify the imposition
of unwanted government "services" that restrict constitutional liberty, such as
forcible medication, prolonged restraint, and prohibitions on patients' family
visitation. The crucial distinction between an individual's affirmative right to
a certain quality of care from the government, and an individual's negative right
against invasive state action, is lost under the professional judgment standard,
as is the court's crucial role in our constitutional system. By applying the
professional judgment standard to negative rights cases, courts cease to protect
the "realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter,"" and
6. Id. at 319 n.25. The scope of the treatment required is directly related to the particular liberty interests
being vindicated. Because Romeo "seem[ed]" to seek only "training related to safety and freedom from
restraints," the Court declared that the case did "not present the difficult question of whether a mentally
retarded person, involuntarily comrmited to a state institution, has some general constitutional right to training
per se, even when no type or amount of training would lead to freedom." Id. at 318. In fact, Romeo left
Pennhurst a few years later and was living in the community within two years after Youngberg was decided.
Former Pennhurst Patient to Get Settlement, UPI, July 25, 1984, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI
File. The Court also noted that the training and treatment must be reasonable in light of "the circumstances
of the case." 457 U.S. at 319 n.25. The emphasis on the particular facts and circumstances of the case before
the Court was intended to contrast with the Third Circuit majority's "abandonment of incremental
decisionmaking in favor of promulgation of broad standards." Id. The Court thus gave broad latitude to lower
courts to determine the scope of treatment or training required by the Constitution in individual cases.
7. 457 U.S. at 317.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 319 n. 25.
10. Id. at 323.
11. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2805 (1992).
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instead simply ensure that a professional behaves within the bounds of his' 2
profession, regardless of the impact his actions might have on the constitutional
rights of the plaintiff. The Court has ignored the reality that the exercise of
professional judgment by a state actor can itself invade constitutional rights.
The Court has thus abdicated its responsibility to provide a barrier between the
individual and unwanted professional intrusion by the state.
Since 1982, application of the professional judgment standard has expanded
far beyond the gates of the mental institution. Courts have applied the standard
to cases involving foster care systems, 3 prisons and jails,14 academia,15 state
departments of education, 6 police practices, 7 and zoning challenges.' The
language of professional judgment has been applied in cases involving
constitutional claims to effective assistance of counsel, 9 First Amendment
claims to freedom of speech and religion,20 and Equal Protection claims.2'
It is even being introduced into cases presenting claims under statutes long
12. 1 use the male pronoun throughout this article to refer to professionals, since the majority of
professionals whose decisions are granted presumptive validity by this standard are male. For example, most
psychiatrists are male. 10 NEWS FOR WOMEN IN PSYCHIATRY 6 (October 1992) (76.2% of all psychiatrists
are male: 41% of psychiatric residents are women, but representation at administrative levels is extremely
low).
13. Yvonne L. v. New Mexico Dep't of Human Servs., 959 F.2d 883,893-94 (10th Cir. 1992); Winston
v. Children and Youth Servs., 948 F.2d 1380, 1390 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2303 (1992);
K.H. ex rel. Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 852-53 (7th Cir. 1990); Del A. v. Roemer, 777 F. Supp.
1297, 1318-19 (E.D. La. 1991); LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959, 996 (D.D.C. 1991); Rubacha v.
Coler, 607 F. Supp. 477, 479 (N.D. 111. 1985).
14. White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 113 (3d Cir. 1990); United States v. Watson, 893 F.2d 970, 979
(8th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, appeal dismissed sub nom. United States v. Holmes, 900 F.2d 1322
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 3243 (1990); Danese v. Asman, 875 F.2d 1239, 1243 (6th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 494 U.S. 1027 (1990); Wells v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1258, 1261 (7th Cir. 1985); Zwalesky v. Manistee
County, 749 F. Supp. 815, 819 (W.D. Mich. 1990); Preston v. Ruggieri, Civ. A. No. 86-4779, 1988 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 12258, at **8-9 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 1988); Newby v. Serviss, 590 F. Supp. 591, 598-99 (W.D.
Mich. 1984); Capps v. Atiyeh, 559 F. Supp. 894, 917 (D. Or. 1982).
15. Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214,225 (1985) ("When judges are asked to review
the substance of a genuinely academic decision . ., they should show great respect for the Faculty's
professional judgment."); Levi v. University of Texas, 840 F.2d 277,280 (5th Cir. 1988); Gutzwiller v. Fenik,
860 F.2d 1317, 1328 (6th Cir. 1988); Clements v. County of Nassau, 835 F.2d 1000, 1004-05 (2d Cir. 1987);
Mauriello v. University of Medicine and Dentistry, 781 F.2d 46, 52 (3d Cir. 1986); Siu v. Johnson, 748
F.2d 238, 245 (4th Cir. 1984); Anderson v. University of Wis., 665 F. Supp. 1372, 1396-98 (W.D. Wis.
1987), aff'd, 841 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1988).
16. Saint Louis Developmental Disabilities Treatment Ctr. Parents Ass'n v. Mallory, 591 F. Supp. 1416,
1476 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (due process challenge to segregation of handicapped children), aft'd, 767 F.2d 518
(8th Cir. 1985).
17. Lavoie v. City of Hudson, 740 F. Supp. 88, 95 (D.N.H. 1990).
18. Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc, 961 F.2d 1211, 1222 (6th Cir. 1992).
19. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) ("A convicted defendant making a claim of
ineffective assistance must identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the
result of reasonable professional judgment... [C]ounsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate
assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment."), reh'g
denied, 467 U.S. 1267 (1984).
20. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986) ("[W]hen evaluating whether military needs
justify a particular restriction on religiously motivated conduct, courts must give great deference to the
professional judgment of military authorities .... ").
21. Levi v. University of Tex., 840 F.2d 277,280-82 (5th Cir. 1988). But see Wilder v. Bernstein, 645
F. Supp. 1292, 1316 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, 848 F.2d 1338 (2d Cir. 1988).
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predating the Youngberg decision, such as Title VII22 and Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act.23 Finally, it has been used as a standard for the interpretation
and modification of consent decrees. 4
Unfortunately, courts have broadened the applicability of the Youngberg
doctrine with little regard for what "professional judgment" and the professional
judgment standard might actually mean. Instead, courts use the professional
judgment standard as a talismanic invocation, rarely examining the predicate
assumptions about professionals upon which the standard relies. Courts,
particularly the Supreme Court, regard the professional-client relationship as
befitting protection from state interference because they envision it as an intimate
partnership dedicated to the client's benefit and furtherance of the client's goals.
In this popular construction, the archetype of the "professional" is a neutral
individual cloaked in expertise, dedicated to a set of objective values, and
governed by a higher code of responsibility in his relationship with his clients.
This concept of the professional is a myth, yet the courts appear oblivious to
the values deeply embedded in professionalism in general and in the medical
and mental health professions in particular. Furthermore, neither the idealized
values attributed to medical professionals nor their actual perspectives and
priorities have much in common with the ideals of autonomy, self-determination,
and individualism embodied in the Constitution.
To make matters worse, the courts idealize the wrong group of professionals,
basing the professional judgment standard on a powerful mythology about
professionals in the private sphere, but almost always applying it in a public
sector context. The Court's image of freely chosen professional-client interaction
is thus transplanted to institutional settings where the professionals are state
actors, the professional-client relationship is permeated with state concerns and
conflicts of interest, and the clients are an indigent and captive population. The
professional's power in these situations lies not solely or even primarily in his
expertise, but in his ability to control every aspect of his clients' lives, including,
ultimately, the decision of whether they will be returned to freedom.
Even if the professional judgment standard were not rooted in false
conceptions of the state professional, it also would fail fundamental tests of
coherence and clarity as a legal standard. First, the Youngberg approach does
not clearly delineate the scope of a professional's responsibilities, nor does it
clearly indicate who is a professional. Second, it does not distinguish professional
decisions that are subject to the professional judgment standard from those that
are not. This overbreadth has permitted an expansion of the standard into areas
where there is clearly no professional-client relationship, such as the practices
22. Torres v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health and Social Servs., 859 F.2d 1523 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
489 U.S. 1017 (1989), and 489 U.S. 1082 (1989).
23. Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Medicine, 932 E2d 19, 26 (1st Cir. 1991) (en banc).
24. United States v. Massachusetts, 890 F2d 507, 510 (1st Cir. 1989), New York Ass'n for Retarded
Children v. Carey, 706 F2d 956, 971 (2d Cir. 1983).
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of universities in denying tenure to professors or dismissing students. The
standard has also expanded from cases involving at least a purportedly
individualized relationship between a professional and a client to cases involving
policy decisions where the concerns of an individual client are no longer relevant,
such as budget cutting and government agency program choices.
When a court classifies a state action as a "professional judgment," the
standard prevents the courts from considering the rights at stake in many
professional decisions. When it collapses an individual rights claim into an issue
of professional judgment, a court abandons the task of weighing the constitutional
values that may forbid effectuating the professional's decision. Professionals
are neither obligated nor competent to consider these values; this must be the
court's role. For example, a Jehovah's Witness's refusal of a blood transfusion
may squarely conflict with medical judgment, threatening the patient with
death.2z But such a decision is legally protected for reasons independent of
professional medical judgment.' Rights do not arise because professionals
recommend them, nor are they protected by professional judgment. Constitutional
rights transcend professional judgment, and in many respects professional
judgment is irrelevant or antithetical to the exercise of these rights. Professional
judgment is not concerned with idiosyncratic individual choices about speech,
association, religious beliefs, marriage, childbearing, life, and death. Yet the
professional judgment standard has transferred the focus of decisionmaking about
civil rights to professionals whose expertise, values, and orientation make them
unsuitable guardians of those rights. The result is that courts abdicate their fact-
finding and decisionmaking responsibilities, creating a significant threat to the
preservation of civil rights. And because so many constitutional rights cases
can be characterized as confrontations between individuals and government
"experts" or "professionals," the professional judgment standard threatens
constitutional liberties on many fronts.
This Article examines the origins, impact, and implications of the
professional judgment standard in a growing variety of civil rights cases. Part
I discusses the assumptions and values underlying the concept of professional
judgment and examines the reality of professional treatment. The discussion
juxtaposes two models. One is the idealized paradigm, assumed in much social
and legal discourse (including that of the Supreme Court), of private,
individualized interaction with a professional from which the state is excluded.
The second, more realistic model of decisionmaking recognizes that
25. Public Health Trust v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96,97 (Fla. 1989); Norwood Hosp. v. Munoz, 564 N.E.2d
1017, 1019 (Mass. 1991). In one case, a doctor refused to conduct an operation without prior consent to
a blood transfusion. rmthrop Univ. Hosp. v. Hess, 490 N.Y.S.2d 996, 996-97 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (granting
order requiring patient to consent to blood transfusion if she has surgery).
26. See, e.g., Public Health Trust, 541 So. 2d at 96 (state's interest in having children raised by two
parents was insufficient to overcome patient's right to religious beliefs compelling refusal of life-saving
transfusion).
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professionals' values are often at odds with those of their patients or clients.
This conflict is intensified for individuals who, like Nicholas Romeo, reside
in understaffed state institutions where the professionals rendering judgments
are subject to attendant budgetary and political pressures.
Part II analyzes the professional judgment standard, arguing that it has been
applied too broadly. The professional judgment standard should be limited to
cases in which the plaintiff claims an affirmative entitlement to professional
services, and has received inadequate services or none at all. The professional
judgment standard is appropriate to guide courts or juries in determining the
level of professional services that the state must provide to individuals in its
custody; the standard is inappropriate and harmful in cases where the individual
seeks to resist state restrictions on his or her privacy or liberty imposed in the
name of professional judgment. Part II also examines the impact of budgetary
constraints and the unavailability of services on the professional judgment
standard and suggests that the standard can be meaningfully applied only to
decisions and recommendations that are insulated from these powerful influences.
Part III considers the expansion of the professional judgment standard to
other settings, including higher education, juvenile justice systems, prisons and
jails, and foster care programs. It also appraises the expansion to other kinds
of claims, including those arising from statutes. Part III discusses the
consequences of applying the standard in these settings and examines why it
has assumed its present contours in each.
Throughout, I will argue that the professional judgment standard represents
a substantial departure from traditional norms of constitutional adjudication.
Rather than being simply another deferential standard adopted by an increasingly
conservative court, the professional judgment standard is a profound abdication
of the judiciary's function in constitutional rights cases, and its proliferation
represents a significant danger to the protection of those rights.
I. THE MEANING OF "PROFESSIONAL" AND "PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT"
A. The Supreme Court's Model of Professional-Patient Interaction
The Supreme Court emphasized in Youngberg v. Romeo that treatment
decisions made in institutional settings by qualified professionals are entitled
to great deference by the courts.27 Departing from prevailing constitutional
adjudication, the Court held that the defendant professionals' decisions should
be regarded as "presumptively valid. ' 2s To understand why this extreme
27. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322-23 (1982).
28. Id. at 323. A LEXIS search of all Supreme Court cases containing the phrase "presumptively valid"
revealed that, until 1982, only statutes, ordinances, regulations, and administrative agency or court proceedings
were considered presumptively valid in the face of constitutional challenge. Since Youngberg, the kinds of
individual decisions considered presumptively valid have proliferated, and include decisions by defense
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deference appears so self-evidently logical to the Court that the opinion hardly
discusses it,29 it is necessary to understand the Court's view of professionals
and professional decisionmaking. This Section argues that in the last twenty
years the Supreme Court has developed and articulated a distinct image of
professionals, particularly medical and health care professionals, that has
dominated its decisions in a variety of areas.30 This model, and the assumptions
implicit in it, will be illustrated primarily through the Court's decisions involving
rights in the area of abortion and mental disability law.
In Youngberg, Justice Powell defined a "professional" as "a person
competent, whether by education, training or experience, to make the particular
decision at issue."' But the word "professional" carries far broader connotations
than simply competence "to make the particular decision at issue." Justice
Powell's definition encompasses plumbers, beauticians, and cat burglars, yet
these occupations are not commonly associated with the term "professional."
The concept is clearly more complex:
[A] profession, sociologists have suggested, is an occupation that
regulates itself through systematic, required training and collegial
discipline; that has a base in technical, specialized knowledge; and that
has a service rather than a profit orientation, enshrined in its code of
ethics.32
This service orientation is part of an underlying moral component of the term
"professional." It implies a self-regulated responsibility to conform to a set of
standards in the use of expertise, competence or knowledge.33
attorneys and officials in institutions of higher education. See infra Part Me(A).
29. Youzgberg, 457 U.S. at 322-23. On the most immediate level, of course, deference to state
professionals serves the overriding purpose of restricting judicial intervention in state-operated programs
and institutions. But, as will be discussed below, the perceived need to restrict judicial intervention arises
as much from the Court's vision of the professionals who administer and work in these programs and
institutions as from its judicial philosophy about the role of courts.
30. The fact that this image is a value-laden construct, rather than an empirical description, is underscored
by an examination of the Court's attitude toward professionals, which used to be considerably more skeptical
and less deferential. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27 (1967).
31. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 323 n.30. The Court differentiated between "persons with degrees in medicine
or nursing, or with appropriate training in areas such as psychology, physical therapy, or the care and training
of the retarded," on the one hand, who would be responsible for "[l]ong-term treatment decisions," and
"employees without formal training but who are subject to the supervision of qualified persons," on the other
hand, who would make "day-to-day decisions regarding care." Id.
32. PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 15 (1982).
33. See, e.g., Raymond v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 443 N.E.2d 391, 394 (Mass. 1982) ("The
ability to practice medicine requires not only technical competence, but also the unswerving dedication to
employ it to preserve life, restore health, and alleviate suffering."); GEORGE J. ANNAs ET AL., AMERICAN
HEALTH LAW 674 (1990) ("A core mission of professional education is to inculcate values to encourage
self-criticism, single-minded devotion to an individual client, and an ethic of public service."); LUCY YOUNG
KELLY, DIMENSIONS OF PROFESSIONAL NURSING 187 (1985) ("A profession is seen as a body of individuals
voluntarily subordinating themselves to a standard of social morality more exacting than that of the community
in general.").
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We also traditionally equate professionalism with neutrality and objectivity.
Specifically, a profession is understood to be based on a body of determinate,
value-free knowledge.34 This knowledge, itself objective, is imparted to clients
in an objective way, regardless of their race, gender, class, or station in life.
To be "professional" is, supposedly, to be nonideological, both as an individual
and as a purveyor of an objective body of knowledge.35 The objectivity and
neutrality of a professional is an essential component of our understanding of
professional judgment, which is seen as neither idiosyncratic nor ideological,
but grounded in "consensually validated knowledge and competence rest[ing]
on rational, scientific grounds."3' 6
Of all professions, perhaps the medical profession evokes this image most
powerfully.37 Despite a number of recent developments that reflect increased
government and third party involvement in health care38 as well as the
deterioration of relations between doctor and patient---epitomized by the patient's
rights movement and spiraling litigation39 -there remains a powerful and, in
34. "The professional offers judgments and advice, not as a personal act based on privately revealed
or idiosyncratic criteria, but as a representative of a community of sh.red standards. The basis of those
standards in the modern professions is presumed to be rational inquiry and empirical evidence." STARR,
supra note 32 at 12.
35. This is hardly an unchallenged assumption. In the legal profession, legal realists and, more recently,
critical legal theorists have attacked it full-scale. Nevertheless, it remains the assumption that must be
criticized. For a cogent description of this assumption and critiques of it, see Martha Minow, PartialJustice:
Law and Minorities, in THE FATE OF LAW 27-29 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Keams eds., 1991). In the
medical profession, such challenges are far less vocal, although not unknown. See, e.g., HAROLD B uRSZTA]N
Er AL., MEDICAL CHOICES, MEDICAL CHANCES: HOW PATIENTS, FAMILIES, AND PHYSICIANS CAN COPE
WITH UNCERTAINTY (1981); WILLIAM F. MAY, THE PATIENT'S ORDEAL (1991). Many of these challenges
have originated outside the medical profession. See, e.g., GEORGE J. ANNAS, JUDGING MEDICINE (1988);
PAUL RAMSEY, THE PATIENT AS PERSON: EXPLORATIONS IN MEDICAL ETHICS (1970).
36. STARR, supra note 32, at 15. See, e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 417 (1986) (plurality
opinion) (stating that the manner of selecting and using expert examiners must "be conducive to the formation
of neutral, sound, and professional judgments. .. "). See also David A. Gerber, Listening to Disabled People:
The Problem of Voice and Authority in Robert B. Edgerton's The Cloak of Competence, 5 DISABILITY,
HANDICAP AND SoC'Y 3, 10 (1990) ("[Plsychologists ... mask their normative assumption with the language
and methods of science.").
37. See STARR, supra note 32, at 4; Jay Alexander Gold, Wiser than the Laws?: The Legal Accountability
of the Medical Profession, 7 AM. J.L. & MED. 145, 151 n.16 (1981). Entire books are written about the
image of the doctor. See, e.g., WILLIAM F. MAY, THE PHYSICIAN'S COVENANT: IMAGES OF THE HEALER
IN MEDICAL ETHICS (1983).
38. Government involvement in health care is primarily through Medicaid, Title XIX of the Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396, 1396a (1988), and Medicare programs, 42 U.S.C. §§ 426, 1395c (1988),
as well as through a host of more specialized programs and requirements, such as the Hill-Burton Act, 42
U.S.C. § 291 (1988). Private third party involvement takes the form of insurance companies, which more
and more are becoming directly involved with the provision of health care. See Gerald L. Glandon & Michael
A. Morrisey, Redefining the Hospital-Physician Relationship Under Prospective Payment, 23 INQUIRY 166
(1986); David D. Griner, Paying the Piper: Third-Party Payor Liability for Medical Treatment Decisions,
25 GA. L. REV. 861 (1991); Paul E. Kalb, Controlling Health Care Costs by Controlling Technology: A
Private Contractual Approach, 99 YALE L.J. 1109 (1990); Gilbert S. Omenn & Douglas A. Conrad,
Implications of DRGs for Clinicians, 311 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1314 (1984).
39. See Judith C. Areen, Bioethics and Law: The Second Stage: Balancing Intelligent Consent and
Individual Autonomy, 31 ARIz. L. REV. 447, 449 (1989); Paul A. Sommers, Malpractice Risk and Patient
Relations, LEGAL ASPECTS OF MED. PRAC., Oct 1985, at 1; Antoinette D. Paglia, Note, Taking the Tort
Out of Court-Administrative Adjudication of Medical Liability Claims: Is It the Next Step?, 20 Sw. U. L.
REV. 41 (1991); Note, Developments in the Law-Medical Technology and the Law, 103 HARV. L. REV.
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many respects, still dominant set of positive assumptions about doctors and the
doctor-patient relationship.4
This set of assumptions, which governs many media portrayals of the
medical profession and much of our everyday discourse, assumes voluntary,
private, individualized interaction between doctor and patient, involving the
highest level of intimacy and trust, from which the state is appropriately
excluded.' Also essential to this image is the assumption that "the physician
can be trusted to treat the patient's health needs and interests as central. ' 2
This is the cornerstone of the medical professional's image and his authority 3
These assumptions are mirrored in television shows from "Ben Casey," "Dr.
Kildare," "The Young Doctors," and "Marcus Welby M.D." to "M*A*S*H*,"
1519, 1523 (1990); Don G. Campbell, When the Question of Insurance Arises, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1990,
at E16; Suzanne Dolezal, People Sick of Uncaring Doctors, DET. FREE PRESS, Apr. 23, 1987, at IB; Nan
Silver, Off the Pedestal: Finding a Good Doctor in the Post-Welby Age, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 27, 1990, at
B3; Bill Stokes, An Uneasy Alliance: Suspicion, Skepticism and an Army of Outsiders Threaten the Doctor-
PatientRelationship-But he Condition is Being Monitored, CHL. TRIB., Apr. 29, 1990, Good Health Magazine
at 14.
40. Images that are empirically disprovable can dominate and shape policy decisions and legal doctrines
even when there is a widespread recognition on the part of experts and many policymakers that the images
do not reflect reality. See, e.g., Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together?: Story-Telling,
Gender-Role Stereotypes and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511 (1992);
Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 187, 192-93. This
is particularly true when these images are strongly tied to a larger, nostalgic vision of a simpler and better
past. Thus, for example, many social practices are still followed as though the traditional nuclear family,
with a mother as homemaker, were the norm in this country. In the same manner, the vision of a benevolent,
paternalistic doctor having an individualized, trusting relationship with patients of the same race and similar
class also continues to dominate even though there is widespread dissatisfaction with the delivery of health
care in this country.
41. This vision is key to many of the arguments against national health insurance or so-called "socialized
medicine." It is also supported by many books written by physicians portraying the doctor-author as involved
in a private, intimate relationship with his patient in which both collaborate for the benefit of the patient.
Many of these books have reached the best seller list in recent years, such as OLIVER SACKS, AWAKENINGS
(1973), on which a popular movie of the same name was based (Columbia Pictures, 1990); OLIVER SACKS,
THE MAN WHO MISTOOK HIS WIFE FOR A HAT (1985); and IRVING YALOM, LOVE'S EXECUTrIONER (1989).
However, Dr. Sacks also wrote a fascinating book which did not make the best seller list, A LEG TO STAND
ON (1984) [hereinafter SACKS, A LEG TO STAND ON], in which he writes from a completely different
perspective-that of the patient. See infra note 86. A recent film about a similar experience, THE DOCTOR
(Touchstone Pictures, 1991), ends triumphantly with the doctor reclaiming the patient-centered model of
care. Films portraying state-run or government hospitals have been far more ambivalent about the doctor-
patient relationship, such as BORN ON THE FOURTH OF JULY (Universal City Studios, Inc., 1989), as have
been those portraying psychiatric hospitals, such as ONE FLEw OVER THE CUCKOO'S NEST (Fantasy Films,
1975).
42. Jay Alexander Gold, The Biosphere and the Circle of Learning, 5 AM. J.L. & MED. 145,153 (1979)
(book review), quoting David Mechanic, Therapeutic Relationship: Contemporary Sociological Analysis,
in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 1668 (Warren T. Reich ed., 1978).
43. As Tacott Parsons noted, "[The doctor's] authority rests, fundamentally, on the belief on the part
of the patient that the physician has and will employ for his benefit a technical competence adequate to help
him in his illness." Talcott Parsons, Introduction to MAX WEBER: THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATIONS 59 n.4 (A.M. Henderson & Talcott Parsons trans., 1947).
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"St. Elsewhere," and "Trapper John, M.D.'4 4 and in almost every daytime soap
opera, as well as in books at the top of the best-seller list and countless movies.
This image is also at the core of much of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence
in cases involving health care professionals, possibly reflecting the Justices'
personal experience with the medical profession. The Court sees medical
professionals as motivated by concern for the welfare and treatment of their
clients,45 or, at the very least, by the pure and disinterested "professional
curiosity a dedicated medical man possesses. 46 Medical professionals are seen
as sharing an identity of interest with their clients untainted by other potential
conflicts or responsibilities. The relationship is assumed to exist in the private
sphere, and to operate best when protected from governmental intrusion.
This vision of doctors and of the doctor-patient relationship, with all its
embedded assumptions, received its most explicit articulation in Justice
Blackmun's impassioned dissent in Rust v. Sullivan:47
In our society, the doctor/patient dialogue embodies a unique relation-
ship of trust. The specialized nature of medical science and the
emotional distress often attendant to health-related decisions requires
that patients place their complete confidence, and often their very lives,
in the hands of medical professionals. One seeks a physician's aid not
only for medication or diagnosis, but also for guidance, professional
judgment, and vital emotional support. Accordingly, each of us attaches
profound importance and authority to the words of advice spoken by
the physician. It is for this reason that we have guarded so jealously
the doctor/patient dialogue from governmental intrusion."
44. Ben Casey (NBC televison series, 1961-66); Dr. Kildare (NBC television series, 1961-66); Marcus
Welby, M.D. (ABC television series, 1969-76); M*A*S*H* (CBS television series, 1972-83); St. Elsewhere
(NBC television series, 1982-88); Trapper John, M.D. (CBS television series, 1979-86). Even in television
shows where medicine is not the central theme, the image of the doctor remains very powerful: witness Dr.
McCoy on Star Trek (NBC television series, 1966-69) and Drs. Crusher and Pulaski on Star Trek: The Next
Generation (Paramount Productions, 1987-present).
45. See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 222-23 n.8 (1990); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179,
196-97 (1973).
46. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 403 (1971).
47. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
48. Id. at 1785 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Because Justice Blackmun, whose affinity for the medical
profession is well known, wrote Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and many of the subsequent abortion
decisions as well, it might be argued that the image of the professional in these decisions is his rather than
the Court's. Nevertheless, his colleagues have adopted Justice Blackmun's language in joining these opinions.
Moreover, other justices have written in similar terms. For example, Justice Powell penned similarly striking
images of the medical profession in City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416,
427, 430, 443-50 (1983); images of privacy and the joint doctor-patient venture were invoked by Justice
Marshall in H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 435 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Other justices have
expressed the Court's conception of the medical profession in contexts other than abortion. See, e.g., Parham
v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (Burger, C.J.) (discussed infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text); Washington
v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (Kennedy, J.) (discussed infra notes 59-64 and accompanying text).
Interestingly, Justice Blackmun has begun to recognize the distinction between the doctor-patient relationship
in private and public settings. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988) (discussed infra notes 129-130 and
accompanying text).
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In fact, the Supreme Court's abortion jurisprudence does much to illuminate
the Court's assumptions about the medical profession. It is widely recognized
that the abortion decisions are dedicated as much to preserving the privacy and
autonomy of the doctor from governmental intrusion as to preserving the rights
of the women involved 9
But the emphasis in the abortion decisions is not so much on the physician
alone as on the special nature of the doctor-patient relationship. Furthermore,
the image is of a relationship firmly embedded in the private sphere, with which
government interference would be inappropriate and harmful.5 0 The decisions
clearly assume that the patient's well-being is the sole motivation for the
physician's actions and advice. 51 There is also a sense that medical decision-
making is a joint venture between doctor and patient: the Court characterizes
a personal discussion between physician and patient about the abortion decision,
its health risks, and its consequences as a "typical element of the physician-
patient relationship." '2 Most of all, the decisions paint a picture of
the conscientious physician... whose professional activity is concerned
with the physical and mental welfare, the woes, the emotions, and the
concern of his female patients. He, perhaps more than anyone else, is
knowledgeable in this area of patient care, and he is aware of human
49. See, e.g., Andrea Asaro, The Judicial Portrayal of the Physician in Abortion and Sterilization
Decisions: The Use and Abuse of Medical Discretion, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 51, 59 (1983); Laurence H.
Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Affirmative Duties, and the Dilemma of
Dependence, 99 HARV. L. REV. 330, 335 (1985); see also Catherine A. MacKinnon, Roe v. Wade: A Study
in Male Ideology, in ABORTION: MORAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 45,53 (Jay Garfield & Patricia Hennessy
eds., 1984).
50. The strongest statement the Court made in this regard was in Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986). Invalidating a statute requiring that certain printed
materials be given to a woman seeking an abortion, the Court criticized this condition as
nothing less than an outright attempt to wedge the Commonwealth's message discouraging abortion
into the privacy of the informed-consent dialogue between the woman and her physician, [making
the physician] in effect an agent of the State in treating the woman and plac[ing] his or her
imprimatur upon both the materials and the list. All this is, or comes close to being, state medicine
imposed upon the woman, not the professional medical guidance she seeks, and it officially
structures-as it obviously was intended to do--the dialogue between the woman and her
physician.
Id. at 762-63 (citation omitted). Note the court's dichotomy between "state medicine" and "professional
medical guidance."
The fact that the Supreme Court has recently moved in the direction of allowing state regulation to
intrude upon the privacy of the doctor-patient relationship, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.Ct.
2791 (1992); Rust v. Sullivan, Ill S.Ct. 1759 (1991); Webster v. Reproductive Health Sev., 492 U.S. 490
(1989), does not mean that the Court has abandoned the image of the doctor-patient relationship as a private
one in which the state should not intrude. Rather, the decisions attempt to minimize the effect of the intrusion,
Casey, 112 S.CL at 2823-24; Rust, I ll S.Ct. at 1777. The image of the doctor-patient relationship remains
the same; it is simply that protecting this relationship is less important to the majority when weighed against
competing state interests. In its most recent abortion decision, the Court has moved for the first time to
emphasize the woman's right to privacy over the privacy of the physician-patient relationship. Casey, 112
S.Ct. at 2807.
51. See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416,450 (1983) ("In accordance
with the ethical standards of the profession, a physician will advise the patient to defer the abortion when
he thinks this will be beneficial to her.") (citation omitted).
52. Id. at 447.
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frailty, so-called "error," and needs. The good physician-despite the
presence of rascals in the medical profession, as in all others, we trust
that most physicians are "good"--will have sympathy and understanding
for the pregnant patient that probably are not exceeded by those who
participate in other areas of professional counseling.53
A number of cases from the past several decades reflect the assumptions
discussed above and add another: that professionals in the private and public
sectors are more similar due to their shared professional code than dissimilar
due to the different contexts and institutions in which they work. This assumption
rests on the belief that members of a given profession, with their purported
objectivity and neutrality, will apply the same standards and possess the same
skills regardless of where they work and who their patients are. For the most
part, the Court does not distinguish between the professional competence and
commitment of private and public health care providerss4 any more than it
distinguishes, in the legal context, between appointed and retained attorneys in
cases involving effective assistance of counsel. 5
This dogged resistance to the possibility that conflicts of interest might
influence the opinions and actions of members of the medical profession can
be seen in a number of cases. In Richardson v. Perales,5 6 a case involving the
determination of disability for the purpose of Social Security benefits, the Court
denied any causal link between the fact that the agency had retained the
examining physicians and the unanimous conclusion of the retained physicians
that the claimant was not seriously disabled, despite the fact that the claimant's
own physician disagreed with this conclusion:
Although each [of the physicians retained by the agency] received a
fee, that fee is recompense for his time and talent otherwise devoted
to private practice or other professional assignment. We cannot, and
do not, ascribe bias to the work of these independent physicians, or
any interest on their part in the outcome of the administrative
proceeding beyond the professional curiosity a dedicated medical man
possesses.5 7
53. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 196-97 (1973).
54. There is one interesting exception to this rule, West v. Atkins (also written by Justice Blackmun),
discussed infra notes 129-130 and accompanying text.
55. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1980). But see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 708 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
56. 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
57. Id. at:403. While the majority characterized the medical reports as "routine, standard, and unbiased,"
id. at 404, Justice Douglas scathingly dissented. He observed that one of the doctors "was a 'medical adviser'
to HEW ... Some [of the other doctors] ... were employed by the workmen's compensation insurance
company to defeat respondent's claim." Id. at 413 (Douglas, J., dissenting). He continued, "Those defending
a claim look to defense-minded experts for their salvation. Those who press for recognition of a claim look
to other experts.... The use by HEW of its stable of defense doctors without submitting them to cross-
examination is the cutting of corners-a practice in which certainly the Government should not indulge."
Id. at 414. Another case decided the same year as Richardson rejected the suggestion that home visits by
a social worker could be intended for any purpose other than the benefit of the client. Wyman v. James,
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The same attitude pervades the Court's jurisprudence in mental disability
cases. While the Court does not necessarily have the highest opinion of the
reliability of psychiatric and mental health predictions, diagnosis or treatment,58
it stubbornly and paradoxically clings to the notion that mental health profes-
sionals-whether private or state practitioners-apply a neutral, if murky, body
of knowledge for the benefit of their clients.
In Washington v. Harper,59 a recent case involving the right of a mentally
ill prisoner to refuse psychotropic medication, the Court rejected the proposition,
supported by a number of studies and a leading textbook in the field,6° that
psychiatrists working in the correctional system often use drugs for behavioral
control rather than for treatment. According to the Court, "the fact that the
medication must first be prescribed by a psychiatrist, and then approved by a
reviewing psychiatrist, ensures that the treatment in question will be ordered
only if it is in the prisoner's medical interests, given the legitimate needs of
his institutional confinement. ' 61 Though Justice Stevens argued that "[u]se of
psychotropic drugs... serves to ease the institutional and administrative burdens
of maintaining prison security and provides a means of managing an unruly
prison population and preventing property damage,, 62 the majority flatly
rejected Stevens' point with the observation that the Hippocratic Oath would
prohibit such misuse. "Unlike Justice Stevens, we will not assume that physicians
will prescribe these drugs for reasons unrelated to the medical needs of the
400 U.S. 309, 322-23 (1971). Justice Douglas, more sensitive to the conflicts of interest inherent in being
both a health or human-services professional and a paid state agent, again dissented forcefully. Id. at 326.
58. See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,430 (1979) (requiring a clear and convincing standard
of proof in civil commitment proceedings, in part because "[psychiatric diagnosis ... is to a large extent
based on medical 'impressions' drawn from subjective analysis and filtered through the experience of the
diagnostician"); see also Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 927 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing
that psychiatrists "sometimes attempt to perpetuate" the "illusion" that they have "a special expertise to predict
dangerousness"); Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 379 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[Sitrong
institutional biases lead [mental health professionals] to err when they attempt to determine an individual's
dangerousness, especially when the consequence of a finding of dangerousness is that an obviously mentally
ill patient will remain within their control."). See generally, Michael L. Perlin, The Supreme Court, the
Mentally Disabled Criminal Defendant, and Symbolic Values: Random Decisions, Hidden Rationales, or
"Doctrinal Abyss?" 29 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 7-22 (1987).
59. 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
60. COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 1995 (Harold I. Kaplan & Benjamin L Sadock eds.,
4th ed. 1985) ("Observers of the prison system in the United States have been particularly critical of the
haphazard ways in which psychopharmacological agents are dispensed."). Cf., Edward Kaufman, The Violation
of Psychiatric Standards of Care in Prison, 137 AM. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 566, 568 (1980) (noting that chaos
resulting from frequent prescription ofpsychotropic drugs for purposes of control caused prisons to discontinue
practice, although overmedication remains widespread); Stanley A. Sitnick, Major Tranquilizers in Prison:
Drug Therapy and the Unconsenting Inmate, 11 WILLAMET E L.J. 378, 387-88 (1975) (arguing that prison
environment tempts officials to use psychotropic drugs as control agents and citing anecdotal evidence that
they do so).
61. Harper, 494 U.S. at 222 (emphasis added). It is beyond the scope of this Article to examine the
interesting juxtaposition of a "prisoner's medical interests, given the legitimate needs of his institutional
confinement."
62. Id. at 244-45 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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patients; indeed, the ethics of the medical profession are to the contrary."'63
The Court's apparent blindness to the fact that penal psychiatrists have
conflicting interests is even more striking in view of its explicit recognition that
"[t]he State has undertaken the obligation to provide prisoners with medical
treatment consistent not only with their own medical interests, but also with
the needs of the institution."'64 Yet these state employed psychiatrists are
presumed to act precisely as would a private physician in adhering to the
strictures of the Hippocratic Oath.
Like Harper, the Court's decision in Parham v. J.R.65 asserts the objectivity
and neutrality of state-employed mental health professionals. The Court reversed
the opinion of the three-judge district court that the admission of children to
state mental hospitals without a judicial-style hearing violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In holding that Georgia's existing
admissions process provided sufficient procedural protection, the Supreme Court
found that review by an admitting psychiatrist adequately protected the liberty
interests of children who were being "voluntarily" committed to state institutions
by their parents:
Georgia's procedures are not "arbitrary" in the sense that a single
physician or other professional has the "unbridled discretion" the
District Court saw to commit a child to a regional hospital. To so find
on this record would require us to assume that the physicians, psycho-
logists, and mental health professionals who participate in the admission
decision and who review each other's conclusions as to the continuing
validity of the initial decision are either oblivious or indifferent to the
child's welfare-or that they are incompetent. 66
Again, the Court found that the state professionals had "acted in a neutral and
detached fashion in making medical judgments in the best interests of the
children. 67
In sum, the Supreme Court's image of the medical professional in general
and of mental health professionals in particular seems to be drawn completely
from the private sphere. The image-and the Youngberg professional judgment
standard-rests upon two assumptions. The first assumption is that to act
professionally is to act neutrally, objectively, and nonideologically, with the
63. Id. at 222-23 n.8. The Court also cited the American Psychiatric Association's own Principles of
Medical Ethics. Interestingly, in Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983), the Court approved the admission
of psychiatric testimony predicting a specific individual's propensity for violence where the psychiatrist had
not personally examined the individual. Id. at 903. To give such testimony explicitly violates the American
Psychiatric Association's Principles of Medical Ethics. Id. at 923-24 n.6 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Nevertheless, as the Court noted, "as this case and others indicate, there are those doctors who are [quite]
willing to testify [in this way] at the sentencing hearing.... Id. at 899.
64. Harper, 494 U.S. at 225.
65. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
66. Id. at 615.
67. Id. at 616.
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primary motivation of furthering the patient's best interests. Second, the Court
assumes that professionalism transcends the gulf between the public and private
spheres for both the professional and the patient, so that no difference exists
between the actions and standards of public professionals treating public patients
and those of private professionals treating private patients.
B. The Reality of Professional-Patient Interaction
The Supreme Court's image of the mental health professional is inaccurate
because the assumptions underlying it are far removed from reality. The
assumptions are particularly inaccurate and damaging when applied to cases
that, like Youngberg, involve indigent patients who must depend for their
treatment on professionals employed by the state. This Section will argue that
professionals do not in fact act neutrally. Rather, all professionals are shaped
by the norms, values, and assumptions of professionalism in general and of their
professions in particular. Professional judgment is also inescapably informed
by assumptions of class, race, and gender. In addition, professionals who are
state actors do not have the same partnership with their clients as do private
sector professionals, who are paid by the clients themselves or by private
insurance.6" Duties to the state generate conflicts of interest, and public sector
care suffers from severe limitations of resources having few parallels in the
private sphere. State institutions often exist primarily for custodial purposes rather
than for treatment. Thus, "professional judgment" in state mental health systems
takes place under circumstances so far removed from the Court's idealized
paradigm of the professional as to make that paradigm unrecognizable and
irrelevant.
1. The Myth of Neutrality
The image that professionals do not impose their own values on their clients
and that they have no goals beyond advancing the client's interest is the source
of much of their power and a principal reason that professional pronouncements
are taken as persuasive. In fact, professionalism is frequently associated with
neutrality in case law.69 In many different ways, however, professionals embody
and impose a complex set of values that are far from neutral. In the private
sphere a professional's values may be perceived as benign and welcomed by
68. Even in those circumstances, there is some doubt as to the identity of interests between professionals
and patients. See infra notes 85-86 and accompanying text. In addition, even this private partnership is being
significantly eroded by the growth of HMO's and other forms of managed care programs that put private
professionals under conflicting priorities to maximize profits and to provide good medical care. That issue,
however, is beyond the scope of this Article.
69. See supra notes 56-64 and accompanying text (discussing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (197 1)
and Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990)).
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the client; in any event, the client is free to go and select another professional
whose values are more consonant with her own. In state institutions, most clients
are captive to the values of the professionals who treat them; their only recourse
to assert their own values and goals may be a court challenge to the state
professional's actions. The courts' failure to grasp the idea that conflict between
a professional and a client often involves a clash of value systems leads the
courts to apply reflexive presumptions in favor of the professional. Where the
clash is evident, as in cases involving religious beliefs and the refusal of blood
transfusions, the courts are far less deferential to professionals. The exposure
of the value systems underlying professional judgments, then, becomes
particularly important.
Members of a given profession often share certain beliefs inculcated as part
of their professional training. These beliefs include values common to all
professions, such as the notion that the professionals' judgment should be
sovereign within their field of expertise. "[T]he ideal of a profession calls for
the sovereignty of its members' independent, authoritative judgment. '70
Likewise, all professions share a preference for professional autonomy as against
governmental regulation and intervention, whether in the form of legislative
requirements or judicial decrees.
Members of a given profession also share values specific to their profession.
The legal profession stresses autonomy and individual responsibility, while the
medical profession is more paternalistic. 71 In the medical profession, the primary
mandate is to cure or restore the health of a patient.72 When curing or healing
a patient conflicts with the patient's own choices, a goal of healing very often
supercedes the patient's wishes: patient autonomy is simply not a primary value
of the medical profession. 3 Clients in the private sphere, who are relatively
70. STARR, supra note 32, at 23. In fact, "[a] professional who yields too much to the demands of clients
violates an essential article of the professional code: Quacks, as Everett Hughes once defined them, are
practitioners who continue to please their customers but not their colleagues." Id.
71. See Martin S. Pernick, The Patients Role in MedicalDecisinmaking, in PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH,
MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN
THE PATIENT-PRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP app. Eat 4(1982) ("[Tlraditional codes of medical ethics mention
little or nothing about patient consent, and express overt hostility towards providing the patient with much
information on which to base a decision."); Alexis M. Nehemkis, The Eye of the Beholder: StaffPerceptions
of Noncompliance, in COMPLIANCE: THE DILEMMA OFTHE CHRONICALLY ILL 158, 171-79 (Kenneth E. Gerber
& Alexis M. Nehemkis eds., 1986).
72. JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 225-26 (1984).
73. The classic example of this situation is when a patient's religious values lead her to refuse blood
transfusions. See Public Health Trust v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989) (state's interest in having children
raised by two loving parents was insufficient to overcome patient's right, pursuant to religious beliefs, to
refuse life-saving transfusion). But it can also occur simply because a patient prefers a certain level of comfort
while a doctor wishes the patient to behave in a less comfortable way that would prolong his life. See ANNAS,
supra note 35, at 27, 30; Nehemkis, supra note 71, at 171-72; KATz, supra note 72, at 26 ("[W]hat passes
today for disclosure and consent in physician-patient interactions is largely an unwitting attempt by physicians
to shape the disclosure process so that patients will comply with their recommendations."). Perhaps the most
eloquent statement reflecting this tension and the need for an imperative outside the medical profession to
balance the conflicts between healing and autonomy comes from Paul Appelbaum, Charles Lidz, and Alan
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more free to consider their doctor's advice in light of their own personal values
and to decide the proper course of action for themselves, 74 may expect and
appreciate this professional value. The fact that physicians consider treatment
and cure to be their first priority should, however, be recognized as a powerful
value system that will inevitably skew professional judgment. For example, a
physician's doubts about a patient's competence to accept or refuse treatment
are typically resolved in the patient's favor if the patient wishes to accept
treatment; the patient's competence is challenged only if she refuses treatment. 75
In addition, medical professionals readily sacrifice patient autonomy to protect
patients from harm or to reduce risks to their health.
Within the specializations of medicine, each branch also has its own specific
set of values, usually (and unsurprisingly) focused on the benefits that the
specialists' particular expertise has to offer. For example, physicians at
institutions tend to resolve doubts in favor of institutional care.76
Members of a given profession also tend to share a professional consensus
on many issues-particularly regarding diagnoses and treatments-for which
there is actually little or conflicting empirical support. 77 For example, mental
health professionals rely heavily on interviews for diagnosis even though studies
Meisel, who say that situations in which patients refuse treatment
are among the most difficult situations physicians must handle. They must come to grips with
the limits on their authority to order interventions and on their power singlehandedly to combat
disease and restore health. Even physicians who are generally supportive of the idea of informed
consent may balk at its implications when patients refuse care physicians believe will be highly
beneficial .... We must all face real limitations on our power to pursue our goals and advance
our values .... [T]hat is the price we pay as a society for supporting individual freedom of choice.
PAUL APPELBAUrM Er AL., INFORMED CONSENT 201-02 (1987). The reality of conflict underlying a perceived
identity of interest is also true in other professional contexts, including the attorney-client context. See Anthony
V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of ClientNarrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107,
2123 (1991) (Poverty lawyers cannot identify with their clients' struggles and tend to silence them. The
silencing is "tied to the denigration of client difference delineated by class, ethnicity, gender, race, sexual
preference, and disability."); Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes:
Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BuFF. L. REV. 1, 46 (1990) ("The lawyer shared... the oppression
of gender, but was placed above [her client] in the social hierarchies of race and class. As a result, even
though the attorney was sure that her client would follow her instructions, the client did not.").
74. The power imbalance between medical professionals and their private clients is also considerable.
Often the patients who have expressed their chagrin most publicly at this discovery are doctors who became
patients. See iufra note 86.
75. See Donald Bersoff, Autonomy for Vulnerable Populations, 37 VILL. L. REV. (forthcoming Jan.
1993); Bruce J. Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 15, 21 (1991).
76. ANNAS, supra note 35, at 158.
77. There is some evidence to suggest that many norms of professional care are not reached through
research or evidence, but rather become accepted through some process of professional consensus not based
on actual fact. See, e.g., Douglas Bilken, The Myth of Clinical Judgment, 44 J. Soc. IssuEs 127, 136 (1988)
(suggesting that political and budgetary factors drive so-called "clinical" decisions); Howard Rubenstein
et al., Standards of Medical Care Based on Consensus Rather than Evidence: The Case of Routine Bedrail
Use for the Elderly, I 1 LAWV MED. & HEALTH CARE 271 (1983) (suggesting that routine use of bedrails,
rather than protecting elderly patients, contributes to their injuries). This is particularly true in the field of
mental health, where the diagnoses themselves are a result not of empirical research but of professional
consensus, see infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text. Even when there is dissension within the
professional community over a given treatment, it is often not apparent to the public, which may perceive
a profession as having a monolithic position on any given treatment issue. This is an entirely reasonable
assumption, given the image of professions discussed earlier.
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show that interviews are not particularly likely to yield valid results; many
standard tests relied upon by mental health professionals are similarly
deficient.78 Worse, studies show that professionals have great confidence in
their own judgments and are highly resistant to changing them, even when these
judgments are based on invalid tools of diagnosis. Evidence suggests that some
professional judgments in the mental health field are made within minutes of
meeting the client.
79
In addition to the unacknowledged value systems incorporated in being a
professional and, specifically, being a medical professional, professionals tend
to share the values typical of their race, class, and gender. Professionals,
particularly those to whom the Supreme Court refers in its decisions applying
the professional judgment standard, are overwhelmingly white,80 male,8 ' and,
presumably, middle class or affluent. In the private sector most clients are also
white and middle class; a slight majority are female. 2 In the private system,
in other words, mental health professionals and their clients often have race and
class characteristics in common.83 This is significant, for treatment varies
according to how much the professional and his or her client have in common.
For example, in the area of informed consent, doctors give more information
to white, better educated patients having higher incomes.'
Similarities between private sector professionals and clients notwithstanding,
the professional's interaction with the client is imbued with power imbalance,
detachment, and control.85 Many doctors in the private sector simply do not
78. Donald Bersoff, Judicial Deference to Nonlegal Decisionmakers: Imposing Simplistic Solutions
on Problems of Cognitive Complexity in Mental Disability Law, 46 SMU L. REV. 327, 343 (1992).
79. Id. at 345.
80. See infra text accompanying notes 90-92.
81. See supra note 12.
82. Walter R. Gove, Mental Illness and Psychiatric Treatment Among Women, in THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF WOMEN: ONGOING DEBATES 102, 103 (Mary Roth Walsh ed., 1987).
83. Even when clients of mental health professionals share race and class in common, gender differences
sometimes have proven to be extremely problematic in providing treatment. See, e.g., PHYLLIS CHESLER,
WOMEN & MADNESS (1972); KATE MILL=TT, THE LooNY-BN TRIP (1990); EDWIN M. SCHUR, LABELING
WOMEN DEVIANT: GENDER, STIGMA, AND SOCIAL CONTROL (1983); Jo Anne Morrow, Women's Health
Care and Informed Consent, 9 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 553 (1978-79).
84. A Review of Empirical Studies on Informed Consent and Decisionmaking, in 2 MAKING HEALTH
CARE DECISIONS: THE LEGAL AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THE PATIENT-
PRACTIONER RELATIONSHIP, PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH 62, 97-98, 121, 124 (finding that"[t]he primary determinant
of how much a physician disclosed is the percentage of patients he or she perceived as being capable of
understanding their condition or treatment," id. at 97-98, and that "there is a relationship between the
proportion of patients who are poor and the proportion of patients who [doctors report] can understand
treatment," id. at 62. Thus, the authors conclude that physicians whose practice consists of mostly poor patients
are less likely to think that their patients want the truth. Id. at 124); David Orentlicher, The Illusion of Patient
Choice in End-of-Life Decisions, 267 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 2101,2102 (1992) ("Interestingly, when physicians
engage in discussions about treatment with their patients, they are more inclined to talk with patients who
are most like them. Patients who seem more intelligent and better educated receive more time and more
explanations from their physicians.").
85. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 480-83 (Cal. 1990) (physician
allegedly patented and marketed a cell-line established from patient's blood cells removed during surgery
without patient's knowledge), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1388 (1991).
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give the time or attention to the doctor-patient relationship that the Supreme
Court appears to assume. Doctors often treat patients, even patients who pay,
as less than equal. It is telling that doctors who have found themselves as patients
have articulated with surprise and outrage the powerlessness they experienced
in that unfamiliar role.86
If wealthy, privileged white doctors sometimes find themselves unheard
and depersonalized as patients, it can be assumed that public sector patients,
who have less in common with their health professionals, will fare even worse.
Treatment for health problems, especially mental health problems, requires an
understanding of the patient's culture and personal history.87 Researchers have
observed that "as the sociocultural distance between the clinician and his patient
increases, diagnoses become less accurate." 88 This problem is particularly
intense in the public sector where the involuntary "clients," unlike their
caretakers, are disproportionately members of racial minorities and are indigent.
In state and county hospitals, black men are hospitalized at a rate 2.8 times
greater than white men, and black women at a rate 2.5 times greater than white
women.89 By contrast, only about 2% of psychiatrists are black.90 Out of
86. See, e.g., ED ROSENBAUM, A TASTE OF MY OwN MEDICINE (1988); SACKS, A LEG TO STAND ON,
supra note 41; ALLEN WIDOME, THE DOCTOR, THE PATIENT (1989). A particularly vivid account is given
by Dr. Sacks, a neurologist. He was hospitalized with a leg injury having neurological complications. He
wrote of his consternation at being infantilized, ignored, and treated with contempt by his doctor
I was stunned ... I thought: what sort of doctor, what sort of person, is this? He didn't even
listen to me. He showed no concern. He doesn't listen to his patients-he doesn't give a damn.
Such a man never listens to, never learns from, his patients. He dismisses them, he despises them,
he regards them as nothing. And then I thought-I am being terribly unfair. [So Dr. Sacks attempts
to see his physician again, and has the following encounter with him:]
"Well, Sacks," he snorted. "What's the matter now? Haven't you been told there is nothing
the matter? Are you critical of the surgery or post-operative care?"
"Not at all," I replied. "Both seem exemplary."
"What is the matter then?"
"The leg doesn'tfeel right."
"This is very vague and subjective. Not the sort of thing we can be concerned with ... 
[Sacks describes the sensation in his leg.]
"Sacks, you're unique," the Registrar said. "I've never heard anything like this from a patient
before."
"I can't be unique," I said, with anger, and rising panic. "I must be constituted the same
way as everyone else! Perhaps (my anger was getting the better of me now), perhaps you don't
listen to what patients say; perhaps you're not interested in the experiences they have." "No,
indeed, I can't waste time with 'experiences' like this. I'm a practical man, I have work to do."
"Experience aside then, the leg doesn't work." "That's not my business."
"Then whose business is it? Specifically, there is something physiologically the matter.
What about a neurological opinion, nerve-conduction tests, EMGs, etc.?"
He turned away and gave me no answer.
SACKS, A LEG TO STAND ON, supra note 41, at 105, 106-07.
87. Even treatment for physical health problems is complicated when there is a cultural or class gap
between doctor and patient. Warnren E. Leary, Uneasy Doctors Add Race-Consciousness to Diagnostic Tools,
N.Y. TIMIE, Sept. 25, 1990, at C 1. The problem is exacerbated when mental health is at issue. Billy E. Jones
& Beverly A. Gray, Problems in Diagnosing Schizophrenia and Affective Disorders Among Blacks, 37 HOSP.
& COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 61 (1986).
88. Herbert S. Gross et al., The Effect of Race and Sex on the Variation of Diagnosis and Disposition
in a Psychiatric Emergency Room, 148 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 638, 638 (1969).
89. ERIC ROSENTHAL & LEE CARTY, NATIONAL INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, IMPEDIMENTS TO SERVICES
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273,600 licensed psychologists in this country in 1986, only 10,000 were
black.9' Ninety percent of the 3,209 doctorates in psychology in 1989 were
awarded to whites.92
Studies on diagnosis and treatment confirm what these statistics suggest:
members of minorities are misdiagnosed far more often than white patients.93
The misdiagnosis usually takes the form of overdiagnosing schizophrenia in
black patients; blacks are diagnosed with schizophrenia at almost twice the rate
of white inpatients.94 Because schizophrenia is generally considered one of
the most serious mental disorders, misdiagnosis may be one explanation for the
fact that minorities are involuntarily committed to state institutions at a
statistically disproportionate rate. Once there, black men are far more likely to
be subject to seclusion than white men.95
More subtly, values arising from race, gender, and class may affect not only
diagnoses but also the very theories forming the bases for diagnosis and
treatment. For example, in 1962 a professional journal attributed the low rate
of diagnosed depression among blacks to the black person's lack of self-esteem.
A black person was less vulnerable to depression because "he has less to lose
and is less apt to lose it."96
Diagnostic categories and treatment protocols are established through a
highly political process. 97 The American Psychiatric Association's Nomenclature
Committee, other decisionmaking councils, and ultimately, the Board of Trustees,
must reach a consensus in order to include diagnoses in the Association's
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual.98 This process received public notice when
the American Psychiatric Association "declassified" homosexuality as sexual
deviation and has again recently been the subject of attention in connection with
the listing of diagnoses such as "self-defeating personality disorder" (attributed
AND ADVOCACY FOR BLACK AND HISPANIC PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 3 (1988).
90. This figure is based on the American Psychiatric Association's Sept. 1992 membership survey.
Telephone Interview with Sandy Farris, American Psychiatric Association Membership Office (Oct. 23, 1992).
Of the 80% of respondents who listed their race, 2% identified themselves as black. Of course, black
psychiatrists may not choose to join the American Psychiatric Association and may be among those who
did not list their race.
91. NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUND., PROFILES-PSYCHOLOGY: HUMAN RESOURCES AND FUNDING 94 (1988).
92. U.S. BUREAU OFTHE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OFTHE UNITED STATES: 1991 at Chart 1010
(IlIth ed. 1990).
93. ROSENTHAL, & CARTY, supra note 89, at 4-5; Leary, supra note 87, at Cl.
94. ROSENTHAL & CARTY, supra note 89, at 4.
95. Id. at 7 (citing W. B. Lawson et al., Race, Violence and Psychopathology, 45 J. CLINICAL
PSYCHIATRY, 294-97 (1984)).
96. ROSENTHAL & CARTY, supra note 86, at 5 (quoting A. J. Prange & M. M. Vitols, Cultural Aspects
of the Relatively Low Incidence ofDepression in Southern Negroes, 8 INT'L J. SOC. PSYCHIATRY 104 (1962)).
97. For an excellent discussion of the value laden nature of many diagnoses, see Bruce J. Winick, The
Right to Refuse Mental Health Treatment: A First Amendment Perspective, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 46-49
(1989).
98. Robert L. Goldstein, Clinical Judgment and Value Judgment: Moral Foundations of Psychiatric
and Legal Determinations of the Status of Homosexuality, in ETHICAL PRACTICE IN PSYCHIATRY AND LAW
293, 297 (Richard Nosner & Robert Weinstock eds., 1990). The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, now
in its third revised edition, classifies mental disorders and lists standardized diagnostic criteria for each.
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to persons who continually and knowingly allow themselves to be exploited)
and "periluteal dysphoric disorder (commonly known as premenstrual stress
syndrome)." 99 Since the profession recognizes diagnoses based on consensus,
the race, gender, class, and sexual orientation of those reaching the consensus
is relevant to the determination of what behavior constitutes mental illnessl" °
and what behavior remains within the boundaries of mental health. Although
a discussion of the issue is beyond the scope of this Article, numerous accounts
have described the power of the mental health profession to enforce gendered
behavior norms 01 and the profession's indifference to the effect of minority
experiences and culture on behavior. In summary, nonneutral values associated
with race, gender, and class shape, however unconsciously, the definition of
mental illness as well as its diagnosis and treatment. These values shape, in other
words, the very professional judgment that the Supreme Court regards as
neutrally applied.
2. The Myth That Professional Judgment Transcends Public/Private
Distinctions
The Supreme Court acknowledged in Youngberg that state hospitals are often
"overcrowded and understaffed ' 102 and explicitly stated that one purpose of
the professional judgment standard was to "enable institutions of this type... to
continue to function."103 Yet professional judgment, as envisioned by the
Supreme Court, is distorted beyond recognition by the limited resources, coercive
environment, and unavoidable conflicts of interest inherent in the public sector.
Professionals employed by the state are state actors. Those who work in state
institutions have conflicting obligations: to the state, whose budgetary demands
restrict state employees' behavior, to the institution, which might be more
concerned about safety and security than treatment; and to the patients, who
did not seek their care and who, for the most part, have no desire to be patients
in the first place. The Supreme Court has generally not acknowledged this
99. See, e.g., DSM-1IIR: Controversial Diagnoses Still notResolved, NEWS FOR WOMEN IN PSYCHIATRY,
Oct. 1986, at 1-2. This labelling of disease by consensus is not exclusive to the mental health arena. "It
comes to this, that a disease is what the medical profession recognizes as such." E.M. JELLINEK, THE DISEASE
CONCEPT OF ALCOHOLISM 12 (1960).
100. A well-known example of this phenomenon was the description of slaves' running away as
symptomatic of a particular mental disease, "drapetomania." KENNETH M. STAmPP, THE PECULIAR
INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH 109 (1956). For an interesting account of racism's
effect on psychology, see ROBERT V. GrHRIE, EVEN THE RAT WAS WHITE (1976).
101. CHESLER, supra note 83; SCHUR, supra note 83; Richard J. Parker, Sex Bias in the Administration
of California's Mental Health Law, 8 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 515 (1979).
102. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982).
103. Id. The Supreme Court stood almost alone in its concern that Pennhurst "continue to function."
A district judge found that "there is no question that Pennhurst, as an institution for the retarded, should
be regarded as a monumental example of unconstitutionality." Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp.,
446 F. Supp. 1295, 1320 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979) (en
banc). Pennhurst was officially closed on Nov. 2, 1987. ARC of Pennsylvania Files Petition in Pennhurst
Case, PR NEWSWIRE, Nov. 16, 1987, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, PRNEWS File.
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conflict0 4 and, when parties have raised the issue, has responded with the
assumption that professionalism will serve as a prophylactic against any pressure
created by state employment: state actors who are professionals are assumed
to act with "professional" intent or motives rather than "state" intent or
motives.' 5o
The health care professional's values regarding the primacy of treatment1
0 6
become particularly troubling when the professional is a state actor and the state
has custody over the patient, for then the professional's already considerable
power over the patient is joined with the power of the state. At that point, the
professional's orientation to treatment must be recognized as a value system
in itself, rather than as a neutral, value-free description of what is required. 0 7
Somehow, the professional's value system must be balanced against competing
values, since the patient's autonomy and ability to weigh the professional's
advice against her personal desires and values cannot be taken for granted, as
it is in the private sphere.
Furthermore, the exercise of professional judgment under the conditions
prevailing in state institutions may often be impossible, as even the Court itself
has acknowledged. 08 When the Supreme Court agreed to hear Youngberg,
it already knew about Pennhurst's abysmal record, having recently decided a
case involving that very institution.'0 9 Justice Rehnquist wrote, "[The District
Court's] findings of fact are undisputed: Conditions at Pennhurst are not only
dangerous, with the residents often physically abused or drugged by staff
members, but also inadequate for the 'habilitation' of the retarded.""0 The
record indicated that the institution had "urine and excrement on the ward
floors," and "[o]bnoxious odors and excessive noise permeated the
institution.' The record before the Supreme Court in Youngberg showed
that little, if anything, had changed in two years: the institution was still
104. But cf. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 50-58 (1988). West is discussed infra at notes 129-130 and
accompanying text.
105. See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 233-35 (1990). For an excellent critique of this
assumption, see United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 498-99 (4th Cir. 1987).
106. See supra text accompanying notes 71-75.
107. For an account of the difficulties arising from the failure of physicians and health care professionals
to recognize that their orientation to treatment and cure is simply one of a number of competing value systems,
see Nehemkis, supra note 71.
108. Thus, the Court in Youngberg was careful to limit liability in situations when professional judgment
could not be exercised because lack of resources precluded the exercise of any such judgment at all. The
Court held that a professional could not be held liable for damages in his individual capacity when lack
of resources prevented him from "satisfy[ing] his normal professional standards." 457 U.S. at 323.
109. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981). Romeo was a class member in
the Pennhurst cases. Just under three years later, the Court decided Permhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). Recently, the Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari on a third Pennhurst
case, Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 901 F.2d 311 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 140 (1990),
leaving intact the Third Circuit's decision upholding the trial judge's jurisdiction to enforce the settlement
concluded by the parties in 1984 and holding that one county's failure to serve 3% of the plaintiff class
constituted substantial noncompliance with the settlement.
110. 451 U.S. at7.
111. Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84, 93 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc).
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"unsanitary and understaffed, and many of its residents are subjected to violence
and enforced inactivity."'12
This situation was not unique to Pennhurst, nor to the late seventies. Cases
decided in the late eighties and early nineties portray men and women subjected
to sexual assault by staff and fellow patients;" repeatedly injured and finally
beaten to death while institutionalized;" 4 kept in full restraints every day for
over three years;" 5 and given psychotropic and other drugs so casually that
they were often delivered to the wrong patient.' 6 Cases described institutions
where people who could walk were locked in wheelchairs" 7 and where patients
were "seat-belted to toilets because only one staff member was available to assist
six residents."'" 8 Several days of testimony about the abysmal conditions in
state institutions led Congress to pass the Protection and Advocacy for Mentally
IIl Individuals Act of 1986."9
112. Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 181 (3d Cir. 1980) (en banc) (Seitz, C.J., concurring), vacated,
457 U.S. 307 (1982).
113. Higgs v. Latham, No. 91-5237, 1991 U.S. App. Lexis 25549 at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 24, 1991) (findingsexual assault of female patient by fellow patient) (per curiam); Shaw v. Strackhouse, 920 F.2d 1135, 1140-41(3d Cir. 1990) (alleging sexual assault by staff member); P.C. v. McLaughlin, 913 F.2d 1033, 1045 (1982)(2d Cir. 1990) (finding institution not liable for sexual abuse of patient by employee); Davis v. Holly, 835F.2d 1175 (6th Cir. 1987) (alleging sexual assault by staffmember); Jackson v. Fort Stanton Hosp. & TrainingSch., 757 F. Supp. 1243, 1275 (D.N.M. 1990) (citing sexual assault by unknown perpetrator resulting indeath), rev'd in part, 964 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1992); Spare v. Cohen, No. CIV.A.82-3579, 1986 WL 4814(E.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 1986) (alleging multiple sexual attacks on profoundly retarded man); Butler v. Comm'rof Mental Health, 463 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Tenn. 1978) (alleging sexual assault by fellow patient). In anothercase, the court found that the claim of a woman who was sexually molested by being forcibly kissed andgroped all over her body was "minor and the injury de minimus, [sic] not of sufficient degree to rise to thelevel of an unconstitutional deprivation of civil rights." Knight v. Colorado, 496 F. Supp. 779, 780 (D. Colo.1980). The frequency of sexual assault in institutions is not reflected by the relative paucity of these cases,which claim violations of constitutional rights. Examination of civil tort actions and criminal actions givesadditional perspective. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Tavares, 555 A.2d 199 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (affirming
conviction of attendant at home for handicapped for forcing residents to have indecent sexual contact). Mostsexual assaults in institutions are not reported, and of those that are, few are prosecuted, see Susan Stefan,Whose Egg is it Anyway? Reproductive Rights of Incarcerated, Institutionalized and Incompetent Women,13 NOVA L. REv. 405,428-30 (1989). In addition, cases about the right to abortion ofinstitutionalized peoplefrequently arise from rape and sexual assault. See, e.g., D.R. v. Daughters of Miriam Center for the Aged,589 A.2d 668 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1990) (denying application to procure abortion for incompetent wardimpregnated by an unknown male); In re Jane Doe, 533 A.2d 523 (R.I. 1987) (denying stay of order ofabortion to be performed on profoundly retarded ward impregnated in sexual assault by unknown male).114. Kolpak v. Bell, 619 F. Supp. 359,366 (N.D. 111. 1985) (alleging repeated beating by staff membersto the extent that autopsy "confirmed... that [the plaintiff] sustained multiple fractures with internal injuries
and hemorrhage to the left kidney, with blood in the urine").
115. Kirsch v. Thompson, 717 F. Supp. 1077, 1080 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
116. Association for Retarded Citizens v. Olson, 713 F2d 1384, 1388 (8th Cir. 1983).
117. Society for Good rll to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 572 F. Supp. 1300, 1346 (E.D.N.Y. 1983)
vacated on other grounds, 737 F2d 1239 (2d Cir. 1984).
118. Jackson v. Fort Stanton Hosp. & Training Sch., 757 F Supp. 1243, 1277 (D. N.M. 1990), rev'd
in part, 964 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1992).
119. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 247a, 10,801-10,851 (Supp. 1992). This testimony was underscored by a reportprepared by Senate staff who had visited 31 state institutions and interviewed administrators, staff, andpatients. The report documented unexplained patient injuries, deaths, abuse, and the indifference of institutionaladministrators to investigation or prevention of patient abuse. Care of Institutionalized Mentally DisabledPersons: Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the Senate Comm. on Labor & HumanResources and the Subcomm. on Labor Health and Human Services, Education, & Related Agencies ofthe Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. Part n1 at 17-75 (Appendix: Staff Report on the
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And these are only the recorded cases. These lawsuits were brought for the
most part by parents'20 or groups of parents.' But most residents of institu-
tions have lost all contact with their relatives, and therefore have no one "on
the outside" to protect their interests. Other potential sources of scrutiny or
protection, such as the media, may be deterred by the remoteness and
inaccessibility of state institutions. Many state hospitals, especially in the West,
are located in rural areas, so traveling to them requires a substantial investment
of time. Institutions, under the guise of protecting the privacy of patients, also
tend to obstruct attempts by the press to investigate institutional conditions.
Professionals at state institutions are at best aware of this abuse and neglect,
but perceive themselves as helpless to prevent it; at worst, they are indifferent
or themselves abusive. State mental hospitals are notoriously unattractive
employment options and often are sinkholes for the worst of the psychiatric
profession. Practitioners in state hospitals often do not merit the term
"professional." Many are unlicensed. 2 Between half and two-thirds of the
psychiatrists in state and county mental hospitals and clinics are foreign medical
graduates who are of uneven quality and who may face linguistic or cultural
barriers to communicating with patients."'
3 Moreover, state hospitals have
found it so difficult to recruit psychiatrists that some rural states, such as
Montana and Wyoming, are forced to rely on temporary staffing agencies that
send a different psychiatrist out on rotations as frequently as every two
weeks. 24 The notion that the "professional judgment" exercised under these
Institutionalized Mentally Disabled) (1985).
120. E.g., Feagley v. Waddill, 868 F.2d 1437 (5th Cir. 1989); Kolpak v. Bell, 619 F. Supp 359 (N.D.
il. 1985).
121. E.g., New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 915 (1983); Concerned Citizens for Creedmoor v. Cuomo, 570 F. Supp. 575 (E.D.N.Y. 1983);
Association for Retarded Citizens v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473 (D.N.D. 1982), aff'd in part and remanded
inpart, 713 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1983); Jackson, 757 F. Supp. at 1277. The Association for Retarded Citizens
is a group composed primarily of parents of mentally retarded citizens, although it includes many members
who are not parents. It led the fight to reform in the treatment of individuals who are developmentally
disabled.
122. In some states, the fraction of unlicensed psychiatrists practicing in public institutions is as high
as 25%. Tamara Henry, Mental Health Programs get Poor Ratings; Wisconsin Ranks Second, U.P.I., Sept.
13, 1988, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. See also Leonard Rubenstein, Access to Treatment
and Rehabilitation for Severely Mentally Ill Poor People, 20 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 385,382 (1986) (citing
four states where, in 1978, over 65% of state hospital physicians were unlicensed and 20 states where the
number was over a third); 'Rent-a-Shrink' A Rural Success: Temporary Mental Care is Booming, CHI. TRIB.,
Nov. 20, 1988, at 27; John Machacek, State's Care of Mentally Ill Needs Work, Report Says, GANNET NEWS
SERVICE, Sept. 11, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, GNS File..
123. An National Institute of Mental Health study in 1980 concluded that over half the psychiatrists
in state and county mental hospitals were foreign medical graduates, while a more recent study puts the
proportion at two-thirds. Armand Checker & Michael J. Witkin, A Comparison of U.S. and Foreign Medical
Graduates Employed by State and County Mental Hospitals. 1975 and 1980, National Institute of Mental
Health StatisticalNote 161, at 3 (Sept. 1982); see also E. FULLER TORREY ET AL, CARE OF THE SERIOUSLY
MENTALLY ILL: A RATING OF STATE PROGRAMS 9 (3d ed. 1990).
124. TORREY, supra note 123, at 9. As the authors note, "the consequences for the continuity and quality
of patient care are obvious."
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circumstances bears any relationship to the patient's actual needs is problematic
at best.
Even if staff are of high quality, other factors may preclude the exercise
of professional judgment. Studies have repeatedly shown that working in an
institutional setting has marked effects on the professionals employed there.
25
Institutions are closed settings, and, as courts have recognized, there is "a
tendency among human service professionals in the institutions to conform their
recommendations for treatment or habilitation... to the constraints imposed
by the state's 'inadequate service delivery system, rather than to exercise true
professional judgment."' '2'
Furthermore, the state mental health professional may be explicitly requested
to pursue goals other than the health of his patient, as is illustrated by the case
of Perry v. Louisiana.127 In Perry, the State of Louisiana sought to medicate
forcibly an incompetent mentally ill prisoner in order to render him competent
to be executed. The American Psychiatric Association and the American Medical
Association forcefully expressed the position of psychiatrists caught between
their duties as health professionals and their obligations to their state employer
in an amicus brief, calling "the directive [by the state] to medicate . . . an
excruciating ethical dilemma for treating physicians."12
The Supreme Court has only once explicitly acknowledged that state-
employed professionals in institutional settings might make different judgments
than would professionals in the private sphere. In West v. Atkins,"9 the Court
observed that professional judgment is profoundly affected by both the state's
limited resources and the institutional setting in which the professional works.
It is worthwhile to present an extended excerpt from this case, which stands
alone in Supreme Court jurisprudence in differentiating private and state
practices. When a physician provides services to prison inmates, the Court said,
the setting
inevitably affects the exercise of professional judgment. Unlike the
situation confronting free patients, the non-medical functions of prison
life inevitably influence the nature, timing, and form of medical care
provided to inmates such as West. By regulation, matters of medical
125. See, e.g., ERVINO GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS 92 (1961) ("[Mlembers of staff.. are being set to a
contradictory task... having to coerce inmates into obedience while at the same time giving the impression
that humane standards are being maintained and the rational goals of the institution are being realized.");
Craig Haney et a., Interpersonal Dynamics in a Simulated Prison, I INT'L J. CRIMINOLOGY & PENOLOGY
69 (1973).
126. Jackson v. Fort Stanton Hosp. & Training Sch., 757 F. Supp. 1243, 1310-11 (D. N.M. 1990), rev'd
in part, 964 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1992) (quoting Thomas S. v. Flaherty, 699 F. Supp. 1178, 1196 (W.D.N.C.
1988), af'd, 902 F.2d 250 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, II S.Ct. 373 (1990)).
127. 498 U.S. 38 (1990); see also Brief for the American Psychiatric Ass'n and American Med. Ass'n
at 2-5, Perry v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 38 (1990) (No. 89-5120)
128. Brief for the American Psychiatric Ass'n and American Med. Ass'n at 16 (No. 89-5120), Perry,
498 U.S. 38.
129. 487 U.S. 42 (1988).
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health involving clinical judgment are the prison physician's "sole
province." These same regulations, however, require respondent to
provide medical services "in keeping with the security regulations of
the facility."... [S]tudies of prison health care, and simple common
sense, suggest that his delivery of medical care was not unaffected by
the fact that the State controlled the circumstances and sources of a
prisoner's medical treatment. For one thing, the State's financial
resources are limited. Further, prisoners and jails are inherently coercive
institutions that for security reasons must exercise nearly total control
over their residents' lives and the activities within their confines; general
schedules strictly regulate work, exercise and diet. These factors can,
and most often do, have a significant impact on the provision of medical
services in prisons.130
Virtually all of this applies equally to the state mental institution in Youngberg
and throws into doubt many of the assumptions of the professional judgment
standard.
This Part has attempted to illuminate the proposition that professionals and
those in their custody neither speak in one voice nor have the same story to
tell. Professional judgment at best defines what a patient needs with reference
to a limited conception of what is "good" for people and a highly fallible
perception of who the patient is and what the patient values. At worst,
professional judgment pursues goals antithetical to the patient's values. Yet
professionals wield awesome "cultural authority;" when professionals speak,
it is highly likely that their "particular definitions of reality and judgments of
meaning and value will prevail as valid and true. 131 The mental health
professional has "[tihe authority to interpret signs and symptoms, to diagnose
health or illness, to name diseases and offer prognoses.... By shaping the
patients' understanding of their own experience, physicians create the conditions
under which their advice seems appropriate."'32
Physicians also shape courts' understanding of patients' experiences. The
Supreme Court frequently accepts the authority of the professional's story over
that of the patient in what it conceives to be medical matters. When the patient's
perception clashes with the professionals' interpretation, the Court usually defers
to professional "authority." In Washington v. Harper,33 for example, discussing
a prisoner who had never been adjudicated incompetent, the Court noted:
Particularly where the patient is mentally disturbed, his own intentions
will be difficult to assess and will be changeable in any event.
Respondent's own history of accepting and then refusing drug treatment
illustrates the point. We cannot make the facile assumption that the
130. Id. at 56-57 n.15 (citations omitted).
131. STARR, supra note 32, at 13.
132. Id. at 14.
133. 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
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patient's intentions, or a substituted judgment approximating those
intentions, can be determined in a single judicial hearing apart from
the realities of frequent and ongoing clinical observation by medical
professionals.'34
In fact, even when the Court concedes that professionals' stories are
confusing and contradictory, it does not look elsewhere for meaning but arranges
legal rules to accommodate the contradictions. In Addington v. Texas,3' the
Court supported a standard of proof lower than "beyond a reasonable doubt"
in commitment hearings because "[g]iven the lack of certainty and the fallibility
of psychiatric diagnosis, there is a serious question as to whether a state could
ever prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an individual is both mentally ill and
likely to be dangerous."' 36
The particular values, limitations, and conflicts of interest that determine
the judgment of the state professional'make it critical for courts to distinguish
between the descriptions and prescriptions of the professional, on the one hand,
and the legal inquiry into the individual rights that state action may threaten,
on the other. In applying the professional judgment standard, however, courts
transform stories about legal rights into stories about medical needs, whose
meaning can then only be interpreted by professionals. The next Part argues
that the professional story about violations of the rights to liberty and autonomy
is constitutionally inadequate. The professional judgment standard is inapplicable
to claims of governmental intrusion on liberty: these stories need to be reclaimed
and reframed as accounts of the denial of civil rights.
II. THE SCOPE OF THE PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT STANDARD:
AFFIRMATIVE AND NEGATIVE RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
As the Supreme Court has recently reiterated, 137 constitutional claims
brought by individuals in government custody can be divided into two distinct
categories: claims for negative rights and claims for positive rights. 138 Both
categories involve the professional judgment standard, but in different ways.
134. Id. at 231-32 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Yet in other settings we assume that a competent
patient is the best source of information about his own intentions, and this information can be and is frequently
communicated by him to the judge "in a single judicial hearing."
135. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
136. Id. at 429. Several states have adopted the beyond a reasonabIe doubt standard in their commitment
proceedings. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. DelVerde, 517 N.E.2d 159, 161 (Mass. 1988). Thesestates, however,
do not appear to have difficulty in committing individuals.
137. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
138. While commentators have criticized this dichotomy, see David P. Currie, Positive and Negative
Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864 (1986); Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique,
88 MICH. L. REV. 2271 (1990), there is no indication that the Supreme Court or the lower courts will depart
from this form of analysis in the foreseeable future. See, e.g., Fialkowski v. Greenwich Home for Children,
Inc., 921 F.2d 459,465 (3d Cir. 1990) (distinguishing between deprivation of rights and affirmative obligations
of state).
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The first category consists of affirmative claims in which the plaintiff asserts
a need for, and a constitutional right to, professional assistance from the state,
such as medical care, training or treatment, or legal aid. 139 To prevail in a
right-to-treatment claim under the professional judgment standard, the plaintiff
must show that the treatment she received constituted "such a substantial
departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to
demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on
such a judgment."' 4
The second and broader category encompasses a variety of claims in which
the plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of a state action that constrains or
limits her rights. Plaintiffs bringing such negative rights claims in an institutional
setting must prove that the disputed action, constraint, or limitation is, as above,
a substantial departure from professional judgment.
141
The professional judgment standard comes into play at significantly different
stages in these two kinds of decisions, with very different effects. In claims for
constitutionally adequate government services, the court applies a constitutional
analysis to determine whether the plaintiff is entitled to state services and the
general contours of the services to which she is entitled, and only then relies
on professional judgment to determine how, specifically, these services should
be provided. This approach defers to professionals in decisions they are
competent to make. Such deference is appropriate here because the plaintiff is
affirmatively seeking to compel state actors to exercise professional judgment
on her behalf.'42
In negative rights claims, however, the plaintiff seeks protection against
the exercise of professional judgment by the state. In this context, professional
judgment inappropriately displaces the protection of rights from governmental
intrusion. If a court applies the professional judgment standard in negative rights
cases, professional judgment as to appropriate services or treatment supercedes
any judicial analysis regarding the plaintiff's constitutional rights or liberties.
The professional effectively exercises his judgment to choose between a patient's
rights to family visitation, speech, or freedom from restraint on the one hand,
and treatments that may preclude these on the other, without mediation or review
by the court.
This approach thus severely curtails constitutional protection of civil rights.
As discussed in the preceding Part, values of autonomy, self-determination or
139. Cases claiming ineffective assistance of counsel and many foster care cases fall into this category.
See infra Part IU(A)(4) & (5). As the professional judgment standard has been expanded beyond the mental
health system, claims such as those against prisons and jails for not providing adequate treatment or screening
for suicidal or mentally disabled prisoners and pretrial detainees also fall into this category. See infra Part
rI(A)(3).
140. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982).
141. Id.
142. The standard only makes sense, of course, to the extent that professionals can exercise their judgment
without distortions due to budgetary concerns or conflicts of interest. See infra Part II(B)(4).
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freedom from intrusion will probably receive little attention in the medical
professional's decision. Indeed, in these cases the very exercise of professional
judgment constitutes the alleged abuse of power. This is particularly true in
institutional settings, where all aspects of an individual's life are subject to
professional oversight: from hygiene" to letterwriting
4  to marriage. W
To assert that constitutional rights in these areas are not violated as long as a
professional exercises judgment in limiting or eliminating them substitutes
professional values for constitutional values and thereby constitutes an abdication
by the courts of their critical obligation to protect individual rights. The Due
Process Clause, intended to "prevent government 'from abusing [its] power,
or employing it as an instrument of oppression,' 146 is virtually erased by such
an approach.' 47
The professional judgment standard is flawed because it collapses both
negative and affirmative claims by institutionalized individuals into one
imperative: regardless of the relief the plaintiff actually seeks, he or she is
ultimately entitled only to the exercise of professional judgment. By focusing
on the institutional context instead of the claims, courts have failed to distinguish
between cases in which the plaintiff claims a right to professional judgment and
seeks the exercise of such judgment as a remedy, and cases in which the plaintiff
challenges the actions of the professional as government interference with
constitutional rights. In negative rights cases, the argument that professional
judgment was exercised in the challenged action essentially becomes an
affirmative defense to the claim. Under the professional judgment standard,
courts defer to professionals' decisions rather than inquiring into the legal claims
at issue.
This deference is misplaced in negative rights cases because, as described
in Part I, professionals base their decisions on a set of values that disregards
143. Green v. Baron, 662 F. Supp. 1378 (S.D. Iowa), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 879 F.2d 305
(8th Cir. 1989).
144. Thomburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989).
145. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
146. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989) (quoting Davidson
v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986)).
147. The breadth of a mental health professional's authority under the professional judgment standard
is highlighted by a contrast with the limits on the power of a state-appointed attorney over a client. It would
be unimaginable for an attorney to overrule his client's right to proceed pro se because of the attorney's
professional assessment that the client would be better served with counsel or to override the defendant's
decision to plead not guilty because, in the lawyer's professional judgment, the client stood a better chance
with a plea bargain. Denial of a client's unequivocal demand to represent himself would amount to per se
reversible error. Meeks v. Craven, 482 F.2d 465, 466 (9th Cir. 1973). Nor may an attorney limit or forbid
his client's letter-writing, even if the letters create evidence significantly damaging to the client's case, nor
forbid association with friends or family on similar grounds. Yet, as the following Section will show, mental
health professionals seek to exercise just such control over their clients' lives in the name of treatment. See,
e.g., Walters v. Western State Hosp., 864 E2d 695 (10th Cir. 1988) (doctors putting patient in seclusion
for several days); Doe v. Public Health Trust, 696 F.2d 901 (11th Cir. 1983) (mental hospital precluding
communication between patient and her parents) Martyr v. Bachik, 770 F. Supp. 1414 (D. Or. 1991) (mental
health facility censoring patients' mail). This is how the professional judgment standard operates in the context
of mental health cases.
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or de-emphasizes the autonomy and self-determination protected by the
Constitution. To make matters worse, as previously noted, although the
professionals involved are employed by the state, courts generally fail to inquire
as to which elements of a challenged decision are influenced by the state's needs
and imperatives, and which represent "pure" professional judgment. In any case,
however, the purest professional judgment is no substitute for judicial analysis
and protection of constitutional rights.
Section A will discuss the error involved in applying the professional
judgment standard to negative rights claims. First, it will examine how the
professional judgment standard eliminates consideration of competing
constitutional values in claims alleging infringement of privacy rights,
unconstitutional punishment, restrictions on freedom of movement, and
limitations on family association. It will then discuss the way the professional
judgment standard operates to eradicate procedural Due Process rights. Finally,
it will evaluate alternatives to the professional judgment standard in negative
rights cases. Section B will discuss the application of the professional judgment
standard to claims for state-provided professional services, where the professional
judgment standard, while still problematic, is more appropriate.
A. Challenges to Professional Infringement of Constitutional Rights: The
Professional Judgment Defense
The professional judgment framework reformulates all constitutional
questions into a dichotomy between professional judgment and its absence, and
thus renders irrelevant those values that transcend the issue of professionalism.
An action may be well within the norms of professional judgment and at the
same time violate constitutional rights to freedom from physical violence, bodily
intrusion, punishment, interference with the parent-child relationship, or
limitations of speech or religion. A finding that professional judgment was
followed thus has little if any relevance to the protection of civil rights; courts
need to look beyond the professional recommendation to the effect of state action
on an individual's rights.
1. Negative Rights Claims in the Institutional Setting
a. Right to Refuse Treatment
The law is clear that a competent individual outside government custody
cannot be treated against her will; the Supreme Court probably raised this rule
to the level of a constitutional right in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department
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of Health.1 48 Most state courts have applied this holding equally to institu-
tionalized persons, requiring a judicial finding of incompetency before an
individual can be treated against her will; 49 and many institutionalized
individuals in fact remain competent to make treatment decisions.' 50 Federal
constitutional law, however, follows the professional judgment standard,' 5'
which requires no showing as to the patient's competence, condition with or
without medication, or need for treatment. Nor is it necessary to show that the
proposed treatment will be effective, that medication is the least restrictive
alternative,152 or even that any treatment alternatives have been considered
or attempted in treating the patient. Certainly, no hearing is required. 53 Rather,
the constitutional right of institutionalized patients to refuse antipsychotic
medications can be overridden under current law by a showing that the physician
has not substantially departed from professional judgment in ordering forced
medication.
54
148. 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2851 (1990). The Court stated that "[tihe principle that a competent person has
a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from
our prior decisions." The four dissenting Justices characterized the right to refuse treatment as "fundamental,"
110 S. Ct. at 2865 (Brennan, J., dissenting); 110 S. Ct. at 2885 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor,
a member of the majority, wrote a separate concurring opinion emphasizing the strength of the competent
person's right to refuse medical treatment. 110 S. Ct. at 2856-57 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
149. See Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986); Rogers v. Commissioner of Dep't of Mental
Health, 458 N.E.2d 308 (Mass. 1983). See also cases cited infra note 210. But see Commissioner of Correction
v. Myers, 399 N.E.2d 452,458 (Mass. 1979) (requiring competent, unconsenting prisoner to undergo kidney
dialysis because state interests in preservation of life and orderly prison administration outweigh individual
rights of privacy and bodily integrity).
150. See PAUL S. APPELBAUM & THOMAS G. GUTHEIL, CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY AND
THE LAW 220 (2d ed. 1991).
151. See United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988) (en bane), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016
(1990); Dautremont v. Broadlawns Hosp., 827 F.2d 291, 300 (8th Cir. 1987); Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d
1387, 1395-96 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1214 (1985); Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F2d
960, 977-81 (2d Cir. 1983). While neither the D.C. Circuit nor the Fifth Circuit has addressed the issue,
several district court decisions have utilized the professional judgment standard. United States v. Leatherman,
580 F. Supp. 977,980 (D.D.C. 1983), appeal dismissed and case remanded, 729 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
See also R.A.J. v. Miller, 590 F. Supp. 1319, 1321 (N.D. Tex. 1984). The application of the professional
judgment standard in cases involving the right to refuse treatment arose when federal courts began analogizing
the physical restraints used in Youngberg to the "chemical restraint" represented by psychotropic medication.
The courts also took their cue from the fact that the Supreme Court vacated Rennie v. Klein, a Third Circuit
right-to-refuse-treatment case pending before it at the time Youngberg was decided, and remanded it for
reconsideration in light of Youngberg. Rennie v. Klein, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982). See, e.g., Project Release,
722 F.2d at 979-80; R.AJ., 590 F. Supp. at 1320-21. On remand, the Rennie court promptly adopted the
professional judgment standard for deciding cases involving the right to refuse medication, although the
en bane court could not muster a majority to agree to an exact meaning of the professional judgment standard
in the context of the right to refuse treatment. Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983) (on remand).
152. However, one circuit requires the court to consider the availability of alternative, less restrictive
courses of action. Bee, 744 F.2d. at 1396. In addition, three members of the en bane court in Rennie v. Klein
joined in a concurrence that would require such analysis. Rennie, 720 F.2d at 274-77 (Weis, J., concurring).
Two judges believed the principle should be applicable but found such application foreclosed by Youngberg.
Id. at 271 (Adams, J., concurring); Id. at 272 (Becker, J., concurring).
153. In some cases, the state required and the court approved a set of mandatory consultations and
additional approvals before medication against the patient's will could commence. All of the consultations
were among mental health professionals, usually at the same facility. See Rennie, 720 F.2d at 270 & n.9;
R.AJ., 590 F. Supp. at 1321-22 (citing Rennie).
154. See Charters, 863 F.2d at 305-08 & n.4; Dautremont, 827 F.2d at 300; Johnson v. Silvers, 742
F.2d 823, 825 (4th Cir. 1984); Project Release, 722 F.2d at 977-81.
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The professional may well be correct in regarding the treatment as effective
and thus may be exercising the best professional judgment in forcibly medicating
the patient. But this judicial approach falls to consider-indeed, it does not even
articulate-the competing values at stake. These values have been readily
recognized in other decisions involving refusals of medical treatment
recommended by a treating professional, such as blood transfusions violating
the religious beliefs of the patient.
1 55
Individuals refusing treatment do not seek services or challenge the quality
of treatment. Their claim is to be protected from state intrusions in the name
of treatment. The professional judgment standard is meaningless in this context.
It may be appropriate to use the professional judgment standard to decide
whether an institutionalized or imprisoned patient is constitutionally entitled
to a particular treatment program or to a certain medication or drug, such as
AZT.56 But to apply the identical standard to determine the constitutionality
of forcing AZT or some other medication on an unwilling patient misses the
enormous distinction between the two scenarios.1 57 The professional judgment
standard does not distinguish between treatment requested and treatment refused.
Furthermore, because the focus is on the professional's judgment rather than
on the legal claim, no distinction is made between "treatments" such as restraints
that implicate traditional liberty interests in freedom of movement and more
benign treatments such as basket weaving and pottery classes.
155. These competing values were well stated in a dissenting opinion by Justice Burger when he was
a judge on the D.C. Circuit. Reviewing a case in which Georgetown College had petitioned the court for
permission to administer blood to an unwilling Jehovah's Witness at the university's hospital, Burger quoted
from Justice Brandeis's famous declaration that "[the makers of our Constitution ... sought to protect
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against
the Government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized man."' In re President of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1010, 1016-17 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (Burger,
J., dissenting) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). Judge
Burger then noted that:
Nothing in this utterance suggests that Justice Brandeis thought an individual possessed these
rights only as to sensible beliefs, valid thoughts, reasonable emotions, or well-founded sensations.
I suggest he intended to include a great many foolish, unreasonable and even absurd ideas which
do not conform, such as refusing medical treatment even at great risk.
Id. at 1017 (Burger, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
156. See Hanson v. Clarke County, 867 F.2d 1115 (8th Cir. 1989) (noting mentally retarded person
has constitutional right to adequate treatment and placement, but not to an optimal placement); Commonwealth
v. Davis, 551 N.E.2d 39, 41 (Mass. 1990) (explaining involuntarily committed patient entitled to "treatment
which is suitable for him to the best of the staff's collective judgment," but not to optimal treatment) (citations
omitted); Wilson v. Franceschi, 735 F. Supp. 395, 397 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (indicating prisoner claiming that
denial of AZT constitutes unconstitutional cruel and unusual punishment must show that "an official's conduct
consists of 'acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs."') (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)).
157. The crucial distinction between the state's "duty to treat" and the patient's obligation to accept
that treatment, or his "duty to be treated," was made long ago by Professor Jay Katz, who worried that the
"right" to treatment would be forced on unwilling patients. Jay Katz, The Right to Treatment-An Enchanting
Legal Fiction?, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 755, 761-63 (1969). See also supra note 148, discussing Cruzan v.
Director, Mo. Dep't of Health. 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2851 (1990).
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b. Behavior Modification: Punishment, Liberty and Professional
Judgment
Behavior modification is a central goal of many mental disability
professionals, especially those dealing with mental retardation. 58 It is also
used with juveniles, particularly in the area of juvenile justice. Cases involving
behavior modification programs represent a particularly good example of the
importance of distinguishing between negative and affirmative constitutional
claims. In some of these cases, plaintiffs assert a constitutional right to behavior
modification programs as treatment. In others, plaintiffs seek judicialprotection
from behavior modification programs that they claim infringe their liberty; these
negative rights cases call for a different analysis than the affirmative rights cases.
Yet the professional judgment standard as presently applied does not admit this
distinction.
59
Where plaintiffs have asserted an affirmative right to behavior modification
programs, courts have appropriately looked to the professional judgment standard
and found such programs constitutionally required. 60  The professional
judgment standard has not yet been applied to behavior modification programs
in negative rights cases because plaintiffs are not bringing federal constitutional
challenges to behavior modification programs in state institutions.' 61 In this
author's experience, mental health lawyers do not litigate such claims because
they assume they would fail under the professional judgment standard. This is
probably correct, because behavior modification is a widely accepted professional
practice. Yet looking simply to professional judgment would miss the crux of
such negative rights claims.
In constitutional challenges to behavior modification programs, plaintiffs
do not challenge the programs' professional adequacy; rather, they demand
158. COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 60, at 1481-82 ("Comparative studies
indicate that behavioral therapies involving straightforward applications of shaping and contingency
management are the treatment of choice for developing appropriate social behaviors .... ).
159. There are many reasons for the apparent paradox that there have been both cases claiming the
right to behavior modification and cases objecting to such programs. Objections to behavior modification
tend to be filed on behalf of prisoners, children in the juvenile justice system, and people in psychiatric
hospitals; claims asserting a right to behavior modification programs are more often made on behalf of
mentally retarded people. Additionally, "behavior modification" covers a wide variety of programs, including
electric shock and cattle prods, see infra notes 162-170 and accompanying text, and programs that involve
only positive reinforcement. The complexity of this issue is illustrated by Youngberg itself: the Pennhurst
staff had devised a behavior modification program to eliminate Romeo's aggressive behavior, but his mother
refused permission to implement it. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 311-12 (1982).
160. See, e.g., Jackson v. Fort Stanton Hosp. & Training Sch., 757 F. Supp. 1243, 1309 (D.N.M. 1990),
rev'd in part, 964 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1992); Thomas S. v. Flaherty, 699 F. Supp. 1178, 1186, (W.D.N.C.
1988), aft'd, 902 F.2d 250 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, I11 S. Ct. 373 (1990); Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 673
F. Supp. 828, 864, 866 (N.D. Tex. 1987).
161. Such claims are reported in cases involving other contexts, such as juvenile justice, prison, and
jail settings, e.g., S.D. v. Faulkner, 705 F. Supp. 1361, 1366 (S.D. Ind. 1989); Goodwin v. Shapiro, 545
F. Supp. 826, 826-27, 840 (N.J. 1982); Clonce v. Richardson, 379 F. Supp. 338, 352 (W.D. Mo. 1974),
where, until recently, the professional judgment standard had not been applied, see infra Part uI(A)(2)-(3).
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freedom from punishment, bodily restraint, or even assert the right to adequate
food, clothing and shelter. In the name of behavior modification, clients have
been denied access to food, 162 religious services, 163 and visitation with their
families 64 They have been slapped, grabbed and pulled by the hair,165 and
jabbed between their fingers by the point of a pencil with sufficient force to
leave welts and scratches. 66 Less than twenty-five years ago, the use of cattle
prods was acceptable as behavior modification. 67 By 1971, over 26 studies
had employed electric shock or emetics to suppress homosexual or other so-
called deviant sexual behavior.
161
Programs of aversive therapy and behavior modification are certainly within
the realm of professional judgment. 169 Professionals rely on the effectiveness
of these programs to extinguish target behaviors. 70 However, by evaluating
a program solely on the basis of whether its use departs from professional
judgment, a court ignores the individual rights at stake.
For example, patients at the Iowa Security Medical Facility challenged the
use of apomorphine, a drug that causes vomiting for fifteen minutes to an hour,
to punish an individual who "violated the behavior protocol established for him
by the staff.' 7' These "violations" included refusing to get up, giving cigarettes
against orders, talking, swearing, and lying. 72 The defendants' response to
162. Goodwin v. Shapiro, 545 F. Supp. at 844 (explaining stipulation of settlement providing that
"nutritionally adequate diet shall not be... withheld in any way as part of a behavior modification program").
163. See David B. Wexler, Token and Taboo: Behavior Modification, Token Economies, and the Law,
61 CAL. L. REV. 81, 85-86 (1973), for a discussion of a "token economy" system at an institution where
attendance at religious services was made contingent on patients' completion of work assignments or self-care
activities. The program was tremendously successful in increasing "target behaviors." Presumably, a patient
could agree to participate in such a treatment program voluntarily; by the same token, to force a patient
into such a treatment program would raise serious First Amendment questions. Under current analysis,
however, the question would be whether such a program was a departure from professional standards or
practice.
164. Doe v. Public Health Trust, 696 F.2d 901, 905 (11th Cir. 1983). See infra notes 181-183 and
accompanying text.
165. Milonas v. Williams, 691 F.2d 931, 942 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983).
166. Kate' Sch. v. Dep't of Health, 94 Cal. App. 3d 606, 623 (1979).
167. As late as 1969, a top journal in the field of psychiatry reported successful use of cattle prods
on mental patients to reduce aggressive behavior. Katz, supra note 157, at 776-77 n.64 (citing Arnold M.
Ludwig et al., The Control of Violent Behavior through Faradic Shock, 148 J. NERvous & MENTAL DISEASE,
624, 624-26, 635-36 (1969)).
168. RALPH ScHWrrZGEBEL, DEVELOPMENT AND LEGAL REGULATION OF COERCIVE BEHAVIOR
MODIFICATION TECHNIQUES WITH OFFENDERS, in LEONARD ORLAND, JUSTICE, PUNISHMENT, TREATMENT
205, 207 (1973).
169. There is, however, some doubt about the long-term effectiveness of aversive therapy. See, e.g.,
Morgan v. Sproat, 432 F. Supp. 1130, 1147-48 (S.D. Miss. 1977).
170. For example, one study of the treatment of transvestism noted that "the patient received painful
electric shocks on his feet from a grid on which he was standing while dressing in women's clothes. Over
a period of 8 days, the patient received a total of 200 shocks during the frequent treatment sessions. A follow-
up study 14 months later indicated only one subsequent relapse of cross-dressing by this patient."
SCHWITzGEBEL, supra note 168, at 207.
171. Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136, 1137 (8th Cir. 1973); see also Mackey v. Procunier, 477 .2d
877 (9th Cir. 1973) (challenging administration of succinycholine, described as a "breath-stopping" drug,
as aversive treatment).
172. Knecht, 488 F.2d at 1137.
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the plaintiffs' constitutional challenge was that "there had been a 50% to 60%
effect in modifying behavior by the use of apomorphine at ISMF."'73 For a
professional, the central issue regarding aversive behavior therapy such as
apomorphine is its effectiveness in changing behavior, and professional norms
are based largely on the effectiveness of treatment. Constitutional norms, on
the other hand, are based on different values, and the "successful" outcome of
the apomorphine injections may be irrelevant to a legal inquiry into whether
such injections violate constitutional rights.
In a recent case, a pretrial detainee was sent to a correctional medical facility
for "examination and treatment." The treatment team described the patient, Mr.
Green, as having
constantly tested limits, been uncaring of expectations, and ... alienated
his peers. He would belch and pass gas in public, neglect his hygiene
if allowed, be profane,--in short, he would almost defy both staff and
patients. Not only would he not accept, but argue against constructive
criticism. 74
The treatment team formulated the following therapy:
We therefore propose that he be placed on a special treatment program
whereby he earn himself out of the B unit [seclusion unit] in two weeks.
This goes as follows: On his first 24 hours, he is granted nothing. On
day 1 he gets his blanket at night; on day 2, he earns his mattress at
night; on day 3 he earns the privilege to work; day 4 he earns his
breakfast; on day 5 he earns the privilege of attending 9 a.m. class;
on day 6 he eams the privilege of attending group, but if that is not
a group day, he can earn an hour's free time; on day 7 he earns lunch;
on day 8 he earns 1 p.m. class; on day 9 he earns supper[;] on day 10,
he earns an hour of free time; on day 11 he earns evening class, but
in the absence of that, he is given one-half hour on the unit; on day
12 he is allowed to earn commissary; on day 13, he is finally liberated.
Any violations would set him back one day. 75
Because Green was a pretrial detainee, his claims were considered under
the standard set forth in Bell v. Wolfish. 76 However, had Green been a patient
173. Id. at 1138.
174. Green v. Baron, 662 F. Supp. 1378, 1380 (S.D. Iowa 1987), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 879
F.2d 305 (8th Cir. 1989).
175. Id. at 1381.
176. This standard permits constitutional deprivations if they are reasonably related to a legitimate purpose
and not excessive in relation to that purpose. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538-39 (1979). The jury in
Green found for the defendants. However, the district court judge decided that the jury instructions had been
flawed, and granted plaintiffs' motion for judgment n.o.v.. The court of appeals agreed that the jury
instructions were flawed, but concluded after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to defendants
that a jury could have found that the deprivations Green experienced were rationally related to a legitimate
government objective. Therefore, the court remanded for a new trial. Green, 879 F.2d at 310.
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in a state mental institution, the professional judgment standard would probably
have upheld the program. In closing statements to the jury, the defendants'
attorney made the following argument: "I think the crux of this case is really
this question-were the things that happened to Mr. Green at the Oakdale
facility-were they punishment or were they treatment? It's our position that
they were treatment."177 If the answer to this question was that "the things
that happened to Mr. Green" were professionally acceptable treatment, then the
professional judgment standard would have been met, ending the inquiry.
However, because constitutional rights include autonomy, bodily integrity,
and the right to be left alone, a finding that the challenged actions are
professionally acceptable treatment is insufficient. As the district court stated,
the dichotomy between an intent to punish and an intent to treat
is ... false. When a mental patient is intentionally subjected to harsh
conditions in order to deter him from maintaining a course of conduct,
the fact that it is done in the name of psychiatric treatment does not
keep it from being intentional punishment.
1 78
The importance of the court's role in protecting individuals from state
intrusion-and the inability of the professional judgment standard to accomplish
this end-can be seen by considering the consequences if the professional
judgment standard were to be adopted in cases alleging illegal search and seizure,
psychologically coerced confessions, or police entrapment. Many such actions
could be considered professionally acceptable police practices, but citizens' rights
against police intrusion would be greatly diminished if professional acceptability
from the standpoint of the police were all that the Constitution required. 179
Courts are often blind to this argument in cases involving behavior modification
and other treatment practices of professionals primarily because of the images,
discussed in Part I, that judges associate with professionalism. Courts are
unaccustomed to connecting the word "treatment" with an unwilling patient
compelled to submit to professional ministrations. To the courts, "treatment"
does not connote an adversarial relationship. But in negative rights cases, the
professional and patient are adversaries, and the court must rely upon
constitutional doctrines and values, rather than on professional values, to resolve
the dispute.
177. Green, 662 F. Supp. at 1386.
178. Id. The court of appeals disagreed, finding that Green could not prevail under the Fourteenth
Amendment unless the defendants had intended to punish him or the deprivation was excessive in relation
to the defendant's goals. Green, 879 F.2d 305. The key is whether the courts follow their own conception
of excessive deprivation or defer to professional judgment
179. See also supra note 147, discussing a defendant's constitutionally protected right to proceed pro





The Constitution protects from government intrusion decisions regarding
marriage, family association, and procreation."'0 Such decisions play a major
role in shaping an individual's identity. The idea that the state could dictate an
individual's family decisions is antithetical to constitutional values. However,
to a mental health professional, dictating these choices may seem a useful aspect
of treatment. Once again, because professional goals threaten constitutional
values, family rights would be severely curtailed if the professional judgment
standard were applied to this kind of decision.
In institutional settings, romantic attachments and family interactions are
often viewed as central to an individual's illness and treatment. In one case,
parents who had hospitalized their minor child were forbidden from visiting
her because her therapy regimen "required Jane to earn all privileges, including
the privilege to communicate with her parents in person or in writing. 181 This
practice is common at institutions and treatment facilities.1 82 It is an exercise
of professional judgment aimed at behavior modification or protection of the
patient.
Yet denying parents and children the right to see each other raises issues
of individual rights unrelated to whether the treatment decision departed from
professional judgment. The First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of familial
association are not limited to situations in which professionals deem exercise
of those rights appropriate or wise. To determine the constitutionality of
restrictions on family visitation solely according to the professional judgment
standard ignores the salience of these rights and precludes them from
consideration by courts hearing challenges to such restrictions."8 3
A visitation case decided before Youngberg illustrates this point. The court
applied a rational basis test to the defendant's visitation policies, which
prohibited patients from receiving visits from the same person more than twice
a week. The court found that these policies bore no relation to asserted concerns
about security and treatment '8 The court did not consider whether the policies
180. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977).
181. Doe v. Public Health Trust, 696 F.2d 901, 905 (11th Cir. 1983).
182. See, e.g., Gary H. v. Hegstrom, 831 F.2d 1430, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987) (Ferguson, J., concurring)
("Visitation for those students in D-1 is limited to thirty minutes on Sunday afternoons.").
183. The court in Doe v. Public Health Trust avoided the more difficult questions in this case by finding
that if the child was a voluntary patient, her rights could be waived in exchange for the benefit of treatment,
as long as the no-communication rule was "medically legitimate and therapeutic." 696 F.2d at 904. The
case was remanded for consideration of whether these conditions had been met. The court declined to articulate
a standard for determining whether the rule was "medically legitimate and therapeutic," but suggested that
the Youngberg standard might be appropriate. Id. The court thus finessed the issue of whether Doe's parents,
who committed her "voluntarily," could waive her right to refuse treatment or to visitation with her family.
While a parent can "voluntarily" commit a minor, Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979), it does not necessarily
follow that the parent can waive all of the minor's rights.
184. Schmidt v. Schubert, 422 F. Supp. 57 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (granting plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment on challenge to hospital visitation policies).
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conformed to professional judgment; rather, it based its decision on the lack
of a sufficient relationship between the policy and its stated purpose. Although
it is not apparent that a rational relationship between treatment goals and
institutional policy forbidding family association is a sufficiently strict standard,
the rational relationship requirement is clearly an improvement over the
professional judgment standard.
Romantic and sexual attachments between patients are also the focus of
professional judgment. These are often
either prohibited outright or subjected to intense staff scrutiny. The
guidelines published by one hospital provide: "If you develop a
relationship with another patient, staff will get together with you to
help decide whether this relationship is beneficial or detrimental to you
and whether it would be to your advantage to continue or discontinue
the relationship." Several authors have suggested that "sexual activity
between psychiatric inpatients should be strictly prohibited, and when
it occurs patients should be isolated . . . and tranquilized if
necessary."' 5
Institutionalization-indeed, any government custody-involves a necessary
limitation of privacy rights. Yet these rights survive incarceration 86 and
institutionalization in some form.1 87 Institutional restraints on intimate relation-
ships and marriage have implications far beyond their therapeutic function,
implications that the professional judgment standard does not address. The values
of autonomy and the right to make personal decisions about intimate matters
such as sex and marriage are not likely to weigh heavily on the minds of
professionals. One ex-patient reports the reaction to a single kiss between two
patients in an institutional setting:
[I]n the lobby of our ward, where both men and women are allowed
to mingle platonically, a woman whom I had met began to scooch over
next to me on the couch where we were both sitting. She teasingly
leaned over toward me, flirting mischievously with the idea of kissing
me in public (as what, at any time, wasn't public?). Finally, as I had
decided to be as brave or stupid as she was being, our lips touched.
I was, in fact, very much attracted to her. This simple act of kissing,
185. Stefan, supra note 113, at 431.
186. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95-96 (1987).
187. In Youngberg v. Romeo, the Supreme Court noted: "Persons who have been involuntarily comntted
are entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions
of confinement are designed to punish." 457 U.S. 307, 321-22 (1982). The standards set out in Wyatt v.
Stickney include the right to "suitable opportunities for the patient's interaction with members of the opposite
sex," subject to "adequate" or "appropriate" supervision. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 381 (M.D.
Ala. 1972); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 399 (M.D. Ala. 1972). Interestingly, institutionalized
mentally ill people enjoy greater rights than institutionalized mentally retarded people, whose rights may
be abrogated by order of a qualified mental retardation professional. Compare 344 F. Supp. at 381 with
344 F. Supp. at 399.
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which was the extent of any physical contact I received during that three
months ...took much courage on the part of both of us. Shock
treatments were rampant in [our institution] and we knew we would
be reported. Sure enough, the attendants came pouring out from behind
the glass window to separate us.
88
In fact, there are consistent reports of women being institutionalized because
of sexual behavior.189 Although, for a variety of reasons, litigation in this area
is sparse, 190 it is evident that applying the professional judgment standard to
these kinds of claims will exclude some of the core values protected by the
Constitution.
2. Professional Judgment and the Denial of Procedural Due Process
Procedural due process is a crucial component in defending against
government infringement of substantive rights. One of the crucial flaws of the
professional judgment standard is that it precludes a meaningful opportunity
for notice and a hearing. Under the professional judgment standard, a claim that
a substantive right has been violated is refocused from the issue of the loss of
the right itself to the question of whether the right was deprived pursuant to
professional judgment. Such judgments are perceived by courts to arise from
a decisionmaking process opaque to judicial inquiry, "one much more subjective
and less susceptible, therefore, to fine-tuned judicial review,"' 9' and therefore
a process too subtle for procedural formalities. Thus, courts conclude that they
can grant no meaningful procedural protections to plaintiffs.
Under the professional judgment standard, the finding that professional
judgment was exercised satisfies the patient's rights to procedure as well as her
substantive rights. As one court held in a case involving academic professionals,
Indeed, the process due one subject to this highly subjective
evaluative decision can only be the exercise of professional judgment
by those empowered to make the final decision in a way not so
manifestly arbitrary and capricious that a reviewing court could
188. DOUG CAMERON, HOW To SURVIVE BEING COMMrITED TO A MENTAL HOSPITAL 44 (1980).
189. E.g., In the Matter ofLynette H., 368 S.E.2d 452 (N.C. Ct. App.), vacated, 374 S.E.2d 272 (N.C.
1988); JUDI CHAMBERLIN, ON OUR OWN 119-20 (1978); CHESLER, supra note 83, at 162.
190. Michael L. Perlin, Hospitalized Patients and the Right to Sexual Interaction: Beyond the Last
Frontier? 3 J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY (forthcoming June 1992) ("lawyers are quick to abandon any allegiance
to advocacy roles in" cases involving right to voluntary sexual activity in institutional settings).
191. Siu v. Johnson, 748 F.2d 238,244-45 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding that in state university tenure decision,
due process requires only professional academic evaluation, not adversarial legal proceedings). As discussed
in Part I, the perceived objectivity of professionalism is one of the assumptions supporting the Supreme
Court's presumption of the validity of professional decisions. Nevertheless, courts can and do refer without
apparent contradiction to the unreviewable subjectivity of professional judgment as a reason to deny
procedural-and ultimately, substantive-due process protections. Id. at 244.
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confidently say of it that it did not in the end involve the exercise of
professional judgment.
192
This collapsing of substantive and procedural rights under the professional
judgment standard was explicated by another court reviewing a challenge to
the use of physical restraints. That court observed:
[A] medical determination by the appropriate professional provides all
of the process that is due in such a case; thus, if plaintiff's substantive
due process rights were not violated (because professional judgment
was exercised), any procedural due process requirements (which require
essentially the same exercise ofprofessionaljudgment) would undoubt-
edly have been fulfilled as well.' 93
In other words, a court's determination that professional judgment was exercised
ends both the procedural and the substantive inquiry simultaneously.
Because there is no recognition of competing values-because the patient's
voice is so completely silenced-no balancing is required of the judge. The
professional takes over the judicial function entirely, assessing conflicting
interests and authorizing limitations on substantive constitutional rights if
professional judgment so requires. This is precisely the procedure endorsed by
the Fourth Circuit in its en banc decision in United States v. Charters:
194
It is therefore settled that in appropriate circumstances government may
properly commit base-line decisions to "deprive" persons of certain
liberty (or property) interests to appropriate professionals exercising
their specialized professional judgments rather than to traditional judicial
or administrative-type adjudicative processes. This occurs when the
conflicting interests-individual and governmental--can only be
assessed in those terms, and even when, as is usual, the exercise of
professional judgment necessarily involves some interpretation of the
disputable "meaning" of clinical "facts."
' 95
Yet the courts act disingenuously when they raise a white flag in the face
of subjective, interpretive decisions by state officials. Many subjective decisions
are governed by procedural due process protections, thus requiring at least some
192. Id. at 245. See also United States v. Charters, 863 F2d 302, 308 n.4 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc),
cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016 (1990) (collapsing the substantive and procedural due process analysis; for both
analyses, the professional judgment standard is adequate, if properly administered, to safeguard constitutionally
protected liberty interests).
193. Wells v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1258, 1261 n.2 (7th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
See also McCartney v. Barg, 643 F. Supp. 1181, 1184 (N.D. Ohio 1986) (reading Youngberg as holding
that "the analytical approach in determining the extent of both substantive and procedural due process rights
is similar.").
194. 863 F.2d 302.
195. Id. at 308.
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accountability and openness from the decisionmakers. 196 Perhaps it is the
Supreme Court's idealized image of certain professions that has led it to defer
absolutely to professional expertise in this particular area. Whether one calls
this deference an abdication of the court's function of the development of
procedural standards or the "commit[ment of] base-line decisions to 'deprive'
persons of certain liberty . interests to appropriate professionals, ' 197 the
result is to eliminate procedural due process protections for the victims of such
decisions. As will be discussed in the following Subsection, however, courts
can, and in other contexts do, develop procedural protections to weigh
substantive claims of individuals who challenge the decisions of government
experts.
3. Adjudicating Negative Rights: Alternatives to the Professional Judgment
Standard
Courts can be extremely deferential without abdicating their responsibility
to create meaningful standards for reviewing constitutional challenges to state
action. Standards can give discretion to state defendants while still permitting
traditional due process review of challenged state actions. The best examples
are the standards developed to review allegations of constitutional deprivation
in prisons and jails. When considering constitutional claims in these settings,
courts balance individual rights against state interests as they do in noncustodial
settings. However, the Court views state interests as heightened in custodial
settings, and thus employs a more deferential standard of review.1 98
The standard of review used to assess whether a restriction or regulation
by prison officials violates constitutional standards was established by the
196. For example, the decision to terminate parental rights could be characterized as a subjective decision
best left to the "professional judgment" of foster care workers, yet the Constitution requires notice, hearing,
and, in certain circumstances, representation before such a deprivation occurs. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Department
of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 32-33 (1981) (holding that trial judges should decide in particular cases whether
due process requires the appointment of counsel for indigent parents in termination proceedings).
197. Charters, 863 F.2d at 308.
198. Ideally, courts should review claims of constitutional violations in institutional settings according
to the same varied standards used in noncustodial settings, though the fact of government custody will increase
the state interests to be considered. For example, claims of violations of First Amendment rights would be
judged according to First Amendment and case law standards, while claims of violations of bodily security
would be judged according to Fourteenth Amendment standards and case law in that area. See infra text
accompanying note 217. Given the current composition of the Supreme Court, the use of a single standard
is unlikely to change in the near future. Less than five years ago, the Supreme Court rejected the argument
that prison regulations totally foreclosing the exercise of fundamental rights should be scrutinized under
a more rigorous standard than those merely limiting the exercise of those rights. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,
482 U.S. 342, 349 n.2 (1987). Earlier, the Court failed to draw a distinction between claims that implicated
fundamental rights and those that did not. Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 597-98 (1984) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the Court applies rational relation review to prison regulations without considering
respondents' claim that these regulations abridge fundamental rights). The Court has also rejected the argument
that more rigorous scrutiny is appropriate unless a court concludes that the activity for which prisoners seek
protection is "presumptively dangerous." Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 88-89 (1987), cited with approval
in O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 349 n.2.
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Supreme Court in Turner v. Safley.' 99 A "regulation is valid if it is reasonably
related to legitimate penological interests." 20° The Court listed four factors
for courts to consider in determining whether a regulation is reasonably related
to valid penological objectives: (1) whether the prison regulation is rationally
related to the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it; (2) the
availability of other avenues for the exercise of the asserted right; (3) the impact
that accommodating the right would have on guards and other inmates and on
the allocation of the prison's resources generally; (4) the existence of alternatives
to the challenged regulation that would satisfy the prison's concerns.20' This
standard is extremely deferential to state needs, yet it preserves the judicial
function of evaluating constitutional rights in the face of invasive state actions.
Unlike the professional judgment standard, the Turner standard requires the state
specifically to identify the state interests served by the policy or regulation; it
requires a relationship between those interests and the challenged action; and
it requires the court to determine whether the relationship is constitutionally
sufficient according to four fairly specific considerations. Even if only a rational
relationship is required, it is the court that determines whether this relationship
exists, while weighing the governmental interest against identified constitutional
rights of the plaintiff. The court must articulate the reasoning behind its
determination in terms of such tangible criteria as the existence of alternatives
to the challenged policy and the cost of accommodating the prisoner's rights.
This adjudicatory path is significantly different from the professional
judgment standard. Because the only sources of information about professional
judgment are professionals themselves, "the due process standard is based on
norms set by the mental health professionals. 2 °2 The definition of actions
that comport with constitutional standards is, in effect, left to the professional
community. While the Supreme Court characterized the professional judgment
standard as a "balancing" of state interests against the plaintiff's liberty
interests, it is really nothing of the kind. As traditionally understood,
balancing in constitutional cases requires the court to weigh the challenged
action's impact on the plaintiff's rights against the state interests served by the
deprivation. The professional judgment standard simply inquires whether the
deprivation of the plaintiff's rights would be acceptable to professionals. The
deprivation need not be related to state interests; indeed, state interests may never
be articulated. Thus, balancing does not take place under the professional
judgment standard-neither professionals nor courts compare the degree of harm
to the individual with the necessity of the government action.
199. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
200. Id. at 89.
201. Id. at 89-91.
202. Wells v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1258, 1262 (7th Cir. 1985).
203. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982).
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The proof of this constitutional pudding is in the outcomes of the cases,
which show that the standard articulated in Turner v. Safley2°4 and its progeny
give prisoners more substantive and procedural protection against state abuse
than would the professional judgment standard. Under this standard, appellate
courts have rejected involuntary medication that trial courts had permitted under
the professional judgment standard. 2°5 Courts have also imposed procedural
due process requirements for involuntary medication of prisoners that would
not be required under the professional judgment standard. Finally, Turner itself
vindicated the family and association rights of a prisoner in a way that a ruling
under the professional judgment standard would not have.
In Washington v. Harper, 6 the Supreme Court considered the right of
a prisoner to refuse antipsychotic medication under the Turner standard, and
articulated a specific substantive standard that the state must meet before
overriding a prisoner's refusal of medication: the state must show that the
prisoner was mentally ill; that, as a result of this mental illness, the prisoner
was a danger to himself or others; and that the medication would benefit the
prisoner.207 The Court further held that the prisoner was entitled to procedural
protections to guard against erroneous conclusions with regard to his mental
illness, his dangerousness, or the benefit the drugs might provide. The state's
procedures, which provided for "notice, the right to be present at an adversary
hearing [with lay assistance], and the right to present and cross-examine
witnesses," were found sufficient."8
The protections established in Harper are far less extensive than those that
the court below had found to be constitutionally mandated,2 9 and far less
extensive than those granted by almost every state court considering the right
to refuse treatment.210 Nevertheless, both the substantive and procedural2 '
204. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
205. This is reflected in the number of cases involving involuntary medication of prisoners that were
reversed on appeal because the lower court had incorrectly applied the professional judgment standard and
had permitted medication without any showing as to dangerousness or the benefit of the medication. See,
e.g., Brower v. Smith, No. 89-6700, 923 F.2d 848 (Table, text in Westlaw) (4th Cir. Jan. 18, 1991); Peacock
v. Adams, No. 89-7695, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 17398 (4th Cir. Mar. 26, 1990).
206. 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
207. The Court held that "the Due Process Clause permits the State to treat a prison inmate who has
a serious mental illness with antipsychotic drugs against his will, if the inmate is dangerous to himself or
others and the treatment is in the inmate's medical interest." Id. at 227. However, the Court created some
confusion about what the constitutional standard requires by specifically upholding the Washington State
Special Offender Center's policy. Id. at 236. This policy allows involuntary medication only if the prisoner
"(I) suffers from a 'mental disorder' and (2) is 'gravely disabled' or poses a 'likelihood of serious harm'
to himself, others, or their property." Id. at 215 (quoting the policy) (emphasis added).
208. Id. at 235.
209. Harper v. Washington, 759 P.2d 358, 363-65 (Wash. 1988), rev'd, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
210. See, e.g., Riese v. St. Mary's Hosp., 271 Cal. Rptr. 199 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988), app. dismissed, 774
P.2d 698 (Cal. 1989); People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961 (Colo. 1985); In re Orr, 531 N.E.2d 64 (1Il. App.
1988); In re M.P., 510 N.E.2d 645 (Ind. 1987); Rogers v. Dep't of Mental Health, 458 N.E.2d 308 (Mass.
1983); Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139 (Minn. 1988); Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986); In
re K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1980); State ex. rel. Jones v. Gerhardstein, 416 N.W.2d 883 (Wis. 1987).
211. In at least two cases, courts have invalidated institutional policies permitting forcible medication
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requirements for giving involuntary medication to a prisoner under Harper are
more rigorous than those mandated by the professional judgment standard.
The same is true in the area of family rights and freedom of association.
In Turner itself, the Court invalidated a prison regulation forbidding inmate
marriage unless the prison superintendent found compelling reasons to approve
it.212 The Court stated that the regulation was an "exaggerated response to
. . .security objectives"213 with "obvious, easy alternatives."2"4 The Court
found that the rule "sweeps much more broadly than can be explained by
petitioners' penological objectives.21 5 Most interestingly, the Court noted that
"although not necessary to the disposition of this case ... the rehabilitative
objective asserted to support the regulation itself is suspect," since marriage of
male prisoners was routinely permitted and marriage of female prisoners
routinely denied. 16 If the regulation at issue in Turner had been subject to
the professional judgment standard, the inquiry and outcome would have been
substantially different. Since many institutions and professionals discourage their
patients from marrying and engaging in intimate relations, the regulation probably
would not have constituted a departure from the standards of the profession;
therefore, it would very likely have been upheld.
Thus, by applying a Turner-type standard instead of the professional
judgment standard to state mental institution cases, the courts would reclaim
their role as the guardian of constitutional limits on state power. Judges are
confident and experienced in balancing various interests and in drawing
conclusions about whether a policy rationally accomplishes a particular purpose.
Courts could inquire into the relation between the challenged restriction and
the state's interest, be it therapeutic or otherwise. They could consider the
availability of other avenues for the exercise of the plaintiff's right, the effect
of accommodating the right on other patients and staff, and the availability of
less restrictive alternatives to the current rule or decision. Unlike the professional
judgment standard, this approach would require state professionals to articulate
reasons for their judgments and leave to the court the job of explicitly
considering the impact of these judgments on the patient's rights.
Although it is preferable to the professional judgment standard, however,
a Turner-type standard is far from ideal because it too provides individuals
diminished constitutional protections once they enter institutions. Individuals
in institutions merit no punishment, and should, as the Supreme Court
acknowledged in Youngberg, be treated with greater consideration than
of patients pursuant to professional judgment because these policies lacked the procedural protections mandated
by Harper. Williams v. Wilzack, 573 A.2d 809 (Md. 1990); Cliff v. Warden, No. 88-0000455, 1990 WL
279544 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 7, 1990).
212. Turner, 482 U.S. at 96.
213. Id. at 98.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 99.
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individuals in jail.217 Negative rights claims of mental patients should be
evaluated according to the standards used to protect such rights in
noninstitutional settings, with the fact of government custody simply increasing
the state's legitimate interests. Short of this, however, the Turner-type standard
would at least preserve the basic framework of our constitutional system by
requiring courts to conduct meaningful judicial review of state infringements
of civil liberties.
B. Affirmative Claims for Adequate Government Services: The Appropriate
Use of Professional Judgment
In resolving affirmative claims for government services, courts follow an
adjudicatory path that appropriately involves the professional judgment standard.
First, the court determines if the individual has a constitutional right to services
from the state. Such a right arises from the specific nature of an individual's
custody. For example, individuals institutionalized for mental disabilities are
entitled to "minimally adequate training,' '21 and every circuit but one that
has ruled on the question has held that children in foster care are entitled to
safe placement.219 Once the court has determined that the plaintiff has such
a right, Youngberg rightly requires that the service delivered accord with
professional standards.
The following hypothetical case study is intended to clarify the basis for
these rights, the standard by which violations of these rights should be judged,
and the distinction between standards to adjudicate affirmative claims under the
Due Process Clause and standards applicable to negative rights claims. Sandoz
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. recently developed a new drug called Clozaril 20 to treat
persons diagnosed with schizophrenia. 22 However, because its risks require
a rigorous monitoring program, it is quite expensive.222 Let us imagine that
217. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321-22.
218. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 319, n.25 (1982).
219. Yvonne L. v. New Mexico Dep't of Human Servs., 959 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1992); Winston v.
Children and Youth Servs., 948 F.2d 1380 (3rd Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2303 (1992); K.H. ex
rel. Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1990); Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791 (11th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989); Gibson v. Merced County Dep't of Human Resources, 799 F.2d 582
(9th Cir. 1986); Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 709 F.2d 782 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 864 (1983); LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959 (D.D.C. 1991); Del A. v. Roemer, 777 F.
Supp. 1297 (E.D. La. 1991); Rubacha v. Coler, 607 F. Supp. 477 (N.D. IM. 1985). The single exception
is the Sixth Circuit, which in Eugene D. v. Karman, 889 F.2d 701, 710 (6th Cir. 1989), cast doubt on whether
the Constitution permits such claims to be brought by children in foster care.
220. Clorazil is the brand name of the drug Clozapine.
221. For examples of Clozapine's use and effectiveness, see infra notes 244-247 and accompanying
text.
222. Treatment with Clozaril used to cost $9,000 a year. Daniel Ward et. al, Letter to the Editor:
Iljunction to Cover Cost of Clozapine, 148 AM. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 271 (1991). The high cost of the drug
treatment resulted from Sandoz's requirement that patients pay for weekly blood monitoring by Caremark,
Inc., as part of the purchase price of the drug. This practice ceased in May 1991, and Sandoz recently settled
a lawsuit for 20 million dollars charging that the arrangement violated antitrust laws. Sandoz Agrees to Pay
$20 Million to Settle Clozaril Lawsuit, 10 MENTAL HEALTH L. RPTR. 82 (Sept. 1992). A prisoner with AIDS
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a patient who has been hospitalized for years at a state institution, for whom
no other treatment has worked, claims that the failure to treat her with Clozaril
constitutes a denial of her due process right to minimally adequate treatment.
This hypothetical presents a question clearly distinct from that which a court
would face if the patient refused Clozaril, and the state wished to medicate her
forcibly.2 23 It also differs from the question presented by an allegation that
the state denied the patient Clozaril because of her race in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause. Rather, this scenario involves the claim that an individual
in government custody has a substantive due process right to treatment, and that
this right includes the affirmative right to receive a specific drug that may
constitute the only effective treatment for the condition causing her loss of
liberty.
Determining the existence of this right is clearly a matter for the courts.
The courts must examine its basis in law and craft a standard for the application
of this right. Yet, unlike negative rights claims, this affirmative claim asserts
that professional judgment mandates treatment with Clozaril. This Section will
first describe the theoretical foundations of the right to treatment and then discuss
how courts use the professional judgment standard to implement the right. I will
argue that the professional judgment standard is appropriate in cases involving
affirmative claims to government services to the extent that state professionals
apply their judgment untainted by state resource limitations, but that the standard
is problematic where this is not the case. I will also argue that Youngberg's
command that state professionals' judgments be presumed valid seriously
undercuts the protection provided by the professional judgment standard.
1. Legal Foundation of the Right to Treatment
Although courts have recognized a right to treatment for over twenty
years,224 both the basis for the right to treatment and its meaning in specific
cases have been the subject of substantial commentary.2u Early district court
requesting treatment with AZT presents a similar question to that of the patient in the Clozaril scenario.
Yet, of course, the two issues are not identical because presumably the prisoner having AIDS has not lost
his liberty on account of this condition, while the schizophrenic patient was hospitalized specifically to treat
her schizophrenia.
223. See discussion supra Part II(A)(l)(a).
224. Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 625 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (for mentally ill in hospital); Johnson
v. Solomon, 484 F Supp. 278, 297-300 (D. Md. 1979) (for juveniles in mental institution); Gary W. v.
Louisiana, 437 F. Supp. 1209, 1216-20 (E.D. La. 1976) (for mentally retarded, physically handicapped and
delinquent children); Davis v. Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196, 1197 (N.D. Ohio 1974) (for patients in state
mental hospital); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781,784 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (same); accordWeisch v. Likins,
373 F. Supp. 487, 491-500 (D. Minn. 1974) (for persons in state mental institutions).
1 225. Scholarly work on the right to treatment was abundant prior to 1982, and came to a virtual halt
in the years after Youngberg was decided. Compare Morton Bimbaum, Some Remarks on "The Right to
Tretament," 23 ALA. L. REV. 623 (1971); Bruce G. Mason & Frank J. Menolascino, The Right to Treatment
for Mentally Retarded Citizens: An Evolving Legal and Scientific Interface, 10 CREIGHTON L. REv. 124
(1976); Ralph K. Schwitzgebel, Right to Treatment for the Mentally Disabled: The Need for Realistic
Standards and Objective Criteria, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 513 (1973); Roy G. Spece, Jr., Preserving
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cases employed different standards than the Youngberg Court and based the right
to treatment on a different foundation. These cases are commonly assumed to
grant rights much broader than the right to treatment established in
Youngberg.226 This belief is unfounded, for many of the early cases are as
hesitant about invading professional prerogatives as was the Youngberg
Court.227 Rather, Youngberg establishes a foundation for a right to treatment
more expansive and more true to constitutional values than the early cases.
In the first of the early cases, Wyatt v. Stickney, the court based the right
to treatment on the so-called "quid pro quo" theory.228 Under this theory, in
the absence of conviction after a procedurally sound criminal trial, the state
cannot totally deprive a person of his or her liberty without offering some
affirmative benefit-such as treatment or habilitation-in return.229 Thus,
habilitation is the constitutionally required quid pro quo for civil confinement.
Another version of the quid pro quo theory requires that when the state deprives
an individual of liberty in order to provide treatment, it must in fact provide
that treatment. 03°
The problem with the quid pro quo theory for institutionalized individuals
is that, although it provides a foundation for the right to treatment, it also allows
the provision of treatment to serve as sufficient justification for deprivations
the Right to Treatment: A Critical Assessment and Constructive Development of Constitutional Right to
Treatment Theories, 20 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (1978); Symposium, The Mentally Ill and the Right to Treatment,
36 U. CI. L. REV. 742 (1969); Symposium, The Right to Treatment, 57 GEO. LJ. 673 (1969); Note,
Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally 111, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190 (1973); John C.
Roberts, Note, Civil Restraint, Mental Illness and the Right to Treatment, 77 YALE L.J. 87 (1967); Comment,
Wyatt v. Stickney and the Right of Civilly Committed Mental Patients to Adequate Treatment, 86 HARV.
L. REV. 1282 (1973); with Note, Beyond Youngberg: Protecting the Fundamental Rights of the Mentally
Retarded, 51 FORDHAMI L. REV. 1064 (1983); Note, The Constitutional Right to Treatment in Light of
Youngberg v. Romeo, 72 GEO. LJ. 1785 (1984).
226. See, e.g., New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752
(E.D.N.Y. 1973); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
227. See Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44,48, n.3 (4th Cir. 1977) ("[Clourts are ill-equipped to prescribe
the techniques of treatment .... The exact contours ofrelief should be left to the sound discretion of experts
in the field."); Johnson, 484 F. Supp. at 301 n.28 ("[Tjoo detailed a foray into the unresolved clinical and
treatment issues... could stifle new developments."); Davis v. Balson, 461 F. Supp. 842, 853 (N.D. Ohio
1978) (professional standards "must be accorded great weight" though they will not always "be constitutional
minimums"); Gary W., 437 F. Supp. at 1219 (cautioning against the imposition of "inexorable bonds").
228. Wyatt, 325 F. Supp. at 784. Earlier cases, notably Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir.
1966), strongly intimated that such a right to treatment existed constitutionally, but rested their holdings
on a statutory guarantee. Following Wyatt, many courts found that institutionalized individuals had a right
to treatment, usually based on some form of the quid pro quo theory. See Johnson, 484 F. Supp. 278; Gary
IV., 437 F. Supp. 1209; Davis, 384 F. Supp. 1196; Welsch, 373 F. Supp. 487.
229. A form of the quid pro quo theory, though not under that name, was first articulated by Morton
Birnbaum, a doctor and lawyer, in The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A. J. 499,503 (1960). The quid pro quo
theory and other early theories supporting the right to treatment are explained and analyzed in Clark v. Cohen,
794 F.2d 79, 93-94 (3d Cir. 1986) (Becker, J., concurring), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 962 (1986).
230. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307,325-26 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring). See also Clark
v. Cohen, 794 F.2d at 93-94. Thus, if the patient claiming a right to Clozapine had been committed under
a state statute entitling him to treatment, then the fact of his commitment automatically created a entitlement
to treatment.
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of liberty.23' This approach would severely undermine negative rights claims
challenging "treatment" decisions as deprivations of liberty. The treatment
challenged by the plaintiff as a deprivation of liberty becomes, under the quid
pro quo theory, a justification for the individual's confinement. Treatment rights
become a substitute for liberty rights.
The Youngberg Court defused the potential for forced exchanges under the
quid pro quo theory by finding that the right to treatment arises directly from
a plaintiff's liberty interests. In determining the scope of the right to treatment,
the Court explained that courts
may start with the generalization that there is a right to minimally
adequate training. The basic requirement of adequacy, in terms more
familiar to courts, may be stated as that training which is reasonable
in light of identifiable liberty interests and the circumstances of the
case.
232
This language could imply a very broad right to treatment. The Supreme Court
has repeatedly emphasized both that institutionalization itself is a massive
curtailment of liberty23 and that there is a separate identifiable liberty interest
in avoiding the stigmatization of inappropriate hospitalization.23 If an
individual is unnecessarily or inappropriately hospitalized, z 5 both of these
liberty interests may oblige the state to provide the treatment necessary to end
the deprivation of liberty.
The Youngberg rationale thus leaves open, where the quid pro quo theory
does not, the possibility of a right to the treatment necessary to be free of
institutional confinement.236 Under the quid pro quo theory, treatment is the
price paid by the state to purchase the individual's liberty. Under Youngberg's
231. This justification is clearly recognized by most proponents of these theories, see, e.g., Donaldson
v. O'Connor, 493 F2d. 507, 520 (5th Cir. 1974) (noting that the need for treatment is grounds for commitment
under state statutes), vacated, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Spece, supra note 225, at 6 (providing needed treatment
is a "legitimate, if not compelling, purpose for involuntary civil commitment"), and was considered one
of the dangers of the right to treatment, Katz, supra note 157, at 755. The Supreme Court appears to have
foreclosed this possibility in Foucha v. Louisiana, 60 U.S.L.W. 4359 (U.S. May 18, 1992), which construed
O'Connor v. Donaldson to hold that "it [is] unconstitutional for a State to continue to confine a harmless,
mentally ill person." Id. at 4361 (citing O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975)). The Court concluded
that "keeping Foucha against his will in a mental institution is improper absent a determination in civil
commitment proceedings of current mental illness and dangerousness." Id.
232. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 319 n.25.
233. The Court most recently reiterated its prior holdings to this effect in Foucha v. Louisiana, 112
S.Ct. 1780, 1785 (1992) ('.[T]he loss of liberty produced by an involuntary commitment is more than a
loss of freedom from confinement."') (quoting Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 492 (1980)).
234. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600-01 (1979); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979).
235. For example, many developmentally disabled individuals are confined inappropriately in mental
hospitals, see, e.g., McCartney v. Barg, 643 F. Supp. 1181, 1182-83 (N.D. Ohio 1986); Armstead v. Pingree,
629 F. Supp. 273, 275 (M.D. Fla. 1986).
236. Judge Becker contends that the right that logically follows from the quid pro quo theory is one
to "habilitation to enable [the involuntarily civilly committed] to leave their commitment." Clark v. Cohen,
794 F.2d 79, 94 (3d Cir. 1986) (Becker, J. concurring), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 962 (1986). His is the only
argument that can be made for this interpretation of the quid pro quo theory.
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rationale, the constitutional predicate for the right to treatment is to protect or
increase liberty, including liberty from the total restraint of institutionalization.
A number of courts have adopted this approach, finding that "the involuntarily
committed have the constitutional right 'to minimally adequate habilitation...
which will tend to render unnecessary... prolonged isolation from one's normal
community."2
7
Youngberg also links treatment within the institutional setting to liberty
interests, stating that "when training could significantly reduce the need for
restraints or the likelihood of violence," the state might well be constitutionally
required to provide that treatment? 38 Both professional literature and case law
link insufficient staffing and insufficient treatment programs with the increased
use of restraints and seclusion0a9 and increased danger to the mentally
handicapped. Thus, involuntarily committed individuals also have the right
to treatment "which will tend to render unnecessary the use of chemical restraint,
shackles, solitary confinement, locked wards.., and [to] conditions of life which
are normal enough to promote rather than detract from one's chance of living
with fewer restrictions on one's movement. ' '241
The treatment or habilitation required under Youngberg is not the kind that
works toward an elusive and perhaps undefinable "cure"; such a requirement
could conceivably keep many people institutionalized for life and would lead
judges to even greater deference to professionals. Instead, the Youngberg
standard's link to liberty interests makes the right to treatment understandable
to and definable by a court. Youngberg's right to treatment focuses on reducing
the obstacles to liberty, both those within the institution and the fact of
237. Cameron v. Tomes, 783 F. Supp. 1511, 1515 (D. Mass. 1992) (quoting Mihalcik v. Lensink, 732
F. Supp. 299, 302 (D. Conn. 1990) (first alteration in original) (emphasis omitted); see also Jackson v. Fort
Stanton Hosp. & Training Sch., 757 F. Supp. 1243, 1312, 1313 (D.N.M. 1990), rev'd in part, 964 F.2d 980
(10th Cir. 1992); Thomas S. v. Flaherty, 699 F. Supp. 1178, 1200-01 (W.D.N.C. 1988), aff'd, 902 F.2d 250
(4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 373 (1990)).
238. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 324.
239. Paul J. Schwab & Connie B. Lahmeyer, The Uses of Seclusion on a General Hospital Psychiatric
Ward, 40 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 228, 231 (1979) (increased use of seclusion is associated with staff-patient
ratios and staff availability); Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 13 10-11 (5th Cir. 1974) (aides in understaffed
hospital frequently put patients in seclusion and restraint without physicians' orders); Thomas S. 699 F. Supp.
at 1189 (seclusion and restraint routinely relied on in lieu of a systematic treatment program); Lelsz v.
Kavanagh, 673 F. Supp. 828, 851 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (mechanical restraints used in lieu of programs);
Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1307 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979) (en bane) (physical restraints used for as long as 720 continuous
hours due to staff shortages).
240. Harold Carmel et aL, Physician Staffing and Patient Violence, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY
L. 49, 50 (199 1)(physical aggression increases as the patient-physician ratio increases); Myra G. Eisenberg
& Diana 0. Tiemey, Profiling Disruptive Patient Incidents, 11 QUALITY REv. BULL. 245, 247 (1985)
(disruptive behavior increased during periods of reduced staff-patient ratios and few therapeutic activities);
Pearl Katz & Fans R. Kirkland, 53 PSYCHIATRY 262, 274 (1990); Wyatt, 503 F.2d at 1311 (patients suffered
brutality and four residents died due to understaffing); Thomas S., 699 F. Supp. at 1186-89 (due to inadequate
treatment programs, patients are injured by self-abuse); Lelsz, 673 F. Supp. at 863 (unacceptable therapy
programs put clients at increased risk of harm); Halderman, 446 F. Supp. at 1308 (understaffing resulted
in injuries to residents by other residents and self-abuse).
241. Cameron, 783 F. Supp at 1515 (citation omitted).
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institutionalization itself. Such an approach resolves the constitutional question
of the right to treatment with reference to constitutional rights. Professional
judgment is employed only to serve those rights by determining the particular
treatment the patient should receive, as discussed below.
2. Standards for the Right to Treatment
After finding that a right to treatment exists and articulating the basis for
it, the Youngberg Court formulated a standard to determine the particular
treatment to which an individual plaintiff is entitled, a standard that appropriately
involves professional judgment. The patient demanding a certain treatment is
not necessarily entitled to receive it simply because she has a right to treatment
of some kind.242 Rather, the right to a particular treatment turns on whether
that treatment is "reasonable in light of [her] identifiable liberty interests and
the circumstances of the case,"243 an issue that courts must determine with
the aid of mental health professionals.
For example, some patients may have a right to receive Clozaril while others
may not, depending on the efficacy of that treatment to their conditions. An
article describing various forensic patients treated with Clozaril mentions one
patient with a longstanding diagnosis of schizophrenia who was forced to wear
a helmet to prevent him from injuring himself.' This "treatment," like most
uses of restraints, simply prevented further injury without ameliorating his
underlying psychiatric problem; and in so doing, it substantially restricted his
liberty and offered no hope of release. However, he responded extremely well
to Clozaril, and was transferred to a less secure unit and then to a group
home.245 Another individual in the study, on the other hand, "still complained
of auditory hallucinations" after treatment with Clorazil. 46 When his dosage
was increased, he suffered two grand mal seizures. 7
The complexity of prescribing treatment for different individuals shows the
role professional judgment should play in a court's determination of what
treatment is constitutionally required. Because the court cannot know the
potential benefits and drawbacks of various treatments in achieving a patient's
242. The right to treatment has never been understood as a right to optimal treatment or to treatment
of the patient's choice. Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 902 F.2d 1085, 1089 (2d
Cir. 1990) ("[T]he issue is not whether the optimal course of treatment as determined by some experts was
being followed, but whether 'professional judgment in fact was exercised."'); Hanson v. Clarke County Iowa,
867 F.2d 1115, 1120 (8th Cir. 1989) ("[Lliberty interests explicated in Youngberg [do not] create a substantive
due process right to optimal care and treatment."); Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 807 F.2d 1243, 1251 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 483 U.S. 1057 (1987) (state has no obligation to grant "a benefit of optimal treatment").
243. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 319 n.25.
244. Gary J. Maier, The Impact of Clozapine on 25 Forensic Patients, 20 BULL. AM. ACAD. OF
PSYCHIATRY & L. 297, 300-01 (1992).
245. Id. at 301.
246. Id. at 303.
247. Id. at 303.
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liberty interests-either through release from confinement or greater liberty in
the institution-it must rely on professional judgment as to whether it is
reasonable to require a given treatment to secure a patient's liberty.
The problem with the professional judgment standard in right-to-treatment
cases is not, therefore, the judicial reliance on professional judgment per se;
the problem is that Youngberg commands courts to presume the validity of the
judgments of state professionals, who are often defendants in the litigation. The
professionals whose decisions are challenged in these cases are plagued by the
conflicts of interest discussed in Part I(B)(2), and even the best-intentioned are
subject to enormous pressure to adjust or dilute their professional standards to
conform to inadequate resources and substandard supplies and facilities.2'
The patient's treatment may not represent the result of a decision or judgment
at all, but simply a default in the absence of alternatives. 249
As discussed in Part I, the model of the private professional-patient
relationship, with the professional using his expertise to advance the patient's
interests, excludes these realities. The judgment of state professionals may well
be handicapped and distorted by contradictory imperatives. For example, a private
psychiatrist with a schizophrenic patient who had not responded to any other
form of medication over time would almost certainly exercise his professional
judgment by recommending Clozaril.2so Whether the hope of relief was worth
the expense involved would be the patient's choice to make, on an individual
basis. A professional in a state institution may be faced with the state's refusal
to fund Clozaril for any patient because of its cost t5 Therefore, the "decision"
not to use Clozaril may not represent a judgment by the professional at all, but
a decision by agency administrators who are not mental health professionals2
52
Many "professional judgments" granted presumptive validity by Youngberg are
in effect default judgments, not the result of a decision among options but the
consequence of an absence of options. Deference is inappropriate under these
circumstances. By the same token, state professionals whose judgment dictates
that their clients should receive treatment in the community may be deterred
248. See supra Part I(B)(2).
249. See id. The question of the extent to which budgetary considerations and lack of resources are
permissible factors in a professional's judgment is one of the most important questions raised by the
professional judgment standard, and is discussed in Part n(B)(4), infra.
250. Michael Winerip, To Some, Hope is Just a Drug Too Far Away, N.Y. TIMES, August 9, 1992,
at A41 (noting that a single psychiatrist in private practice in New York had more patients on Clozaril than
all the patients in two New York State Hospitals combined, despite the fact that 554 patients in the hospitals
would potentially benefit from the drug).
251. The Texas legislature appropriated $4.2 million for Clozaril use, yet only 430 patients are receiving
it out of a potential 20,000-40,000 people who could benefit from it. Oklahoma does not allocate any money
for Clozaril treatment. Wider Access Has Doubled Number of Patients on Clozaril, PHARMACEUTICAL BUS.
NEWS, May 29, 1992, Finance/Business Section.
252. For example, only one-fifth of eligible patients receive Clozaril in Massachusetts, although the
state mental health commissioner who announced the program denied that cost was a factor, citing instead
"the state's limited medical and nursing expertise." Judy Foreman, Clozapine Access will be Limited, BOSTON
GLOBE, July 27, 1990, at 13.
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from recommending this treatment because of the social, political and legal
consequences involved. Attempts to exercise professional judgment in these cases
might entail considerable career costs for the professional. 2 3 In other cases,
the lack of staff or physical plant problems may make it impossible for a
professional to exercise professional judgment. Private professionals may share
some of these extraneous pressures, but not to the same degree.
The significant obstacle plaintiffs face due to the presumptive validity of
state professional action is well illustrated by translating Justice Blackmun's
persuasive argument against special deference to prison administrators into the
institutional setting. 4 When an institutionalized person attempts to demonstrate
that the treatment she receives is a departure from professional standards or
practice, she is necessarily calling into question the professional judgment of
the defendants. Under these circumstances, it is perverse to insist that a court
grant presumptive validity to the very decisions being challenged. Such a
requirement boils down to a command that when a court is confronted by a claim
of departure from professional standards, it must assume that professional
standards were met.
The question before the judge, therefore, should simply be what approach
professionals in general would take to treat a person in the plaintiff's situation
so that her release from confinement could be expedited. If the court is convinced
that several different approaches are acceptable to accomplish this goal, and
that the defendants chose one of them for valid professional reasons, then the
plaintiff has received treatment that is reasonable in light of her liberty
interests. 5
253. Many mental health professionals have claimed that they were fired or disciplined because they
expressed concern over the adequacy of the treatment or safety of their patients. See, e.g., Schwartzman
v. Valenzuela, 846 F.2d 1209,1211 (9th Cir. 1988) (psychologist discharged afterpublicly criticizing hospital
for unnecessary administration of psychotropic drugs, failure to provide safe work environment, and failure
to supervise patient who raped and killed another patient at institution); Downing v. Williams, 624 F.2d
612, 615 (5th Cir. 1980) (patient suffered cardiac arrest and had to wait 45 minutes for ambulance; a
psychiatrist was fired for making the following entries in patient's chart: "No suction; No resusc. equipment;
No emergency ambulance available; Gross neglect; Would have to suction by mouth."), vacated, 645 F.2d
1226 (5th Cir. 1981).
254. Justice Blackmun stated:
When a detainee attempts to demonstrate... that the challenged conditions are not
"reasonably related to a legitimate government objective," he necessarily is calling
into question the good faith of prison administrators. Under those circumstances, it
seems to me somewhat perverse to insist that a court assessing the rationality of a
particular administrative practice must accord prison administrators "wide-ranging
deference ......... Such a requirement boils down to a command that when a court
is confronted with a charge of administrative bad faith, it must evaluate the charge
by assuming administrative good faith.... I regard it as improper to make the plaintiff
prove his case twice by requiring a court to defer to administrators' putative
professional judgment.
Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 592-93 (1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) (citations
omitted) However, the Rutherford majority found that prison administrators are entitled to "wide-ranging
deference." Id. at 585.
255. Of course, if the defendants' course of action was preventive rather than ameliorative when
ameliorative treatment was available, as in the helmet example, supra text accompanying note 244, or if
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3. Right to Treatment Recommended by a State Professional
Another advantage of the professional judgment standard in affirmative
claims is its potential to enforce a professional's recommendation of treatment
that increases the plaintiff's liberty. This is particularly clear in cases in which
plaintiffs assert a right to be treated in the community rather than in an
institution. The presumptive validity accorded to professional judgments
combined with the plaintiff's right to liberty-increasing treatment under
Youngberg allows plaintiffs to make a strong case for forcing a state to comply
with the recommendations of its professionals for community placement that
had been ignored due to inertia or lack of funds.~6 After all, as one court
noted, "[n]othing in Youngberg authorizes state officials to ignore the judgment
of their own professionals or precludes a court from enforcing it once the
judgment is made."
' 57
Recently, courts have granted class recovery and class remedies in such
claims.2 8 These courts hold that freedom from bodily restraint under
Youngberg "includes the right to be free from confinement in an institution where
such confinement is shown on a factual basis to be unnecessary."259 Although
in Youngberg itself, the parties agreed that no amount of treatment would enable
Romeo to live outside an institutional setting,260 the liberty interests at stake
in right-to-treatment cases clearly include freedom from unnecessary
the treatment had been used for months or years without effect, it might not be professionally acceptable
in the particular individual's case.
256. Clark v. Cohen, 794 F.2d 79 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 962 (1986); Thomas S. v. Morrow,
601 F. Supp. 1055 (W.D.N.C. 1984), aff'd in part and modified in part, 781 F.2d 367 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
476 U.S. 1124 (1986), and cert. denied, 479 U.S. 869 (1986); Jackson v. Fort Stanton Hosp. & Training
Sch., 757 F. Supp. 1243 (D.N.M. 1990), rev'd in part, 964 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1992).
Only a few courts have held that the right to treatment in Youngberg was inapplicable to decisions
involving placement, that is the location of treatment. See, e.g., Sabo v. O'Bannon, 586 F. Supp. 1132, 1141
n.7 (E.D. Pa. 1984). The environment in which treatment is delivered is undoubtedly considered by
professionals to be a part of treatment, and has been ever since there have been mental health professionals.
See David J. Rothman, THE DISCOVERY OF THE AsYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE NEW
REPUBLIC (1990); Herbert A. Eastman, Metaphor and Madness, Law and Liberty, 40 DEPAuL L. REV. 281
(1991).
257. Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 629 F. Supp. 1487, 1494 (N.D. Tex. 1986).
258. Thomas S. v. Flaherty, 902 F.2d 250 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 373 (1990); Jackson
757 F. Supp. 1243 (D.N.M. 1990).
259. Homeward Bound, Inc. v. Hissom Memorial Ctr., No. 85-C-437-E, 1987 WL 27104, at *20 (N.D.
Okla. July 24, 1987) (citing Youngberg).
260. 457 U.S. at 317. As noted previously, Romeo moved out of Pennhurst after the Supreme Court's
decision and was living in the community within two years of the decision. Former Pennhurst Patient to
Get Settlement, UPI, July 25, 1984 available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
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confinement26' and the stigma associated with institutionalization. 262 As one
court emphasized:
An individual confined to an institution against his best interests is
unduly restrained to the same extent that an individual shackled to his
wheelchair is unduly restrained. If professional judgment dictates that
community placement is necessary in the best interest of the individual,
then the individual has a constitutional right to such placement, and
continued confinement in the institution constitutes undue restraint.263
Indeed, this issue is ideal for illustrating the dichotomy between claims for
treatment based on professional judgment and claims against state infringement
of liberty. If a plaintiff's claim simply challenges the fact of institutionalization
as an unconstitutional restraint on liberty,264 the claim should be judged not
according to the professional judgment standard but rather according to the
constitutional standards set out in Foucha v. Louisiana265 and O'Connor v.
Donaldson.266 These cases forbid keeping an individual "against his will in
a mental institution ... absent a determination in civil commitment proceedings
of current mental illness and dangerousness." 267 On the other hand, if the claim
is that professional judgment requires services and treatment to be provided in
a community setting, then the claim is one for affirmative services and may be
appropriately adjudicated under the professional judgment standard.2 68 Finally,
261. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979); O'Connor v.
Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
262. The liberty interest in avoiding the undoubtedly crippling stereotypes associated with institu-
tionalization has been recognized in a series of Supreme Court decisions. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979);
Addington, 441 U.S. at 425-26. The Court recognized the level of stigmatization associated with hospitalization
when it noted that even convicted felons had a liberty interest in avoiding being so categorized. Vitek v.
Jones, 445 U.S. at 492-93. See also Doe v. Austin, 848 F.2d 1386, 1391 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 967 (1988); Donahue v. Rhode Island Dept. of Mental Health, 632 F Supp. 1456, 1462 (D.R.I. 1986).
263. Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 629 F. Supp. 1487, 1494-95 (N.D. Tex. 1986).
264. Some cases have also successfully challenged institutionalization as segregation under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Homeward Bound Inc. v. Hissom Memorial Ctr., No.
85-C-437-E, 1987 WL 27104 (N.D. Okla. July 24, 1987).
265. 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992) (insanity acquittee may not be held in mental institution unless he is both
mentally ill and dangerous).
266. 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (nondangerous person capable of surviving alone or with willing help of
others may not be involuntarily confined).
267. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1784. "Even if the initial commitment was permissible, 'it could not
constitutionally be continued after [mental illness and dangerousness] no longer existed."' Id. (quoting
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. at 575).
268. These community setting claims may be seen as raising concerns under DeShaney about the
obligation of the state to provide services outside of institutional settings. DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Dep't Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1988). However, these affirmative rights have been found to arise only
when individuals are "wholly dependent on the state." See Jackson v. Fort Stanton State Hosp. & Training
Sch., 964 F.2d 980, 991 (10th Cir. 1992). DeShaney is properly read, and has been interpreted by the courts,
to create a dichotomy based on government custody. Cases since Deshaney support this distinction in finding
that children in foster care in the community, as opposed to those not in state custody, have rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment. See infra Part II(A)(4). Logic and common sense also support this reading.
Some so-called "community settings" are actually cottages on the grounds of an institutional facility; some
are locked facilities; some house as many as 50 or 60 residents. To differentiate effectively between
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professional judgment should have no relevance if the plaintiff in a community
setting is resisting treatment that the state seeks to impose.269
The right to treatment under Youngberg springs from the liberty interests
of institutionalized individuals. Unlike the quid pro quo theory, which sees
treatment as compensation for a deprivation of liberty, Youngberg links treatment
to the enhancement of liberty and the prevention of restraint. The Supreme Court
explicitly stated that "[i]t may well be unreasonable not to provide training when
training could significantly reduce the need for restraints ... ,270 The logic
of Youngberg supports an exchange between the state and an individual that
is more favorable to the individual than that which the quid pro quo theory
justifies: treatment cannot simply justify massive state restraints on liberty but
must serve to restore liberty lost due to state-imposed restraint.
4. The Effect of Budget Constraints on Application of the Professional
Judgment Standard
A fundamental question in defining professional judgment is whether it must
focus solely on an individual's needs and circumstances, as a professional would
in a private relationship with a client, or whether professional judgment may
include consideration of state budgetary constraints or the availability of
treatments.271 The Youngberg Court emphasized that it is the factfinder-a
jury or court-that is to perform the balancing of state and plaintiff interests,
using professional judgment as the standard to guide that balancing.2
However, the circuits dispute whether and to what extent fiscal constraints and
the unavailability of resources for treatment can inform professional judgment.
It is a crucial issue because the treatment recommended by professional judgment
defines the limit of the patient's entitlement under Youngberg. A proper
understanding of the professional judgment standard rejects judgment driven
by budgetary concerns or the unavailability of treatment alternatives while
allowing the same attention to costs that private sector professionals give. Thus,
institutional and community care is difficult, if not impossible. To distinguish further between being in custody
"voluntarily" and "involuntarily" is more problematic and has caused division among and even within the
circuits. Compare Doe v. Austin, 848 F.2d 1386, 1392 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 967 (1988)
with Higgs v. Latham, No. 91-5273, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 25549 (6th Cir. Oct. 24, 1991) and Jordan v.
Tennessee, 738 F. Supp. 258 (M.D. Tenn. 1990). This issue is, however, beyond the scope of this Article.
269. Several states have passed laws authorizing "outpatient commitment" which would permit forcible
medication in community settings. See Susan Stefan, Preventive Commitment: Misconceptions and Pitfalls
in Creating a Coercive Community, 11 J. HEALTH & HUM. RESOURcEs ADMIN. 459 (1989). To date, no
constitutional challenges to these statutes have been brought.
270. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982).
271. By "budgetary constraints" I mean simple lack of funds allotted, in contrast to the "availability
of treatments," which is limited not by funding levels but by governmental inertia in developing or funding
alternative forms of treatment that may be less expensive than those currently provided.
272. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321.
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institutionalized individuals' constitutional rights will not ebb and flow at the
mercy of state appropriations.273
The majority of courts have affirmed that professional judgment may not
be controlled by availability of resources or budgetary considerations,274
holding, for example, that "what is appropriate care, treatment and placement
must be determined by a qualified professional based upon medical and
psychological criteria, not upon what resources are available." 275 In fact,
"[e]vidence that the professional judgment was made to conform to what was
available may indicate that the judgment was 'a substantial departure from
accepted professional judgment, practice or standards.' ' 276 This interpretation
makes sense-accepted professional standards are based on expertise in diagnosis
and treatment, not developed on the basis of state budgetary or resource
considerations. 7 As one court has said:
The obligation of the defendants to eliminate existing unconstitu-
tionalities cannot depend upon what the Governor or the Legislature
may do .... Neither should lack of funding be available as an excuse
for the defendants' failure to provide the plaintiff class, who through
no fault of their own are clients of the state hospital system, with
minimally adequate care, treatment and placement.278
If courts permit the professional judgment calculus to include resource
availability or budgetary considerations, the ultimate result will be varying
273. Almost every state's mental health budget is underfunded, and fiscal constraints no doubt take
their toll on institutional professionals. Courts have recognized and condemned "a tendency among human
service professionals in the state psychiatric institutions to conform their recommendations for treatment
or habilitation... to the constraints imposed by the state's inadequate service delivery system, rather than
to exercise true professional judgment." Thomas S. v. Flaherty, 699 F. Supp. 1178, 1196 (W.D.N.C. 1988),
affid in part and modified in part, 781 F.2d 367 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1124 (1986), and cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 869 (1986).
274. See Kirsch v. Thompson, 717 F. Supp. 1077, 1080 (E.D. Pa. 1988); Baldridge v. Clinton, 674
F. Supp. 665, 670 (E.D. Ark. 1987); Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 629 F. Supp. 1487, 1495 (N.D. Tex. 1986); Clark
v. Cohen 613 F. Supp. 684, 704 (E.D. Pa. 1985), af'd, 794 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1986) (endorsing the concept
that professional judgment "must be based on medical or psychological criteria and not an exigency,
administrative convenience, or other non-medical criteria"), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 962 (1986); Thomas S.
v. Morrow, 601 F "Supp. 1055, 1060 (W.D.N.C. 1984), aff'd in part and modified in part, 781 F.2d 367
(4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1124 (1986), and cert. denied, 479 U.S. 869 (1986). See also Ohlinger
v. Watson, 652 F.2d 775, 779 (9th Cir. 1981) (a pre-Youngberg case holding that, "[1]ack of funds, staff
or facilities cannot justify the States' failure to provide.. . treatment necessary for rehabilitation").
275. Baldridge, 674 F. Supp. at 670 (citations omitted).
276. Lelsz, 629 F. Supp. at 1495 (citations omitted).
277. See, e.g., AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL AssocIATION, SPECIALTY GUIDELINES FOR THE DELIVERY
OF SERVICES (1989); American Psychiatric Association, Ethical Principles of Psychologists 45 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 390-95 (1989). By exempting state professionals from individual liability for failure to exercise
professional judgment because of budget limitations, the Youngberg Court indicated that professional judgment
is an absolute standard from which budgetary constraints might force a departure. Id. at 323. The holding
indicates that it is not appropriate to consider budgetary constraints in professional decisionmaking. The
Court could easily have declared instead that professional judgment only required consideration of those
alternatives made feasible by available resources.
278. Baldridge, 674 F. Supp. at 670.
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standards of constitutionality across the fifty states, depending on how well each
state funded mental health services. This kind of varying outcome, where
constitutional rights erode in lock-step with reductions in state funding for the
mental health system, was precisely what the Supreme Court tried to avoid when
creating the professional judgment standard, 279 which permits an assessment
of challenged actions at a given institution against professional standards
developed nationwide.
This is not to say that state professionals must act as if they had unlimited
insurance policies for each of their clients. Courts must oversee some kind of
balancing between the state's fiscal interests and the plaintiff's right to treatment
However, the professional judgment standard, arising as it does from the model
of the private sphere professional relationship, both allows and controls such
considerations. A professional in the private sector can reasonably recommend
several treatment alternatives at various costs, which all adequately meet the
patient's needs though they may not be equally beneficial, and can let the patient
choose among them. Thus, the question is whether the treatment being labeled
inadequate would be among the options offered this patient in a private setting.
It may not be the treatment that a private patient with wealth or insurance would
choose. But would a professional recommend it to a private patient? If so, then
the professional judgment standard is met.
Where courts have allowed professional judgment to be based on the
availability of resources, an examination of the treatment approved reveals an
obliteration of the already scant protection of patients' constitutional rights. In
P.C. v. McLaughlin,uo° a mildly retarded young man was inappropriately held
at Brandon, an institution for severely retarded people, for over two years
because no other placement could be found for him. While there, P.C. was
sexually assaulted by a staff member. P.C. argued "that he was not sent to
Brandon based on an exercise of professional judgment because-as appellants
admit-his admission did not hinge on a decision that his level of functioning
necessitated it.'28' The court agreed, finding that the "decision was prompted
by the total lack of any viable alternative" but went on to hold that "[b]ecause
P.C.'s placement decision was made by qualified professionals in light of the
circumstances then facing them, their judgment is entitled to deference in the
courts reviewing that decision.'' 8'
279. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982) (referring to the requirement of "uniformity in
protecting these [liberty] interests").
280. 913 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1990).
281. Id. at 1043.
282. Id. This comes close to adopting the standard proposed by Chief Justice Burger in his concurring
opinion in Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 331 (1982), that a court's inquiry ceases after it determines
that professionals made the decision. Courts have uniformly refused to interpret Youngberg this way. See,
e.g., Griffith v. Ledbetter, 711 F. Supp. 1108, 1111 n.1 (N.D. Ga. 1989).
P.C. is an example of the case the Supreme Court had in mind when it carved out an exemption from
damages actions for professionals who can not exercise their judgment because of financial constraints. See
supra note 277. P.C. asked for both injunctive relief and damages against individual defendants. The
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Yet the defendants did not make a professional judgment to place P.C. at
Brandon; P.C. was placed and kept at the institution because the "defendants
did not have a residential placement available. ''283 Brandon was not selected
because it was cheaper; in a professional sense, Brandon was not "selected"
at all. P.C.'s placement was not the result of decision, but of default.
The Second Circuit's analysis left P.C. with no right to appropriate treatment.
Rather, he was merely entitled to have a professional perform the triage that
left him confined in an institution where he clearly did not belong. The Second
Circuit ignored Youngberg's insistence that the right to treatment be linked to
liberty interests; surely no liberty interest is vindicated when an individual is
confined in a completely restrictive facility that cannot provide him with useful
services.'t 4
The only other case finding that professionals may consider budgetary
constraints or availability of services did not, as P.C. did, legitimize decisions
made wholly for resource-limitation reasons. In Jackson v. Fort Stanton State
Hospital & Training School,'ss the Tenth Circuit reversed a District Court's
order enjoining treatment teams from considering the unavailability of community
placements in making recommendations for placement of institutionalized people.
The court held that "[a] professional determination that includes an analysis of
cost is reasonable and does not constitute '. . . a substantial departure from
accepted professional judgment.',,286 However, the court also recognized the
risk that:
[B]y imposing overly extensive cost restrictions in individual cases,
the state could so limit the range of recommendations available to
professionals that their judgment would be rendered inadequate to meet
defendants admitted that the only reason P.C. went to the institution for severely retarded people was that
the state could not find a placement that would meet minimal professional standards. P.C., 913 F.2d at 1038.
According to the court, P.C.'s social worker engaged in significant efforts to find him such a placement
and should not have been held individually liable for his failure to provide the placement he knew P.C. needed.
Id. at 1037. But equally clearly, P.C. stated a claim for equitable relief to require the state to provide him
with a placement consistent with the professional judgment of those charged with his care.
283. 913 F.2d at 1038.
284. P.C. stands in stark contrast to Thomas S. v. Morrow, 601 F. Supp. 1055 (W.D.N.C. 1984). Like
P.C., Thomas S. suffered from mild mental retardation and behavioral problems. Like P.C., after he turned
18, Thomas was bounced among inappropriate placements, including a nursing home and a detoxification
facility, "because there [was] no place else for him to go." Id. at 1057. The Thomas S. court, however, saw
professional judgment as addressed exclusively to the needs of the client: "[J]udgment... modified to fit
what is available.., likely has become 'a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice,
or standards."' Id. at 1060. The defendant's budgetary constraints cannot limit the equitable power of the
court to remedy continuing conditions that depart from the standard of professional judgment. Otherwise,
the state could provide its own defense to unconstitutional conduct simply by lowering legislative
appropriations. Thus, Thomas S. was "entitled to treatment recommended by qualified professionals whose
judgment is unsullied by consideration of the fact that the state does not now provide appropriate treatment
or the funding for appropriate treatment." Id. at 1060.
285. 964 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1992).
286. Id. at 992 (citation omitted).
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constitutional standards. In such a case, the court might have to enter
an order that would implicate appropriations decisions.?
Despite its partial recognition that budgetary constraints could prevent the
exercise of professional judgment, the circuit court crucially misunderstood the
findings and holding of the district court. The lower court had held that the
unavailability of community services could not be taken into consideration in
a decision not to recommend them; it had not said that a professional could not
consider cost.
The distinction between the two considerations is significant: services, though
quite affordable, may be unavailable due to bureaucratic indecision or legislative
inaction. In P.C., for example, the state may well have paid more for P.C's
inappropriate confinement than for treatment in a professionally appropriate
setting. On the other hand, in the Clozaril scenario, the drug is readily available,
and the right to treatment question turns on whether the state must pay high
costs to provide the drug to every patient who might benefit from it. As
discussed above, the state need not do so if there are other more economical
treatments that are sufficiently effective that professionals in the private sector
would also prescribe them.
In sum, professional judgment may comprehend more than one acceptable
treatment for a given condition, allowing patients some flexibility to choose
according to their economic means. Courts should allow state professionals this
same range of treatments as they attempt to care for multiple needs with limited
funds. However, when funds become so depleted as to prevent any professionally
acceptable treatment, the constitutionally required professional judgment standard
is no longer being met. Likewise, the state violates the patient's right to treatment
when it gives her inadequate treatment simply because it has failed to develop
programs to meet her needs.
III. THE EXPANSION OF THE PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT STANDARD
The professional judgment standard does not by its terms refer to the
institutional setting for which it was developed. In fact, the standard articulated
in Youngberg is worded so broadly that it lends itself to application in a growing
number of areas whose resemblance to the professional-client relationship in
state institutions is increasingly remote. For example, the Supreme Court has
held the professional judgment standard applicable to most constitutional
challenges to decisions of academic defendants on tenure, the denial of degrees,
and the dismissal of students for academic reasons." s The standard has also
been applied in cases challenging agency and systemic decisions in social service
287. Id. at 992 (emphasis added).
288. See infra Part n'l(A)(1).
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systems including budget cuts, agency policies, and reallocation of resources. 9
Finally, the professional judgment standard has been used in cases involving
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel' and statutory discrimination
claims.29' Indeed, use of the standard is expanding so rapidly that it could
conceivably be applied to any constitutional claim for professional services or
challenge to professional decisionmaking.
These new applications are not necessarily harmful in cases involving an
individual professional-client relationship and an affirmative claim for the sorts
of services the professional is expected to provide. But for claims alleging state
intrusion on negative rights, the professional judgment standard presents problems
similar to those arising in the negative rights claims of patients in state mental
institutions: the standard precludes striking a balance between plaintiff and state
interests and instead casts the claim as a question of whether professionals would
ratify the intrusion into the plaintiff's rights. Cases involving the juvenile justice
system and academia fit this category.
Many of the cases now considered under the professional judgment standard
also lack the characteristics that originally justified, at least in theory, the
deference to the expert's voice. Originally, the standard applied to individual
professional-client relationships where the professional at least was presumed
to share an identity of interest with his client and to be answerable to a higher
canon of professional responsibility. Application of the professional judgment
standard is now spreading to situations significantly different from this original
scenario. The focus of the standard has changed from the nature of the
professional-client relationship to the nature of the decisionmaking: most of the
recent cases involve subjective decisions by alleged experts, often affecting
powerless and isolated groups of people. These are the sorts of decisions most
susceptible to abuse, affecting classes of people whose rights the courts should
be most alert to protect.
A. Expansion to Systems Not Involving Mental Disabilities
1. Higher Education
Cases challenging decisionmaking in higher education illustrate how quickly
and thoughtlessly the use of the professional judgment standard has spread to
situations very different from the one originally contemplated in Youngberg.
These cases also show the great power the standard places in the hands of state
experts: universities have yet to lose a single case decided under the professional
judgment standard.
289. See infra Part IIl(B).
290. See infra Part lI(A)(5).
291. See infra Part HII(C).
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Three years after Youngberg was decided, the Supreme Court adopted the
professional judgment standard in Regents of University of Michigan v.
Ewing,292 a case involving a student's due process challenge to his expulsion
from an undergraduate/medical school program after failing a required
examination. The student argued that the university had acted arbitrarily by
refusing to allow him to retake the exam, depriving him of a property interest
in continuing his course of studies. The Supreme Court assumed, without
deciding, that such an interest did exist,293 but held that
[w]hen judges are asked to review the substance of a genuinely
academic decision, such as this one, they should show great respect
for the faculty's professional judgment. Plainly, they may not override
it unless it is such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms
as to demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did not
actually exercise professional judgment.
294
The Court made no attempt to analyze its extension of the professional
judgment standard to a new variety of constitutional challenge; nor did it discuss
the suitability to an academic setting of a standard developed in response to
constitutional litigation in overcrowded, underfunded state institutions. Rather,
the Court discussed the university's procedures for deciding Ewing's case,
295
finding that "the faculty's decision was made conscientiously and with careful
deliberation, based on an evaluation of the entirety of Ewing's academic
career." '296 The decision thus seems to transform a substantive due process
challenge into a procedural case, endorsing the substantive decision to expel
Ewing because of the procedural safeguards that had been followed in his
case.
297
The Court presumed without question that these decisions are "necessarily
subjective.""29 In support of its conclusion that Ewing's dismissal did not
deviate from academic norms, the Court noted that nineteen other students, some
292. 474 U.S. 214 (1985).
293. Justice Powell wrote separately to indicate his strong doubt that any protectable interest was at
stake. Id. at 228 (Powell, J., concurring).
294. Id. at 225.
295. Id. at 216-17, 217 n.4, 219.
296. Id. at 225.
297. Id. at 225-28. This review of the procedure followed by professionals contrasts with the lack of
procedural review of the judgments of state mental health professionals, see supra Part H(A)(2), and suggests
that courts can require expert decisionmaking to conform to certain procedures. One reason for the Court's
procedural approach in Ewing may be that "accepted academic norms," Ewing, 474 U.S. at 227, tend to
emphasize procedures that mask an ultimately subjective decision whose basis is completely unarticulated.
The fact that these procedures tend to be customary does not mean that they are required by the Constitution.
As the Court held earlier in Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 90 (1978), the very fact that
academic dismissals are subjective means that hearings are not required. As noted in the discussion on
procedural due process, supra Part I(A)(2), and forced medication, supra Part II(A)(l)(a), the perceived
subjectivity of these decisions may result from the framing of the standard rather than from an inability to
articulate standards and to provide procedural protection.
298. Ewing, 474 U.S. at 228.
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with "better" records than Ewing's, were dismissed from the program without
being permitted to take the examination at all.299 On the other hand, Ewing
was the only student in seven years who was not permitted to retake the
examination in question; some students, in fact, took it three times or more.
The Court took the contradictions of this history as evidence that the decision-
making was subjective, which it clearly was, and that it necessarily was
subjective, which is far less clear.01
Indeed, the expulsion decision was only subjective because the university
chose to make it so, and because the Court did not require anything more. The
school easily could have set clear rules regarding the examination and expulsion
from the program: all students could have been permitted to retake the
examination once, or any student with a grade point average under a certain
number could have been precluded from taking the examination. This approach
would have made the Court's elaborate inquiry into the procedures surrounding
Ewing's expulsion unnecessary, while allowing it to review the rationality of
the substantive policy. The Ewing Court, however, did not review the substantive
standard applied to dismiss Ewing, even though that was the basis of his claim,
because no substantive standard was even articulated by the University. What
might have been called arbitrariness and standardless subjectivity in other settings
was insulated from inquiry by its transformation into "professional judgment."
Both before and after Ewing, courts have applied the professional judgment
standard to cases involving the expulsion of students, the refusal to readmit
students, 02 and the failure to grant a professor tenure.303 In most of these
cases, the courts have followed Ewing in sifting the procedural record rather
carefully while ignoring the question of the substantive standard used by the
institution in making the decision.3°
In academic cases, the expert decision accorded deference does not even
make a pretense of arising from a professional-client relationship. The rationale
underlying the professional judgment standard, at least in part, was that there
was an identity of interest between the decisionmaking professional and his
client. 05 Little remains of such a fiduciary relationship in the higher education
299. Id. at 228 n.14.
300. Id. at 219.
301. Id. at 228 n.14.
302. Mauriello v. Univ. of Medicine and Dentistry of N.L, 781 F.2d 46,52 (3d Cir.) (upholding dismissal
of student from Ph.D. program), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 818 (1986); Anderson v. Univ. of Wis., 665 F. Supp.
1372, 1396-97 (W.D. Wis. 1987) (upholding refusal to readmit student to law school), affd, 841 F.2d 737
(7th Cir. 1988).
303. Siu v. Johnson, 748 F.2d 238, 245 (4th Cir. 1984). Although Ewing had not been decided at the
time, Siu adopted the Youngberg standard in analyzing a due process chalenge to the refusal to grant tenure
to a professor.
304. After announcing a very deferential standard, the Court reviewed the University of Michigan's
actions regarding Ewing's dismissal with a level of attention to detail in the record not seen in professional
judgment decisions regarding challenges to institutional treatment. Other courts have treated education cases
similarly. See, e.g., Anderson, 665 F. Supp. 1372 (W.D. Wis. 1987) (exhaustively examining the record).
305. See supra Part I(A).
[V/ol. 102: 639
Professional Judgment Standard
context: while there is individualized interaction between professors denied tenure
and the faculty tenure committee, and between students dismissed from academic
programs and the committees that make those decisions, these relationships are
adversarial, not fiduciary. Certainly neither the professor nor the students are,
in any sense, "clients" of the decisionmaking committee.
The decision to apply the professional judgment standard based on the nature
of the decisionmaking at issue rather than on the existence of a professional-
client relationship carries the seeds of a massive expansion of deference to
government experts. Courts apply the professional judgment standard in academia
because they see decisionmaking in that context as inherently subjective,
discretionary, and native to the specialized domain of professionals, a domain
courts should invade with great hesitation, if at all. The decisionmaking of many
state actors, however, can also be so characterized, and thus be similarly shielded
from constitutional scrutiny.
2. Juvenile Justice
The professional judgment standard has been used to defend intrusive
practices designed to control children in the juvenile justice system. Such
negative rights cases are singularly inappropriate for the application of the
professional judgment standard. Juvenile institutions can characterize almost
every restriction and restraint as treatment, a particularly insidious possibility
in a justice system whose mandate to rehabilitate coexists with an explicit or
implicit responsibility to confine, and even to punish, individuals regarded as
young criminals.
Most juvenile justice cases involve the use of isolation and restraint.
306
One case challenged the practice of placing juveniles in extended isolation for
"several days" or "weeks" for "'mouthing off' to staff, refusing to obey an order
or directive, yelling or swearing, [and] getting out of bed at night without
permission .. ". ."07 Other policies and practices defended as exercises of
professional judgment include isolation for hours at a time in a room measuring
four by eight by nine feet and "grab[bing] one of the student's arms and grabbing
and pulling of the hair ".... 30s
306. See, e.g., Gary H. v. Hegstrom, 831 F.2d 1430, 1431 (9th Cir. 1987); Santana v. Collazo, 793
F.2d 41,42-43 (Ist Cir. 1986); Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172, 1178 (Ist Cir. 1983); Milonas v. Williams,
691 F.2d 931, 935-36 (10th Cir. 1982).
307. Gary H., 831 F2d at 1434 (Ferguson, J., concurring).
308. Milonas, 691 F.2d at 941-42. The court noted that by the time the suit was commenced, a child's
time in the isolation room had been limited to 24 hours at a time. Id. The district courts in Milonas and
Gary H. found for the plaintiffs. The different outcome of each case on appeal turned on the remedies devised
by the district courts: Milonas, where the judge enjoined four specific practices of defendants (e.g., polygraph
examinations, isolation except when a boy was physically violent, censorship of mail) was upheld, while
Gary H., which had ordered defendants to follow very specific guidelines drawn from professional standards,
was vacated and remanded.
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The use of such harsh methods in juvenile justice facilities should not be
surprising, but it is not acceptable. While mental health authorities have at least
formally embraced the goal of providing treatment, no unifying institutional goal
governs policy and practices in the juvenile justice field.309 Confusion reigns
in juvenile justice systems as to whether the primary goal should be controlling
potentially dangerous individuals or treating children who can still be saved.
Such confusion leads to youths being shackled and hogtied in isolation cells
called "adjustment unit[s]." 310 The confusion also makes it impossible to define
and assess any meaningful legal standard of professional judgment.
Moreover, in the juvenile justice field, the medical professional's conflict
of interest between serving the institutional needs of his employer and the needs
of his patients is exacerbated by the overtly punitive characteristics of much
of the "treatment" dispensed to juveniles in state custody. Thus, only the most
attenuated "professional-client" relationship may exist between a facility
professional and ajuvenile, and commonality of interests is often lacking. Cases
involving juvenile justice issues are, for the most part, classic negative rights
cases for which the older, rights-focused approach" is most appropriate.
3. Prisons and Jails
It is difficult to imagine a relationship farther from the voluntary, private
professional-client model than the relationship between a prisoner or pretrial
detainee and prison or jail officials. Such officials are not professionals in the
sense described in Part I, the inmates are not their clients, and the relationship
between the two groups is essentially adversarial. In addition, preexisting
standards created by the Supreme Court determine the constitutionality of actions
by prison and jail officials. 312 Despite these facts, the professional judgment
standard is being applied to cases in this area.
Courts have applied the professional judgment standard to prisoners' claims
of undue bodily restraint,3 13 unsafe conditions,314 and excessive force in
shooting escaping prisoners.35 Not only has the Youngberg standard been
309. See Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment, Treatment
and the Difference It Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821, 833, 846-47 (1988); Jodi Siegel, Reforming Florida's
Juvenile Justice System: A Case Example of Bobby M. v. Chiles, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 693, 701 (1992).
310. Siegel, supra note 309, at 698 n.39.
311. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
976 (1974).
312. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 540 (1979) (holding that
deprivation of liberty of pretrial detainee must bear reasonable relationship to rational government objective);
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (holding deliberate indifference to medical needs of prisoners to be
cruel and unusual punishment in contravention of Eight Amendment).
313. Preston v. Ruggieri, Civ. A No. 86-4779, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12258, at **8-9 (E.D. Pa. Oct.
28, 1988); Wells v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1258, 1261-62 (7th Cir. 1985).
314. Zwalesky v. Manistee County, 749 F. Supp. 815, 819 (W.D. Mich. 1990); Danese v. Asman, 875
F.2d 1239, 1243 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1027 (1990).
315. Newby v. Serviss, 590 F. Supp. 591,598-99 (W.D. Mich. 1984) (applying professional judgment
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imported into challenges to the adequacy of psychiatric care in prisons and
jails,316 but it has also been applied to cases challenging medical care without
a mental health component.317 Some courts have applied Youngberg's
professional judgment standard to wrongful death actions arising from inmate
suicides.318 Some courts apply a combination of standards. 319 As in the higher
education cases, courts rarely undertake to explain the logic behind their
extension of the professional judgment standard to this very different
scenario.320
The application of the professional judgment standard to cases involving
prisoners and pretrial detainees is even more incongruous than its use in the
academic arena. The relationship between a prison or jail employee and a
prisoner or pre-trial detainee bears no resemblance to a professional-client
relationship. The individuals making the challenged decisions are often guards,
who cannot be categorized as "professionals" under any ordinary understanding
of the term.321 To the extent that prison administrators can be considered
professionals, their primary mission is prison security and efficiency rather than
the welfare of prisoners. While in the juvenilejustice arena at least some tension
exists between the model of juveniles as clients deserving treatment and the
model of juveniles as security risks, prisons and jails lack even the pretense of
a professional-client alliance. The professional judgment standard, which seeks
to balance plaintiff interests and state interests,322 becomes in the prison and
jail context a mere proxy for the latter. Conflict of interest problems lurking
standard to claim that prison supervisory personnel had duty to provide reasonably safe conditions of
confinement).
316. Langley v. Coughlin, 715 F. Supp. 522, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Capps v. Atiyeh, 559 F. Supp. 894,
916-17 (D. Or. 1983).
317. McCloud v. Delaney, 677 F. Supp. 230, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (applying combination of Eighth
Amendment and professional judgment standards to claim of inadequate medical treatment); Wilis v.
Barksdale, 625 F. Supp. 411 (W.D. Tenn. 1985) (death from heat stroke).
318. See cases cited supra note 314.
319. McCloud, 677 F. Supp. at 232. See also Lewis v. New York City Dep't of Correction, No. 87
Civ. 3640, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8845 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 1988). After holding that the Estelle standard
was the appropriate standard, the court found that the plaintiff "has not shown that this decision was 'such
a substantial departure from an accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate
that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment,"' Id. at *7 (quoting
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982)).
320. The sole case to examine the doctrinal confusion with any care, Langley v. Coughlin, 715 F. Supp.
522, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), considered the application of Youngberg to pretrial detainees' claims as the logical
result of the Supreme Court's decision in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S.
989 (1989). The court in Langley noted that since affirmative entitlements to government services were based
on "the obligation of the state to provide appropriate care for people involuntarily in its custody, we may
fairly infer that the standards by which to judge an alleged failure to provide such care should be comparable
regardless of the circumstances under which the individual is involuntarily confined." 715 F. Supp. at 539.
321. See Preston v. Ruggieri, Civ. A No. 86-4779, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12258 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 28,
1988). For a description of the typical background of guards in the Texas correctional system, which can
hardly be called professional training, see Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1288-89 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
In fact, in one case, the plaintiff prevailed precisely because he was placed in restraints by guards rather
than by a professional. Wells v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1258 (7th Cir. 1985). Most other cases applying the
professional judgment standard to actions by guards do not comment on this issue.
322. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
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in the public mental health context and exacerbated in the juvenile justice system
disappear in prison and jail cases, because no pretense of identity of interest
between prison professionals and inmates ever existed. Rather, use of the
professional judgment standard simply masks the adversarial relationship that
earlier courts understood so well.3u
Given the dissimilarities between prisons and jails and the original treatment-
oriented context of the professional judgment standard, why do courts employ
the standard in cases involving prisoners? First, in other contexts courts have
emphasized the contextuality and subjectivity of the decisions prison officials
must make:
[R]umor, reputation, and even more imponderable factors may
suffice to spark potentially disastrous incidents. The judgment of the
prison officials in this context, like that of those making parole
decisions, turns largely on "purely subjective evaluations and on
predictions of future behavior," indeed, the administrators must predict
not just one inmate's future actions, as in parole, but those of an entireinstitution. 32
Second, courts characterize prisons and jails as unfamiliar, self-contained
arenas where administrators are confronted with complex and nearly incompre-
hensible burdens on a daily basis.3z In the professional judgment cases, also,
it would appear that courts have concluded that prison decisionmaking is too
subtle for meaningful judicial inquiry.
The dangerous potential for unreflective expansion of the professional
judgment standard is evident here. Almost any decision by a state actor can be
characterized as subjective, and manifold activities can be seen as beyond judicial
expertise. Subjectivity of decisionmaking in an arena professed to be unfamiliar
to the courts has apparently sufficed to transform decisions made there into a
"professional judgment." The careless application of the professional judgment
standard to decisions by clientless nonprofessionals suggests an almost unlimited
future scope for the standard.
This expansion of judicial deference is wholly unnecessary. Even if all these
decisions were products of professional judgment, courts should still assess them
not for their professional effectiveness, but for their impact on constitutional
rights. Courts have reviewed such "professional" decisions as the assignment
of inmates to cell blocks, and have invalidated decisions that segregated inmates
323. See, e.g., Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 199 (9th Cir. 1979); Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp.
1265 (S.D. Tex. 1980); Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93, 99 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
324. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 474 (1983) (upholding informal, nonadversarial review of
administrative confinement decisions) (quoting Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458,464
(1981)).




by race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.326 Unnecessarily, the
professional judgment standard has simply become a shorthand for decision-
making by defendants in an area in which courts have little desire to intervene.
4. Foster Care
Foster care cases usually involve affirmative claims for services and thus
resemble right to treatment cases. As discussed above, the professional judgment
standard can serve as a useful guide to the level of services required.327
Unlike the application of the professional judgment standard to higher
education and prisons and jails, the expansion of the professional judgment
standard to cases involving children in the foster care system has been
accompanied by substantial analysis and discussion about whether such an
application is appropriate. The circuits are presently in conflict, with older
decisions applying Estelle v. Gamble's deliberate indifference standard32s to
assess the rights of children in foster care,32 9 and more recent decisions,
particularly since DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social
Services,330 applying the professional judgment standard. 331 A few foster
care cases mix the two standards.332
Foster care cases typically challenge the state's failure to provide adequate
services to those in its custody. The application of the professional judgment
standard is particularly appropriate in this context if decisionmakers are true
professionals making choices independent of financial or staffing
considerations.333 The relationship between a child and his or her caseworker
is or should be the individualized relationship discussed in Part I of this Article,
specifically geared toward assisting and benefiting the client and facilitated by
the professional's appropriate training. Foster care cases almost always involve
326. Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968); Battle v. Anderson, 376 F. Supp. 402, 410-11 (E.D.
Okla. 1974).
327. See supra Part II(B).
328. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) ("deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of
prisoners" violates Eight Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment).
329. Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989); Doe v.
New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 709 F.2d 782, 791-92 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864
(1983).
330. 489 U.S. 989 (1989).
331. Yvonne L. v. New Mexico Dep't of Human Servs., 959 F.2d 883 (10thCir. 1992); K.H. v. Morgan,
914 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1990); LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959 (D.D.C. 1991); Del A. v. Roemer,
777 F. Supp 1297 (E.D. La. 1991). One circuit has questioned whether foster care amounts to sufficient
state custody to create any enforceable rights under Youngberg. See Eugene D. v. Karman, 889 F.2d 701,
710 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 931 (1990).
332. See, e.g., Gibson v. Merced County Dep't of Human Resources, 799 F.2d 582, 589-90 (9th Cir.
1986) (finding that defendants did not act with deliberate indifference but citing Youngberg analysis at length).
333. This assumption is probably inaccurate for most, if not all, of the state foster care systems. See,
e.g., NATIONAL COMMhI'N ON CHILDREN, BEYOND RHETORIC: A NEw AMERICAN AGENDA FOR CHILDREN
AND FAMILIES 288 (1991); RICHARD WEXLER, WOUNDED INNOCENTS: THE REAL VICTIMs OF THE WAR
AGAINST CHILD ABUSE 230-37 (1990); LaShawn A. 762 F. Supp. at 977.
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a claim of entitlement to this professional paradigm and the quality of services
it represents.
Unfortunately, the difficulties that hinder the implementation of the
professional judgment standard in right-to-treatment cases are rampant in the
foster care cases as well. These problems include budget constraints, lack of
appropriate alternative placements, and lack of training or expertise of the so-
called "professionals," who are often social workers with little or no actual
education in the field. In addition, the courts' understanding of the professional
judgment standard in foster care cases has been almost uniformly deficient. For
example, one court indicated that use of the professional judgment standard is
appropriate in actions for injunctive relief but suggested that a deliberate
indifference standard might be more appropriate in actions to recover monetary
damages.334 This court also apparently misinterpreted the Supreme Court's
grant of immunity to professionals sued for damages in their individual capacities
when the failure to exercise professional judgment stemmed from budgetary
constraints; the court took this rule to mean that budgetary constraints might
provide relief from liability in a suit for injunctive relief.335
Another case purporting to follow the professional judgment standard held
that plaintiffs must show knowledge on the part of the state in order to meet
the standard.336 The confusion of the court regarding the mental state required
by Youngberg is obvious; the statement that a showing of knowledge is required
is followed scarcely a page later by an analysis in which the court equates the
professional judgment standard with the standard imposed for judging claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel.337 This standard-conformity to minimal
professional standards-probably does not require the showing of any particular
mental state.
338
The professional judgment standard is generally appropriate for use in foster
care cases, provided that courts ensure that the judgments in question have been
made by true professionals and have not been distorted by gross underfunding
or other budgetary constraints. However, no cases have yet been decided in
334. LaShawn A., 762 F. Supp. at 996 n.29. Youngberg was, of course, an action seeking damages.
335. Id. at 997. In an incomprehensible twist of logic, however, the court refused to accept the argument
in the case before it because it found that the defendants had not exercised professional judgment: "[T]he
Court has determined that defendants have failed to exercise professional judgment almost as egregiously
as they have failed to carry out their constitutional duties. Because of this, defendants' arguments about fiscal
constraints are unavailing." Id. (emphasis added).
336. K.H. v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 852 (7th Cir. 1990). However, the court also held that "[t]he only
right in question in this case is the right of a child in state custody not to be handed over by state officers
to a foster parent or other custodian, private or public, whom the state knows or suspects to be a child abuser."
Id. Thus, the placement of a child with a foster parent suspected by the state of being a child abuser raises
the possibility that a standard of recklessness (or even gross negligence) may be sufficient, despite the court's
earlier statement to the contrary.
337. Id. at 853.
338. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 699 (1984). There has been some suggestion
that "sheer negligence" by counsel creates a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Lankford v. Idaho,
Ill S. Ct. 1723, 1737 (1991). To the extent that negligence describes a state of mind, it is a far cry from
the knowledge or recklessness envisioned by Judge Posner in K.H-, 914 F.2d 846.
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which the meaning and appropriate application of the professional judgment
standard in the context of foster care have been addressed with the attention
and vigor found in the more persuasive mental health cases.33 9 Thus, it is
impossible to know what services it will guarantee to children.
5. Effective Assistance of Counsel in Criminal Cases
Tvo years after the Supreme Court decided Youngberg v. Romeo, it
confronted for the first time the challenge of setting standards for judging
whether a defendant had received effective assistance of counsel.34° As in other
rights-to-services cases, the standards of the profession here provide a useful
determinant of the quality of aid to which the claimant is entitled.
Although the Court stopped short of adopting the professional judgment
standard, the analysis and rhetoric of these cases are almost identical to those
articulated in Youngberg. The Court admonished that:
Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court
must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance .... A convicted
defendant making a claim of ineffective assistance must identify the
acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result
of reasonable professional judgment. The court must then determine
whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omis-
sions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assis-
tance.... [T]he court should recognize that counsel is strongly
presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant
decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.34'
The Court has also stated explicitly that the standard for ineffective assistance
of counsel remains constant, regardless of whether counsel is retained by the
accused or appointed by the State.
42
The professional judgment standard is appropriate in ineffective assistance
of counsel cases according to the analysis of Part II, since it applies only when
the plaintiff makes an affirmative constitutional claim for services.343 Where
a client claims that the lawyer failed to render legal services of adequate quality,
339. Among these mental health cases are Shaw v. Strackhouse, 920 F.2d 1135 (3d Cir. 1990); Jackson
v. Fort Stanton State Hosp. & Training Sch., 757 F. Supp. 1243 (D.N.M. 1990), rev'd in part, 964 F.2d
980 (10th Cir. 1992); Thomas S. v. Morrow, 601 F. Supp. 1055 (W.D.N.C. 1984), aff'dinpartand modified
in part, 781 F.2d 367 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1124 (1986), and cert. denied, 479 U.S. 869 (1986).
340. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668; United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
341. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90.
342. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335,344 (1980). The Court stated, "We may assume with confidence
that most counsel, whether retained or appointed, will protect the rights of an accused." If anything, the
Court here was concerned about the inadequacy of retained counsel. Id.
343. See supra text accompanying notes 137-147.
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the professional judgment standard is a useful tool for setting the required quality
level.
B. Expansion to Systemic and Policy Decisions
The professional judgment standard began by diverting judicial attention
from the plaintiff's claim and reframing it as an inquiry into the professional's
decisionmaking process. As described above, as use of the standard expanded,
it lost its grounding in the professional's relationship with and obligation to the
client, and came to be applied generally to decisions marked by subjectivity
and discretion. Simultaneously, courts grew lax in their requirement that the
decisionmaker be a true professional, and that decisionmaking be individualized.
These developments culminated in the standard's recent application to cases
involving policy decisions that affect large groups of people and have no
individualized basis. These cases involve challenges to state budget-cutting
practices and to the operation of entire social service programs such as foster
care systems.3
The attack on budget cuts has drawn life from a variety of legal arguments:
that such cuts preclude the exercise of professional judgment on behalf of those
entitled to it; that they lead to deterioration of the plaintiff's abilities or
condition;345 that cuts affecting only specific groups receiving government
services violate the Equal Protection Clause;346 and that professional judgment
was not exercised in making the cuts themselves.
Litigation challenging budget cuts arises in large part from a misreading
of Youngberg to suggest that those responsible for the inadequacy of resources
and the resulting inability to exercise professional judgment should be liable
344. See, e.g., LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959 (D.D.C. 1991).
345. Many clients deteriorate in institutional settings. They lose the ability to perform simple everyday
tasks. Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and O'Connor suggested in a concurring opinion in Youngberg that there
may exist a due process right to receive the training necessary to prevent the loss of self-care skills a client
possessed upon entering an institution, 457 U.S. 307, 327 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring). Several courts
that have considered the question have adopted Justice Blackmun's analysis by holding that such a right
exists, or have suggested at least that they would adopt such a standard were the issue properly raised. See
P.C. v. McLaughlin, 913 F.2d 1033, 1042 (2d Cir. 1990); Clark v. Cohen, 794 F.2d 79, 95-96 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 962 (1986); Society for Good Will to Retarded Children Inc. v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d
1239, 1250 (2d Cir. 1984); McNamara v. Dukakis, No. 90-1261 I-Z, 1990 WL 235439, at *3 (D. Mass. Dec.
27, 1990); Jackson v. Fort Stanton Hosp. & Training Sch., 757 F. Supp. 1243, 1309 (D.N.M. 1990), rev'd
in part, 964 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1992); K.H. v. Morgan, No. 87-C-9833, 1989 U.S. Dist LEXIS 10516, at
*25 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 6, 1989), aff'd in part, 914 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1990); Thomas S. v. Flaherty, 699 F.
Supp. 1178, 1201 (W.D.N.C. 1988), aftd, 902 F.2d 250 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 373 (1990); Doe
v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 670 F. Supp. 1145, 1172-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (applying standard
to foster care); Association for Retarded Citizens v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473, 487 (D.N.D. 1982), affd in
part, 713 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1983).
346. Philadelphia Police & Fire Ass'n for Handicapped Children v. City of Phila., 699 F. Supp. 1106,
I111 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (holding that cuts only in programs for clients who live at home unconstitutionally
discriminate between those clients and others who live in community residence facilities).
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either for damages or injunctive relief.347 In fact, the Supreme Court merely
held that treating professionals were immune from damage judgments if their
failure to exercise professional responsibility was based on budgetary
constraints 4'
In Philadelphia Police & Fire Ass'n for Handicapped Children v. City of
Philadelphia,349 the first case challenging budget cuts, the district court found
that Youngberg protected the interests of mentally retarded individuals living
at home in continuing to receive services from the defendants because the loss
of such services would cause them to regress, thereby jeopardizing their health
and safety. The court found that the budget cuts did not constitute an exercise
of the defendant's professional judgment since the cuts were based on
"administrative" or "fiscal" considerations rather than on consideration of the
class members' individual needs.5
The Third Circuit reversed,351 finding itself constrained by the "broad,
harsh decision"3 52 in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social
Services,353 which had been decided while the case was on appeal. The
appellate court held that mentally retarded people living at home had no
affirmative constitutional right to services, and since no liberty interest was
implicated, no remedy was available. Therefore, the court neither rejected nor
accepted the district court's application of the professional judgment standard
to budget cutting.
Since Philadelphia Police, a federal court in financially beleaguered
Massachusetts has considered constitutional challenges to budget cuts affecting
institutionalized individuals.3- The court held state administrators to the
professional judgment standard in cutting the budget for mental health
services355 and cited the "interaction between the top levels of [the Department
347. This theory was suggested by Judge Posner in K.H. v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 854 (7th Cir. 1990)
(citations omitted) ("The officials responsible for the inadequacy of those resources might be liable in damages,
provided they were sued in their personal rather than official capacities .... and there might of course be
broader liability in an injunctive suit against those officials."). See also McNamara v. Dukakis, Civ. A. No.
90-1261 i-Z, 1990 WL 235439, at *6 (D. Mass. Dec. 27, 1990). Judge Posner's statement in K.H. regarding
monetary relief against officials responsible for inadequate resources appears to be based on a misreading
of Youngberg. While limiting the circumstances under which damages can be collected for departure from
professional judgment, Youngberg appears to indicate that injunctive relief will always be available if the
departure from professional judgment is proven. In the case of individual plaintiffs, there should be no need
to sue the individuals responsible for the lack of funding, since plaintiffs will obtain injunctive relief simply
from the liability of the treating professional. See Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 836-37 (11th Cir. 1990).
348. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982).
349. 699 F. Supp. 1106 (1988), rev'd, 874 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1989).
350. Id. at 1117-18.
351. Philadelphia Police and Fire Ass'n v. City of Phila. 874 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1989).
352. Id. at 166.
353. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
354. McNamara v. Dukakis, Civ. A. No. 90-12611-Z, 1990 WL 235439 (D. Mass. Dec. 27, 1990).
355. Id. at *6 ("Youngberg suggests that the professional to which the court should look in determining
the adequacy of treatment depends on the 'particular decision at issue.'... Accordingly, decisions about
distribution of scarce resources in the mental health context should also be made by 'person[s] competent,
whether by education, training or experience,' such as 'administrators,' with the appropriate background."
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of Mental Health] and local program administrators and staff, including
individuals with clinical background at every level" as evidence that an agency
exercised professional judgment in implementing budget cuts.
35 6
It is becoming increasingly common for the professional judgment standard
to be applied to decisions made not by an individual professional, but rather
by a collective body charged with policymaking, such as a state agency. In
LaShawn A. v. Dixon, for example, the court held that "the Constitution places
a duty upon state agencies to exercise professional judgment when carrying out
their responsibilities. 35 7 In Winston v. Children & Youth Services, the court
upheld a county foster care agency's visitation policy in part because "the agency
exercised discretion in establishing a visitation policy comporting with
professional standards.,
358
The processes of systemic policymaking and of running a county or state
agency are the antithesis of the model of professional judgment, in which
individualized and contextualized decisionmaking advances the interest or health
of a specific client. As in the prison and jail cases, the professional judgment
standard has, in the claims against social service systems, lost all vestiges of
a professional-client relationship. Furthermore, most social and foster services
cases do not even consist of discernible relationships between identifiable
individuals. Instead, they involve two amorphous groups: the service agency
and the community of its clients.
C. Expansion to Interpretation of Statutory Claims and Consent Decrees
Not only is the professional judgment standard, due to its vagueness, now
being applied to areas where legal rules have not been clearly set, but it is also
being applied in areas previously the domain of settled legal doctrine. Having
evolved into a doctrine applicable wherever challenged state action involves
complex decisionmaking, regardless of whether a professional-client relationship
exists, the professional judgment standard is now used to resolve even statutory
claims for which extensive precedent using other modes of analysis exists, such
as claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196409 and the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.360
For example, courts have begun to incorporate the professional judgment
standard in cases charging discrimination on the basis of handicap under Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act.36' This provision was designed to extend to
(citations omitted) (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323-25 (1982))).
356. Id.
357. 762 F. Supp. 959, 994-95 (D.D.C. 1991).
358. 948 F.2d 1380, 1390 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2303 (1992).
359. Pub. L. No. 88-352,78 Stat. 241,253-266 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2000e17 (1988)).
360. Pub. L. No. 93-112,87 Stat. 355 (1973) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
361. Id. at § 504, 87 Stat. at 394 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988)).
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handicapped persons362 the protection against discrimination on the basis of
race, sex or national origin provided by Title VII.363 Section 504 requires that
a federally funded educational program provide "reasonable accommodation"
to a person's disabilities in order for handicapped people to have equal access
to its benefits.3" Recently, the First Circuit announced that in handicap
discrimination actions brought against universities under Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, the determination of whether the university reasonably
accommodated the plaintiff's handicap should be made by "evaluat[ing] whether
[the] facts add up to a professional, academic judgment that reasonable
accommodation is simply not available., 365 The question of what constitutes
reasonable accommodation does not fall within the particular expertise or
professional background of academics but is, in fact a legal question;
nevertheless, the use of the professional judgment standard grants deference to
university decisions in matters pertaining to reasonable accommodation of their
handicapped students so long as the school documents that its officials have
weighed the alternatives.
The professional judgment standard has similarly been used to defend policy
decisions challenged under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. In St. Louis
Developmental Disabilities Treatment Center Parents Ass'n v. Mallory,366 the
court applied the standard where severely handicapped children claimed they
were automatically segregated from the public school system and sent to separate
schools for the handicapped in violation of the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act,367 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,368 and the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Constitution. The plaintiffs
argued that school assignments were based simply on the label "severely
362. The provision prohibits any program receiving federal funds from discriminating against a person
otherwise qualified to participate in the program on the basis of that person's handicap. In deciding whether
the individual is otherwise qualified to participate in the program, the court must determine whether reasonable
accommodations to the handicap would enable the plaintiff to participate in the program. Id.
363. Pub. L No. 88-352,78 Stat. 241,253-266 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2000e17 (1988)).
364. 29 U.S.C. § 794a (1988). See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979)
(finding that reasonable accommodation did not require substantial change in programs to accommodate
hearing-impaired applicant).
365. Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Medicine, 932 F.2d 19, 27-28 (1st Cir. 1991) (en banc). While the
court did not adopt wholesale the "substantial departure from accepted academic norms" language ofEwing,
rightly recognizing that accommodation "may involve new approaches or devices quite beyond 'accepted
academic norms,"' id. at 26 (quoting Southeastern Community College, 442 U.S. at 412), it did retain the
professional judgment language, as quoted above. The court established a somewhat more fact-based standard:
If... relevant officials within the institution considered alternative means, their feasibility, cost
and effect on the academic program, and came to a rationally justifiable conclusion that the
available alternatives would result either in lowering academic standards or requiring substantial
program alteration, the court could rule as a matter of law that the institution had met its duty
of seeking reasonable accommodation.
Id.
366. 591 F. Supp. 1416 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aft'd, 767 F2d 518 (8th Cir. 1985).
367. 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (Supp. 1990).
368. Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355,394 (1973) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988)).
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handicapped" rather than on any individualized assessment of the benefits of
integrating the child into a regular public school.
369
The district court applied the professional judgment standard to resolve the
Due Process and Section 504 claims, noting that "there is an ongoing debate
on the proper educational placement for the profoundly handicapped. The Court's
function, however, is not to decide the debate nor interfere with the decision
of Missouri's educators unless they have substantially departed from 'acceptable
professional judgment, practice or standards.'
370
Claims of segregation, however, transcend "professional judgment" about
educational matters. In the 1950's and 1960's, there was an ongoing debate about
whether racial integration in the schools was educationally appropriate,37' and
indeed that debate continues to this day.372 Had decisions regarding racial
integration been framed as decisions involving the professional judgment of
educators, our schools would look very different today. An expert's judgment
according to the standards of his profession (whatever they might be) does not
justify discrimination, whether on the basis of race or handicap.
Other cases, while not explicitly adopting the professional judgment standard,
have used its language and logic in troubling ways. Citing professional judgment
language, courts have accepted defendants' interpretations of consent decrees.
37 3
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit has deferred to the professional judgment of the
director of a prison in a Title VII case to determine whether the exclusion of
men from certain jobs in a prison setting was justified.374
In several recent foster care cases, 375 courts have applied the professional
judgment standard in interpreting the requirements of the Adoption Assistance
and Child Welfare ACt. 3 76 In one case, the court held that the "[p]laintiffs ha[d]
369. St. Louis Developmental Disabilities, 591 F. Supp. at 1440.
370. Id. at 1466 (quoting Monahan v. Nebraska, 687 F.2d 1164, 1171 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
460 U.S. 1012 (1983)).
371. See William F. Anderson, Jr., Instructional Problems of Integration, 37 PHi DELTA KAPPAN 353
(1956); Nick A. Ford, A Teacher Looks at Integration, 15 PHYLON 261 (1954); Gerald S. Lesseret al., Some
Effects of Segregation and Desegregation in the Schools, in INTEGRATED EDUCATION 267 (Meyer Weinberg
ed., 1968); Clyde V. Martin et al., Segregation vs. Desegregation, 41 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 319 (1960).
372. See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in
School Desegregation Litigation, in THE STRUCTURE OF PROCEDURE 271 (Robert M. Cover & Owen M.
Fiss eds., 1979).
373. See United States v. Massachusetts, 890 F.2d 507,510 (Ist Cir. 1989) (upholding plan to improve
conditions at state hospital for mentally ill despite its variance with original decrees); New York Ass'n for
Retarded Children v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956, 971-72 (2d Cir. 1983) (upholding modification of consent decree
subject to professional judgment standard), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 915 (1983).
374. Torres v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health and Social Servs., 859 F.2d 1523, 1531-32 (7th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1017 (1989), and cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1082 (1989).
375. See, e.g., Del A. v. Roemer, 777 F. Supp. 1297, 1311 (E.D. La. 1991) (holding that the Adoption
Assistance and Child Welfare Act, 42 U.S.C. § 671 (1988), did not create private right of action, and that
even if it did, defendants' actions would not violate Act); Winston v. Children and Youth Servs., 948 F.2d
1380,1390 (3d Cir. 1991) (deferring to professional judgment of government agency employees in establishing
visitation policy), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2303 (1992).
376. 42 U.S.C. § 671 (1988). It should be noted that the Supreme Court recently held that the Act does
not create certain private rights of action, Suter v. Artist M., 112 S. CL 1360 (1992), raising the possibility
that the type of case represented by Del A. and Winston, see supra note 375, will no longer be brought.
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not proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the decision to allow [a
child] to remain in [an abusive] foster home.., did not involve an exercise
of minimally acceptable professional judgment."377 In another case, the court
upheld a visitation policy allowing one hour of biweekly visitation between
children in foster care and their parents against a challenge that such decisions
should be made on an individualized basis, because the policy had been
developed on an individualized basis.378
Whether or not the requirements of these statutes were violated, the
application of professional judgment analysis in these cases is disturbing for
a variety of reasons. Although the standard may be appropriate for constitutional
challenges to the treatment of children in foster care, it is not relevant to claimed
violations of rights created by federal statute. The professional judgment standard
was created by Chief Judge Seitz and adopted by the Supreme Court as a
constitutional framework for balancing an individual's rights and the state's
interests. Rights created by federal statutes, such as the Rehabilitation Act, Title
VII, and the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, should not be subject
to the same balancing. Statutes explicitly define rights that are not subject to
intervening professional interpretation and redefinition prior to judicial
enforcement. When Congress intends courts to defer to professional judgment,
it has not hesitated to say SO.379 The courts' importation of a constitutional
standard originally intended as a guide to adjudicating substantive Due Process
rights into statutory determinations shows the threat that this amorphous standard
poses not only to individual constitutional rights but to statutory rights as well.
IV. CONCLUSION
The problem with defining a professional as "a person competent, whether
by education, training or experience, to make the particular decision at issue"38
is that this definition transforms the court's understanding of both "the decision
at issue" and who should properly be making it. Thus courts recast questions
of law as questions of fact, which, in turn, will necessarily be regarded as the
province of "professionals" to whom the court should defer. The decision
properly at issue in Youngberg v. Romeo, for example, was not the clinical one
of whether Romeo should have been restrained, but the constitutional one of
whether the imposed physical restraints, regardless of clinical efficacy or
indication, violated his constitutional rights. The clinical decision is one that
However, the cases still exemplify courts' readiness to defer to professionals on statutory questions.
377. DelA., 777 F. Supp. at 1313.
378. Winston, 948 F.2d at 1391-92.
379. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 404, 89th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1, at 46-47 (1965), reprinted in 1965
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943, 1986 (on role of physician in determining appropriate treatment under certain federal
health insurance programs).
380. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 n.30 (1982).
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professionals, unconstrained by budgetary problems and conflicts of interest,
would presumably be qualified to make. The legal decision is one that judges
are not only qualified but also required to make in order to preserve liberties
guaranteed by the Constitution. While judges may need to inquire into the
clinical or professional rationale underlying the decision to restrain in order to
make a decision regarding constitutionality, that rationale should not form the
substance of the constitutional standard.
An evaluation of the restraints' propriety in terms of clinical standards may
be relevant to the relationship between government purposes and the means used
to achieve those purposes. Clinical standards cannot and should not, however,
be transmuted into constitutional values, and satisfying them cannot be equated
with fulfilling constitutional norms. As Justice Blackmun noted in a case
challenging prison regulations, "I am concerned about the Court's apparent
willingness to substitute the rhetoric of judicial deference for meaningful scrutiny
of constitutional claims .... The fact that particular measures advance prison
security... does not make them ipso facto constitutional., 381 Freedom from
bodily restraint, like freedom from governmental intervention in general, may
not be in the best interests of the individual, especially in the judgment of others.
The exercise of free speech may also be counter-therapeutic.
Indeed, many great Supreme Court decisions have transcended some
professional's judgment in order to vindicate an individual's constitutional rights.
West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,3 82 Brown v. Board of
Education,3 3 and Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District,3 4 would have been decided otherwise by panels of professional
educators in West Virginia, Kansas, and Iowa-indeed, these cases were before
the Court precisely because professionals had decided otherwise. The same can
be said of O'Connor v. Donaldson,385 Wisconsin v. Yoder,386 and any of
a number of other cases in which the Court consulted the Constitution rather
than the judgment of professionals.
Furthermore, historical decisions widely regarded as shameful are replete
with language of deference to professional judgment. Korematsu v. United
States s upheld the internment of Japanese Americans in deference to military
authorities.388 Prior to Barnette, in Minersville School District v. Gobitis,8 9
381. Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 593-94 (1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
382. 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding that requiring flag salute by public school children whose religion
forbade it violates First Amendment).
383. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (forbidding racial segregation of public school children).
384. 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (upholding students' rights to wear black armbands in protest).
385. 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (nondangerous person capable of surviving alone or with willing help of
others may not be involuntarily confined).
386. 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (granting Amish parents religion-based right to teach children at home, despite
state's mandatory public school laws).
387. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
388. Id. at 218 ("[W]e cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of the military authorities.").
389. 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
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the Supreme Court had justified forcing children to salute the flag against their
religious convictions by declaring that "the courtroom is not the arena for
debating issues of educational policy."390 Today, Goldman v. Weinberger3 9t
and United States v. Stanley392 follow in that tradition, and they, too, are filled
with the language of deference to professionals.
393
The claim of an individual seeking relief from government intrusion on her
rights is not answered by the assurance that the state action arose from a
professional judgment. For institutionalized people and other unwilling clients,
this assurance amounts to no more than a constitutional right to have professional
judgment exercised on their behalf in exchange for all their other rights. Rights
to privacy, free speech, freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, and Due
Process are extinguished at the will of professionals exercising their judgments
in the name of appropriate treatment.
In cases in which the constitutional claim is that the plaintiff was entitled
to professional judgment and did not receive it, such as claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel, claims for treatment, or claims for services in foster care,
the professional judgment standard is an appropriate benchmark. But when the
plaintiff seeks refuge in the courts to protect her autonomy from intrusions by
state professionals-to protect the manifold idiosyncracies and acts of courage
that the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment shield from the
professional ministrations of the majoritarian state-then the professional
judgment standard is akin to a white flag raised by the Court, surrendering those
who sought judicial asylum to the tender mercies of professionals whose
mandates do not include sensitivity to constitutional rights.
390. Id. at 598 (1940).
391. 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (upholding Air Force prohibition of wearing yarmulkes required by officer's
religion).
392. 483 U.S. 669, 681 (1987) (denying federal remedy for serviceman secretly given LSD because
"the injury arises out of activity 'incident to service'").
393. See Goldman, 475 U.S. at 507 ("In the context of the present case, when evaluating whether military
needs justify a particular restriction on religiously motivated conduct, courts must give great deference to
the professional judgment of military authorities concerning the relative importance of a particular military
interest."); Stanley, 483 U.S. at 682-83 ("A test for liability that depends on the extent to which particular
suits would call into question military discipline and decisionmaking would itself require judicial inquiry
into, and hence intrusion upon, military matters.... Even putting aside the risk of erroneous judicial
conclusions (which would becloud military decisionmaking), the mere process of arriving at correct
conclusions would disrupt the military regime.").
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